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THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

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Escape to the Present
Men Behind the War

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

JOHANNES STEEL

NEW YORK: HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

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THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

1. Prefatory

THESE estimates of the future of Europe are offered with diffidence. Whatever is contained in this book is the fruit of insatiable curiosity; if at times it appears dogmatic, nothing has actually been further from its author's intention. But emphasis and a positive approach to the subject are vitally necessary today. As for the explanatory backgrounds included in most of these chapters, my purpose in including them arises from the belief that only by understanding the facts of the past will we be able to draw conclusions about the future.

Some of the conclusions arrived at are, of course, arbitrary; a thousand and one people may—and probably will—disagree with me. I have tried to write this book from the American point of view, though doing so may seem suspiciously difficult or perhaps even impossible for one who was born in Europe and has lived half his life against a cosmopolitan, rather than an American, background. Nevertheless, I hope that my experience in the United States, acquired with intensity and enthusiasm, added to a Continental and even a world background, may result in a detachment of which neither a conventional European nor a born American might be capable.

To my mind, the greatest difficulty in thinking about the European world of tomorrow is to achieve perspective. As a rule, Europeans see the rest of the world only in relation to Europe, which they consider the fountainhead of Western civilization. Thus their sense of proportion is inevitably affected. I think if this war has taught the world and most particularly us in the United States one thing, it is the purely relative importance of the European continent.

The Pacific is today as great a reality to Americans as Europe. We are beginning to see that as a cultural, political, and economic entity, Europe has lost at least some of its overwhelming significance in relation to the rest of the world. New political and economic forces have

emerged in the Western Hemisphere, the Far East, and very importantly in Russia, which is partially *in* Europe but certainly not *of* Europe.

Undoubtedly, the emphasis in world historical trends is shifting away from the old "Continent," which is geographically a peninsula of the Asiatic land mass anyway. The industrialization and modernization of Russia, the slow but perceptible advance of the masses in the South American continent, the emergence of the Chinese people as a future great nation, and the general development of a Pacific civilization (partly under the aegis of a benevolent American imperialism)—all these are responsible for the change.

It is always difficult to take a long point of view when the writing of it must be done from some immediate perspective. In attempting to do so in these chapters, I have, of course, written from my own set of premises. As far as the long view is concerned, my belief is that the dominant factor in world affairs has for several decades been generally considered to be the question of markets and raw materials, and that this view has received too much emphasis. It remains even today the chief preoccupation of many politicians and economists, in spite of the fact that much has happened during the last few years to change the whole concept of economics and world politics.

The fact is that we are now living at the beginning of a new industrial and scientific epoch. In the past few years, we have developed the basis of a technology which is bound to have an even greater impact upon world economy than the earlier advent of hydraulics, steam, or electricity. Magazines and newspapers have recently been carrying accounts of a vast number of new products and new techniques. Many of us anticipate these new developments without considering their power to mold history. They are going to be more important to the future, not alone of Europe but of the world, than most of us realize. At the same time, raw materials, as they become simpler and more basic, will by that very token be more universally available, and the struggle for control of them that much the less obsessing.

The future of modern plastics illustrates this point. Within a few years after the end of the present conflict a number of textiles that are manufactured today from cotton, silk, wool, and linen will almost surely be replaced by materials made from plastic threads which will wear better and be both more beautiful and less expensive. A single raw material, cellulose, here replaces a variety of agricultural products. Automobile bodies and even certain parts of motors will probably be

made of plastics. Railroad cars and airplanes will be manufactured wholly or partly from plastic materials as strong as steel or any other metal and produced more easily and at a much lower cost. The impact of this development on coal-mining and the steel industry cannot easily be imagined yet, but it will be revolutionary.

Glass, too, will perhaps be superseded in most cases by transparent or translucent plastics such as are already beginning to be used in the optical industry. They will also be used in building, and to replace plate glass in cars and airplanes. And the production of steel and tin will be further affected when the container industry changes over to plastics. Prefabricated houses and furniture will be made of plastics, with a consequent enormous impact upon the housing industry and the building trades.

Even in the field of metals themselves there have been countless new developments. Perhaps the most interesting is the new use of magnesium, a very light metal providing extremely strong alloys. The source of magnesium is cheap and inexhaustible; it can be refined from sea water, a material resource of most countries. Eventually it will replace steel, aluminum, and copper in many industries.

All this means that raw materials will inevitably become steadily less important, with consequences upon the international raw-materials situation which are self-evident. Many of the new techniques, for instance, may well mean economic hardship for such raw-materials producing areas as the Dutch East Indies; but they also mean that areas poor in material resources, heavy metals, and fuels will be less handicapped. This factor may have very important consequences for the future of China and India in particular.

Also and inevitably, the future of Europe will remain bound up with the future of the world, and perhaps to a greater extent than ever before. At the same time, as the rest of the world catches up in a material way with the West, Europe will no longer remain either the financial clearinghouse or the manufacturing center of the world.

In every technological area of man's life the outlook is almost equally studded with immediate and fateful changes. New developments in the field of electronics, which even today are most sensational and spectacular, should give us within a few years from now the miracle of transmission of light to our homes and factories without wire. Once again, the consequences for the copper industry are self-evident. Electronics will also make possible heating systems for our homes based on high-tension short waves—eliminating the use of metallic radiators and pipes.

In agriculture, it seems more than likely that entirely new systems of farming will be developed as the result of new chemical and radioactive fertilizers which will assure much larger crops using less labor and fewer materials. Simultaneously the development of scientific systems of nutrition, vitamins, and hormones will change profoundly our agricultural requirements.

But more important than all the other imminent technical and scientific advances will be the acquisition of the stupendous energy released by the disintegration of the atom. This development, which appears to be not far off, will create new and unlimited sources of power, make unnecessary any future massive hydroelectric developments, and bring about a great revolution in the technique of supplying power and light. It would seem a fair conjecture that it will also greatly reduce the importance of gasoline, fuel oil, and coal as basic commodities.

Such developments as these, and literally thousands of others, are not dreams or hopes—they are already largely tested and proved by research and many of them can be put into practice on a large scale as soon as hostilities cease. The result will be that all our traditional ideas about markets and the distribution of raw materials will have to undergo a basic change. No nation will find it worth while to establish a sphere of influence over some small country which has oil if energy normally produced by oil can be replaced by energy which can be produced within its own borders.

Countries whose political and economic importance was in the past based upon the possession of such raw materials as oil, iron, cotton, or coal will lose influence and significance in the new world economy. It is easy to see how this would affect the future economy and finances of Holland, whose East Indian imperial possessions were valuable to no small extent because of the production of a single commodity which is already obsolescent—rubber. The consequences of the use of synthetic rubber in the postwar years will exercise a profound influence, not only upon the economy of Holland, but on the economy of Europe generally as well as upon the rest of the world.

With such changes in prospect, there is going to be chaos if there is no adequate planning to cushion the shocks they will inevitably cause. It will not be easy to plan on a sufficiently wide scale. Unless a world plan for the distribution and production of raw materials is formulated very promptly, we may well live through the strangest of historical paradoxes: bloody revolutions and interminable civil war throughout

a world on the threshold of an age of abundance. The politicians and economists who write the peace of tomorrow will have to learn to think in these new terms if they are not to repeat the blunders of the past.

These sweeping observations may possibly seem to be true only from the long point of view; they may not appear to affect the immediate problems of the peace. Yet it would be an invitation to disaster to attempt any postwar solution which is couched in purely economic terms and which applies to the problems of the future the economic pattern that existed before the war broke out.

If we make such a mistake, we are in danger of repeating the great economic blunders which were made following the First World War and which, to no small proportion, were contributing causes of the Second World War. I am not referring to the obvious and not-so-far-reaching errors in the financial provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Personally, I think the Versailles Treaty was one of the more intelligent international documents drawn up by man. (Most of the people who rail against it have never read it.) The problem was then, and is today, more fundamental and far-reaching than the relatively simple matter of reparations, the division of markets, or the drawing of territorial boundaries to the satisfaction of minute political entities which may have no further economic or political *raison d'être* in the world of tomorrow. The great trouble at the end of the last war was that the men who were in charge of reconstructing the economic world were thinking in terms which applied to the situation in 1910 rather than in 1920. Are we in danger of using the terms and data of 1925-1935 to build the world of 1955? The record of the immediate past suggests that we are.

The First World War brought a number of technological advances and scientific inventions which shortly afterward were put at the service of industry and commerce. For instance, the arrival of the air age was undoubtedly accelerated by the intensified research of the war years of 1914-1918. These advances brought about many changes which profoundly affected the structure of world economy. It is not possible to recapitulate here the great industrial advances, based on the technological experience of the First World War, which were made in the postwar years. They were destined to leave no field of commerce or industry, and no corner of daily life, untouched. The economists of 1920, however, failed entirely to perceive the impact that those developments were to have upon world economy in the next two decades.

It was a mistake we cannot afford to repeat. New political forms will have to be developed to fit the economic realities of tomorrow. If that is not immediately possible, at least dynamic political solutions will have to be found, within the framework of which profound changes are possible. There is, indeed, some likelihood that certain historical processes which have already commenced can be broadened and enlarged to contribute to these solutions. The past three years have been remarkable for a process of polarization by the smaller nations of Europe around the greater powers. This is a solution which politically and militarily will give a good deal of security to the small nations and which, economically, should provide large and relatively stable units within the boundaries of which a certain equilibrium and balance between agriculture and industry can be achieved.

Russia underlined the importance of this trend when, on February 1, 1944, the Kremlin granted autonomy to the constituent Soviet republics. That step made a deep impression on the peoples of Poland, Hungary, and Romania in particular, and the peoples of Europe in general. It immediately accelerated the process of polarization around Russia by providing machinery for the closest possible relations between such sections of the Soviet Union as the White Russian and Ukrainian republics on the one hand, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria on the other. It held the same potentiality for the Baltic republics in their relations with the Scandinavian nations.

Some European nations reacted unfavorably to the new Soviet blueprint, but all were impressed by the unusual fact that the world was confronted by a tangible act of policy. This act of policy helped the rest of Europe to make a choice of the direction in which its members wanted to go in their increasing polarization around Russia and England.

In this sense, the changes in the Soviet constitution were the counterpart of Premier Jan Christian Smuts' invitation to the smaller democracies of Western Europe to band themselves with Britain to pursue jointly with her a policy that will benefit all of them.

This process of polarization may well constitute a historically natural and simple means of achieving stability, equilibrium, and lasting peace. There is nothing in the idea of a group of smaller powers clustered about one larger power which automatically prejudices the political independence and cultural autonomy of the smaller nations. If it is conceivable, for instance, that Holland, Belgium, and France would not prejudice their existence as individual states by joining a

close co-operative with Britain as the largest member, it is equally conceivable that such nations as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria would also not prejudice their individual nationhood by joining a co-operative led by Russia.

The creation of two great Federal Unions, one directed from Moscow and the other directed from London, may provide the means by which to make sure that the world will not again be faced by German aggression twenty years hence. Beyond this, it is pertinent to observe that the Soviet Union now stands fully revealed as a dynamic state which is in the constant process of constitutional evolution, rather than the fixed, rigidly molded political entity so many people thought it was. In this aspect, Russia constitutes a living antithesis to fascism, which, of course, was nothing more than the efficient organization of economic and political decay into a static pattern which had no chance to develop into anything except war. Soviet policy today is a practical step toward realizing the concept of regionalism. Naturally, to succeed, it must prove itself to be a true regionalism, and not merely a formation of blocs imposed by outside pressure and pitted one against the other.

There are other nations, particularly the smaller ones, which may express a spontaneous desire to group themselves in a regional system of co-operation. Thus, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy (which are not treated specifically in this volume) could certainly do worse, from an economic as well as a political point of view, than to begin thinking along the lines suggested by Marshal Smuts on November 5, 1943.

As far as the final fate of these three nations is concerned, there is no reason, as Marshal Smuts has pointed out, why the British Commonwealth should be exclusively extra-European. Smuts even suggests that Britain should work intimately with the smaller democracies of Western Europe, which by themselves may hereafter be lost again, as they are lost today. In the world of modern total war, there is no such thing as absolute neutrality and there must inevitably be some modifications, at least, of what Salvemini has called "the sacred cow of national sovereignty." Why should not a group of nations voluntarily limit the principle of national sovereignty to the extent of associating themselves with the foreign policy of London, while another group of nations associates itself with the policy of Moscow—both policies being ultimately subject to a higher international authority and morality?

Whether this is mere wishful thinking or not, no European nation must be allowed in the future to make legislative decisions which will affect adversely the political destiny and economic fate of a neighbor-

ing nation without first submitting such a decision to international arbitration, and without making an initial appeal to the regional authority so that the interests of the immediate neighbor may be taken care of. Europe would then, in effect, be divided into two major economic and political units, one directed from London, and the other directed from Moscow. Each of these units would be able to protect the interests of its constituent members within the framework of a general world organization. However the situation may finally work itself out, it is certainly interesting to observe that two men of such different background, experience, and character as Smuts and Stalin should be thinking along the same lines.

Before anything of this sort can be achieved, however, a number of problems affecting the nations of Europe in general, and the future of Germany in particular, will have to be met. In trying to outline these problems I have made an attempt to analyze their natures and origins. It seems to me that only if we understand the items which make up the sum of the Polish problem, for instance, can we arrive at a solution for it. The reader will discover that these items have been treated (as far as my own limitations and those of a brief book permit) with reference to ethnography as well as politics, sociology as well as economics, diplomacy as well as Poland's relation to her neighbors on the east and on the west. The same method has been applied to the analysis of the Baltic and Finnish problem, to the problems of the Balkans and of France.

In the chapters on these countries which follow, I have obviously not assembled all the existing facts about each country and problem. Rather, I have made perhaps arbitrary choices—selecting what I subjectively believe to be the most pertinent facts and those which, in my opinion, should be taken into particular consideration in any reconstruction of Europe.

Not all the enemies of peace are openly fighting us today. It is, for instance, axiomatic that democracy must be restored in Spain and the ugliness of Franco's brand of fascism must be removed if there is to be permanent peace in Europe. Indeed, the United States has a special interest in helping the people of Spain to abolish the Franco regime. The danger of fascism in South America will remain as long as we continue our policy of nonintervention and our tacit support of Spanish fascism.

In the end, the solution to the entire problem of South American fascism lies not in Buenos Aires, or La Paz or Mexico City, but in

Madrid, the fountainhead of its inspiration. America can only gain by the re-establishment of democracy in Spain and, in fact, throughout all Europe. A policy directed toward reconstituting what the diplomats call the status quo ante bellum will lead only to European civil war.

Justifying any attempt to put Humpty Dumpty back on his wall again on the grounds of expediency will prove at best shortsighted, a waste of time and effort. Experience in Italy has shown that there is an important lesson to be learned from the different results obtained by American military operations during the winter of 1943-1944 in the Pacific and by Allied operations in Italy during roughly the same period of time.

The American naval offensive in the Central Pacific was a magnificent achievement which, in every sense of the word, was unprecedented. It was an operation in which the American Navy and Naval Air Forces demonstrated the highest technical skill in executing what history will show to have been one of the boldest strategic conceptions in naval warfare or, for that matter, in any kind of warfare. One of the dominant characteristics of this Pacific offensive has been the simple fact that it was in no way hampered, retarded, or embarrassed by such political considerations as prevailed in Italy. In the Pacific we fought a real war with only one objective—the destruction of the Japanese enemy. In Italy, our military command was handicapped by considerations of policy and sentiment which literally cost the lives of thousands of Americans. It is a bitter thing to have to say this, but it is true.

Our policy of expediency, our policy of dealing with Badoglio and maintaining the monarchy, brought about a complete apathy among the Italian people as well as the refusal of the Italian soldiers to fight for us. And other considerations, such as the emotionally inspired delay in shelling Monte Cassino, and our unwillingness to have the American Air Forces do to Rome what the R.A.F. did to Berlin, aborted the success of the Anzio operation, which had started so hopefully. It was not the military commanders who were at fault in these cases, but our political policy. This was responsible for a situation which continued to go from bad to worse while we were unable to make up our minds to fight in Italy as we were fighting Japan. The tragic end result was that instead of saving lives, expediency cost lives and created new political problems for the future.

The real core of the European problem is, of course, Germany. What is presented here in the way of facts on the influence of German cartels and the alliance of aggression between German big business,

the German Junker class, and the General Staff, is by no means the full story. It is merely an attempt to sketch the broad outlines of a phenomenon that requires the most detailed and expert study. The suggestion for the destruction of the German cartels is not intended as a dogmatic and inevitable solution, but rather as a casting-about for a possible answer.

Finally, I have written a concluding chapter on the role of the Church in Europe in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the war. The purpose of this chapter is to try to arrive at some conclusion as to how much religion might contribute to the reconstruction of Europe. I am fully aware that this is the most controversial chapter of the entire book and that, because of it, I may have prejudiced the reception of the rest of the volume. It seems to me, however, to be a matter of importance that what amounts to a conspiracy of silence on an extremely important subject should finally be broken by someone. Religion is a great and powerful factor in the modern world, as it was in the days when Jesus was asked to define the complex question of man's relation to God and to the State.

I do not pretend that I have succeeded in assembling all the facts available on this difficult subject of the religious situation of modern Europe. What is contained in this chapter on the Church is, however, fact and not propaganda for or against any one school of thought or faith. From these facts the reader can draw his conclusions and form his own opinion as to the extent to which religion can make a contribution to the moral as well as physical reconstruction of the Continent.

While facts are the basic preoccupation of the pages which follow, there are, of course, a number of human imponderables which cannot be calculated precisely. Certainly they must be present in all political thinking about the shape of things to come. If for no other reason—because they will unquestionably exercise a profound influence upon the course of future European history.

The paramount one of these imponderables, the one with which we have to deal on the very morrow of Europe's liberation, will be the apathy of the general mass of peoples. There has been a tremendous amount of vigorous underground opposition to the German tyranny, manifested in all forms of sabotage, which will have made a substantial contribution to the coming military victory. The existence of this underground opposition should not blind us to the terrible and overriding fact that years of malnutrition and years of economic and

political slavery will have left a profound mark on the peoples of Europe.

It is difficult to know yet to what extent the peoples of Europe have lost not only faith in democracy as such, but faith in any way of government. It is impossible to predict accurately how many years it will take them to regain their social, political, and moral consciousness. In the interim, we shall have to be prepared to deal with millions of physical and moral wrecks, many of whom will be beyond rehabilitation.

No number of roseate pronunciamientos and declarations of faith in the resilience of European democracy can dispel this ominous truth. The Germans have engaged in a thorough destruction not only of human institutions—from legal systems, through factories, to organized religion—but also of the faiths by which men work and live together. The German Moloch has destroyed half of Europe's educational institutions. In Poland, for instance, it has razed to the ground *all* cultural institutions, deliberately liquidated the whole intellectual class, and completely destroyed its educational facilities, its libraries, and its scientific establishments.

Certainly, new men in all the liberated countries will rise to replace these losses, but when and how soon? The Nazis and the Fascists have executed literally hundreds of thousands of the kind of men who would have best been able to build a new Europe. The experience of AMG in Italy has already shown only too clearly that the torture chambers of Fascism have almost completely "liquidated" the men and women who could have helped the Allies to re crank the broken-down machinery of state. Even if the Allied policy was not the most promising one by which to achieve that objective, the apathy of the Italian people and their complete disinterest—at least as far as Southern and Central Italy are concerned—give us an indication of what to expect in other parts of Europe.

Torture leaves its mark not only upon the tortured but also upon their wives and children and their friends. Has the spirit of nine million foreign slave workers in Germany been broken by the German policy of feeding them just enough to keep them from starving but not sufficient to maintain their morale and their physical health?

These are questions to which we will not have immediate answers. It might be argued that the remarkable people of Yugoslavia have certainly demonstrated that the spirit of liberty is not dead in Europe. But special conditions obtain in that country. Perhaps one reason why the Yugoslavs continued to fight long and heroically is the fact that

their remarkable leader, Tito, has been able to give them something to fight for beyond the reconstruction of that deadening status quo ante bellum. And whatever the truth may be in the specific case of Yugoslavia, the broad European picture is one of a mass of imponderables and human complexities which are unpredictable.

It is safe to say that most of these will prove negative influences. There may, of course, be imponderables that work beneath the surface of the European body politic today which will exercise a very positive influence. There may well be secret subterranean streams of political activity in the underground resistance movements which may burst forth into a revolutionary geyser. But when, and where, and how? Is Tito the new Lenin of the Balkans? Is Germany beyond the hope of redemption? If not, what spiritual and moral catharsis is necessary for the Germans to achieve it?

What will be the final outcome of the revolutionary upheavals in Belgium and Greece, which were still unresolved early in 1945, thanks to British intervention in the internal affairs of those two countries, and to the tacit support of Britain by the United States, as exemplified by Mr. Stettinius' halfhearted "hands-off" policy? Can General Charles de Gaulle effect a working compromise among the contending social forces in France which will enable them to rally around him for the reconstruction of the country? Will the liberation of Italy's industrial north lead to revolution, and to what extent will British intervention support the counterrevolution? To these questions history alone can provide the answer. What I have tried to do is to assemble in this book some of the facts which seem to me to be unalterable and which cannot be affected by any set of imponderables, however important.

J. S.

2. *Poland*

“**P**OLAND is the key to Europe,” Napoleon is said to have exclaimed in a conference with his generals discussing preparations for the conquest of that country. An arbitrary statement, to be sure, which may have been made for the sole purpose of justifying a ruthless military campaign. Napoleon was, however, a sound geopolitician who succeeded in integrating his knowledge of political and military geography into his plans for imperial conquest. If one draws a few lines on a map of Europe from one extremity to the other—from the Shetland Isles to the Crimea, from the North Cape to Cape Matapan (Tainaron), from Gibraltar to the easternmost point in the Urals—all the lines intersect near Warsaw. This central position alone would make Poland the “key to Europe.”

The lack of natural frontiers in both the east and the west makes the problem of Poland's security particularly difficult. Poland cannot have an isolationist policy; she has to rely on some international system to help defend her independence and national existence.

Before defining a foreign policy for future Poland, it is well to review the experience of the twenty years of Polish independence. In 1918, the rulers of the new Polish state were in an unusual position. Both Russia and Germany were so weakened that they could not play a dominant role in the strategy of power politics. Unchecked by either of these traditional rivals, Poland became one of the decisive factors in East-Central Europe, and her alliance with France seemed to promise complete security against any threat from Russia and Germany.

The idea was then born among Polish leaders that their country could again become a Great Power, that it was possible to restore her position of the sixteenth or the seventeenth century—before the growth of Prussia and Russia—when the Jagiellos were the most powerful rulers in East-Central Europe. The “Jagiellian” idea had particular

influence on Józef Pilsudski, an old-time revolutionist turned dictator, who considered himself a successor to the old Polish kings. This conception was the basis of his aggression against Soviet Russia in 1920, with the intent of separating White Russia and the Ukraine from Russia, and setting up a great federation comprising Poland, White Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. His plan was never realized, however, because he had failed to recognize Russia's growth in Europe. The Kiev campaign was disastrous. Nevertheless, the Polish leaders continued to be possessed by the idea of increasing the territory and the population of the new state in order to create the basis for a "Great Power policy." Various arguments were used: to the west, new territories were claimed because they had a Polish majority; to the east, other territories were claimed, despite their non-Polish majority, for historical reasons, and for the sake of attacking Russian Bolshevism—an argument which had great influence among the Allied statesmen in Paris.

The foreign policy of Poland was based on the principle of "balance": balance between Russia and Germany, in order to keep them apart and to be able to oppose each of them. In accomplishing this task, Polish policy discounted the help of the Western Allies—France, later also Great Britain—and tried to surround Poland with smaller states, the Baltic states and the Little Entente.

This policy could work to some degree as long as Germany and Russia were weak. But as soon as these two powerful neighbors started to play a role more proportionate to their real strength and resources, Polish foreign policy was in a state of crisis. The discrepancy between Poland's tendency to play "Great Power" politics, speaking the language of a great state, and the poverty of the country—the lack of economic reserves indispensable to a Great Power, as well as lack of industrial resources and modern armaments—destroyed the effectiveness of the "policy of balance" in the old form. A choice became imperative. After Hitler came to power in 1933, the military clique around Pilsudski, who were the rulers of Poland, made their choice. They chose collaboration with Hitler's Germany.

For five years the world was confronted with the unique spectacle of a country whose vital interests were perhaps more menaced by Nazi Germany than those of any other country, helping its enemy rearm and prepare for aggression against Europe—and, as it turned out, against Poland herself first of all. Hitler benefited greatly from his connection with Colonel Józef Beck in Poland; under the cover of this alliance, he continued his preparations for war and, with Poland's help,

sabotaged every plan for collective security. For Poland, the advantages were of a wholly illusory nature. Beck, more and more dependent upon Hitler, could act the Foreign Minister of a great state and make trips to foreign capitals in behalf of "purely Polish policy," without regard for any other nation, even Russia. Under cover of the German-Polish pact, Poland could force Lithuania to accept the incorporation of Wilno into the Polish state, and she could steal a part of Czechoslovakia. But the alliance did not save Poland from war.

By 1939, the Polish foreign policy of "balance" was in a state of complete bankruptcy. It was no longer possible, as in 1934, to maintain a limited choice, with reservations. Now it was necessary either to go over to the German camp completely and, like Mussolini, become Hitler's satellite in the war against the Western democracies and the Soviet Union, or to choose the other side—the anti-German coalition—a side which meant, especially for Poland, a close collaboration with Soviet Russia.

If Colonel Beck could have followed his leanings, he would have accepted Hitler's offers and collaborated to the end. But popular feeling in Poland was against it. Against his will, Beck was obliged to accept British guarantees and to join the anti-Hitler side. In the White Book on Polish-German relations, published by the German Government in 1940, we find extremely interesting reports of German diplomats in Warsaw early in 1939, showing how much alone Beck was in his policy of collaboration with Germany, and how infuriated he was by the telegrams congratulating him on his firm stand against German demands.¹

But the rulers of Poland did not follow through on their new policy. They refused to allow the passage of Russian troops through Polish territory, thus prohibiting eventual military collaboration between Poland and the Soviet Union.

One would think that the military disaster in the fall of 1939 would have put an end to the fundamental misconceptions of Polish foreign policy. It seems obvious that Poland cannot function as an isolated nation, maintaining Polish independence against both Germany and Russia. Unfortunately, the majority of Polish émigrés in London, who have decisive influence over the policies and projects of the Polish Government-in-exile, clung to the old ideas of the period between the two World Wars. For them, the defeat of September 1939 was an accident resulting from secondary causes; they continued to believe that

¹ For numbered references see the list following the main text.

Poland was destined to carry on, in a new form, the old policy of balance, and to reach the status of a Great Power.

A booklet published in Paris in 1940 for Polish soldiers, written by a prominent Polish journalist, Tadeusz Kielpinski, elaborated on the idea that "Poland, occupying the central regions of Europe, a country that must maintain equilibrium in Europe, is condemned to greatness as a plane is condemned to speed."²

In a book published in Montreal, Viktor Rosinski, former general secretary of the Polish Maritime League and now an editorial writer for the Polish weekly *Ameryka Echo* of Toledo, Ohio, suggests a considerable increase of Polish territory in the West, and the inclusion of Minsk, Cernaŭti, and part of Soviet Byelo-Russia and Bucovina. "The new Poland will no longer be a state with a narrow strip of the Baltic, but a state with a large littoral." He also proposes the distintegration of the Soviet Union: "Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian, Georgian, and other Caucasian nations must return to an independent life."

The salient feature of the official Polish program is an East-Central European federation or confederation comprising the states situated between Russia and Germany, from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Its nucleus is contained in the Polish-Czechoslovak protocols of November 11, 1940, and January 19, 1942, and the Greco-Yugoslav protocol signed on January 15, 1942. These four states are considered the charter members of the new confederation, which is also to be open to other states.

The documents and articles dealing with the new organization are formulated in intentionally vague general terms. Politicians and writers have interpreted the plan variously. It is obvious that the Czechoslovak Government did not see it in the same light as the Polish Government; but in view of the relations between the United Nations, it has very definite implications. In the *New York Times* of November 5, 1941, Anne O'Hare McCormick gave a clear interpretation: "[This] proposal . . . projects the shadow of a new Great Power, for a union of the eight countries of North and South Central Europe would create a bloc of 110,000,000 people, bigger than Greater Germany and a strong buffer between the Reich and Russia." That is the idea: the creation of a barrier between Germany and Russia. In Polish political writings, it is understood that Poland is to be the nucleus of this new state; if she keeps her territory of 1939 and receives new territories in the West, she will be the strongest state in the new bloc, with a population of 40,000,000.

Here is a resurrection, in a new form, of the plan of "balance" and the old "Great Power" idea. Yesterday this Great Power was to have been Poland alone; today it is to be an enlarged Poland associated with other states which refuse to make a choice between Russia and Germany. Another modification of the original Polish conception relates to the Western powers who are to uphold this policy. France is no longer in a position to guarantee Poland's safety; therefore the guarantors of the new organization will have to be the Anglo-Saxon powers.

In an address delivered at the forty-seventh annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia on April 10, 1943, Professor Oskar Halecki, president of the Polish Institute of Science and Arts in America, defends this proposal for a federation extending "from Finland in the north to Greece in the south, and connecting this whole group of nations between the greater powers in the west and in the east." But he understands that such a federation cannot exist without some larger international organization, which has to be made secure by means of a sufficiently strong international police force. In his opinion, however, "such a mission should not be entrusted to all the great powers."³ He wants to limit it to Great Britain and the United States, barring Soviet Russia. Since this version of the new international order is one of the main themes of official Polish propaganda, the hostility of the Soviet Union toward the plan is understandable.

The anti-Soviet nature of the new bloc becomes even clearer when it is studied a little more carefully. Professor Halecki stresses the importance of Finland's participation in such a group. In a booklet entitled *The Core of a Continent*, published by the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Henryk Strasburger, Polish Minister to the Middle East, advocates the participation of the Baltic states in the new combination with Poland. He regrets that a close alliance was not achieved in the period between 1918 and 1933. Ignoring the fact that the Baltic countries have belonged to the Soviet Union since 1940, he would like to eliminate Russia from that area, and would create in the Baltic a balance of power, one of the conditions of which would be "to arouse the interest of Great Britain, and, if possible, of the United States, so as to secure their co-operation in the defense of the narrows and canals of the Baltic."⁴

In a booklet in Polish, the translation of whose title is *Governmental Crisis*, published in London early in 1943, another Polish publicist, Mr. Stanislaw Mackiewicz, a supporter of General Kazimierz

Sosnkowski, discusses the problem of the Central European Federation. He attributes the failure of the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement to the refusal of the Czechs to support the Polish position regarding the boundaries with Russia. The only federation he considers possible for Poland is with states which are forced to defend themselves against both Germany and Russia. These ideal allies are, in his opinion, Hungary and Romania—then members of the Axis. Federated Poland, Hungary, and Romania would constitute a power stretching from sea to sea, with 60,000,000 inhabitants, strong enough, with the support of Great Britain, to prevent a repetition of the defeat of 1939. He proposes that Poland insist upon the common Polish-Hungarian frontier established after the destruction of Czechoslovakia, and oppose any reduction of the territory of these two states. Polish officials may say that they are not responsible for the ideas of Mr. Mackiewicz, but it is a fact that the Polish-Czech agreement is virtually dead and that the Polish Government-in-exile refused to declare war on Hungary.

This conception, definitely anti-Soviet, is a revival of the policy of the cordon sanitaire. There is no other basis for the union of these particular states. This bloc of predominantly agricultural states, with a rather low industrial potential, would be equally powerless against either of its great neighbors without the support of the other. They would still have to choose between Germany and the Soviet Union.

History has already proved the impossibility of basing European order and stability exclusively on an association of small states. It was the idea of the authors of the Treaty of Versailles that under the leadership of France the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente, and Poland would constitute a barrier against German expansion. Internal weaknesses and lack of unity among the ruling groups of these countries, coupled with their refusal to ally themselves with Russia, created the conditions for German victory in Europe.

If Poland wants to have a constructive foreign policy, based on realities in the modern world, and to avoid new wars in which she would become the battlefield as a result of her geographical position, she must give up her dreams of recapturing the past and her adventurous and Utopian plans of "Great Power policy." When she has done so, it may be possible to define her relations with her neighbors. Accord with Czechoslovakia and with Hungary and Romania can best be established after her relations with Russia and the Western powers are clarified.

There have always been two trends in Polish foreign policy. Toward the West, it was essentially defensive, traditionally concerned with the

defense of Slav territories in the face of Teutonic expansion, which in the course of the centuries established a German state on Slav territory. The history of Prussia is the history of either the extermination of Slav elements or their forced Germanization.

Curiously enough, however, the Poles inflicted on their eastern neighbors the same wrongs they suffered from their neighbors to the west. Their foreign policy toward the East was as imperialistic as Prussia's policy against them, involving as it did imperialist expansion and merciless oppression of the Ukrainian and White Russian peasants. In the seventeenth century, the Polish kings even planned to dominate Russia, with Polish soldiers in the Kremlin. As Mackiewicz puts it: "In the East, we have never been a nation of peasants or mining workers, but of masters." ⁶ The question indeed is: Will future Polish policy be that of "peasants and mining workers," or of "masters"—big landowners and noblemen—dreaming of regaining their one-time dominion over the Ukrainian and White Russian peasants? The advocates of the latter policy are inevitably pushed into the arms of Germany, as their only chance of maintaining their domination in the East, even if it means sacrificing the interests of the Polish "peasants and mining workers" in the West.

It was neither blunder nor accident that the Polish Government-in-exile accepted without question a Nazi story that 10,000 Polish officers had been slaughtered by the Russians in the Smolensk area, then occupied by German troops. On April 25, 1943, the Soviet Government severed relations with Poland, charging that the failure to ask Russia for an explanation of this story violated all standards of relations between friendly states. The Soviet Government asserted that the Germans had committed this crime themselves, and that profascist Poles had connived in the staging of a farcical investigation in the presence of representatives of the International Red Cross, largely for the purpose of exerting pressure on the Soviet Government and wresting territorial concessions from it.

The Polish ministers may hate Germany, and may not desire a German victory; but the anti-Soviet implications of their program of eastward expansion have forced them to take a position which is made to order for Goebbels. Only with the rehabilitation of Germany could they realize their dream of recovering Poland's dominant position in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, a new Poland facing the West and strengthened on her western borders, with a labor population predominantly Polish and free from reactionary control, would not only help to restrain Germany, but would contribute to pacific relations with

Russia in the East. There are no conflicts of interest between the Polish peasants and workers and those of the Soviet Ukraine, White Russia, or any part of the Soviet Union. The common fight against German oppression in this war creates new alliances or, better, renews traditional alliances against the Germans.

Thus a democratic Polish foreign policy, based on the interests of the Polish masses, would lead to collaboration with Soviet Russia. Its aim would be not to subdue the Germans, but to protect themselves and to prevent German enslavement of the Slav peoples. The principle of collaboration with Russia was accepted by the late Polish Prime Minister, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, against the fierce opposition of reactionary Polish émigrés, who subscribed to the traditional expansion toward the East and refused to recognize the unmistakable national preference of the Ukrainian and White Russian peoples. General Sikorski was, however, supported by considerable numbers of the Polish Underground.

Sikorski and Stalin regarded co-operation between Poland and Russia not merely as a temporary expediency of war, but as a permanent policy within a system of collective security. A common declaration of friendship and alliance signed in Moscow on December 4, 1941, stated that a lasting and just peace could be achieved only "by new organization of international relations based on the association of democratic States in union. Such an organization to be a decisive factor must have respect for international law and be supported by the armed forces of all the Allied Governments. Only under such conditions can Europe be re-established and the defeat of the German barbarians achieved; only thus can it be guaranteed that the catastrophe caused by the Hitlerites shall never repeat itself." ⁶

Unfortunately, Sikorski's attempts to bring about real improvement in Polish-Russian relations were repeatedly overridden by the reactionary groups in London. The rupture of diplomatic relations in April 1943 did not, however, mean the end of Soviet-Polish collaboration. On May 4, 1943, in a letter to Ralph Parker, then Russian correspondent for the *New York Times*, Stalin defined the Soviet policy as tending toward a strong and independent Poland after German defeat. The relations between the two countries are to be based "upon the fundament of solid good neighborly relations and mutual respect or, should the Polish people so desire, upon the fundament of an alliance providing for mutual assistance against the Germans as the chief enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland." ⁷

The Polish Government-in-exile, dominated by General Sosnkowski

after Sikorski's death in July 1943, continued to pursue the old policy of "balance." But new forces emerged which decisively defend the principle of alliance with Russia. The most important of these is the Union of Polish Patriots, made up of Polish émigrés in Russia, directed by a committee with a decisive non-Communist majority. The Union is headed by Lieutenant Colonel Zygmunt Berling, formerly Chief of Staff of the Fifth Division of the Polish Army, who has been in Russia since 1941.

In the summer of that year, anticipating the Polish-Soviet pact signed in December, a Polish Army was organized in the USSR under General Wladyslaw Anders. General Anders suggested that as soon as divisions were ready they be sent into action on the German-Soviet front. The Soviet Government agreed, but the Polish generals made excuses to postpone sending the divisions into action, at the same time calling for additional enrollment.

The Polish Army in Russia was set at 30,000 men, though later at General Sikorski's request the Soviet Government raised the limit to 96,000. By February 1942, it was organized to include 73,415 men. To finance and maintain these troops, Soviet Russia loaned the Polish Government 65,000,000 rubles, without interest, later increasing the loan to 300,000,000 rubles. In addition, more than 15,000,000 rubles were distributed by the Soviet Government in outright gifts as allowances to officers of the Polish Army units in the process of formation. When the Soviet Government refused to allow any further expansion of the Polish Army on Russian territory until troops were sent to the front, the Polish Government proposed to evacuate the whole Polish Army from the USSR to the Near East. The Soviet Government agreed, and by September 1942 had helped move 75,491 Polish officers and troops, and 37,756 members of their families.

Figures are not available of the number of those who chose not to be evacuated but to remain and fight at the side of the Russians, but Lieutenant Colonel Berling was one of them. As commander of a Polish division, he made a statement on May 5, 1943, exposing the deception practiced by General Anders. In conversation with Polish officers, Anders had expressed himself as follows regarding the formation of the Polish Army:

I am highly satisfied, since this territory as yet is distant enough from the front, and military operations won't hinder us during the training period. And when the Red Army collapses under German blows, which will be no later than within a few months, we will be able to break through to Iran via the Caspian

Sea. Since we will be the only armed power in this territory, we will be in a position to do whatever we please.

Colonel Berling stated that after proposing to send divisions to the front as soon as they were ready, General Anders had changed his mind and declared that none would go to the front until they were all ready—trained, armed, and equipped; and then, adding that there was no necessity for hurry, he had done everything he could to drag out the training.

General Anders' Chief of Staff, Leopold Okulicki, sabotaged the establishment of a base on the Caspian Sea to receive English arms and provisions from Iran. Soviet authorities built a special railway branch and warehouses on the shores of the Caspian, but not a single rifle, tank, or sack of supplies came through, thanks to General Anders' command.

A close watch was kept on all Poles suspected of "Soviet sympathies," anti-Semitism was rife, and there was discrimination against soldiers of Ukrainian or Byelo-Russian nationality. The latter were told that in the future there would be no Ukraine or Byelo-Russia, and that they must fight only for Poland. Soviet intervention alone prevented the shooting of two soldiers who had been court-martialed for declaring that they did not want to fight for Poland, since they were Ukrainians and had no intention of living in Poland.

While the Polish Army was being organized, a considerable number of officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers systematically engaged in anti-Soviet agitation in the vicinity. The Z.W.Z. (League of Armed Struggle), a secret anti-Soviet organization, led the anti-Soviet agitation and passed death sentences on soldiers and officers suspected of a friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. Such sentences were executed secretly, and the corpses were found in the fields at some distance from the camps.

Meanwhile, the Polish espionage service collected information about Soviet plants, state farms, Army depots, and so on. When confronted with this, Lieutenant Colonel Leon Bakiewicz, chief of General Anders' Intelligence Service, declared: "Our intelligence service must work if we are to know what our ally is actually worth. For if it is not worth anything, it would be better to pick up our belongings and get away from here."

The situation exposed by Lieutenant Colonel Berling was deplored by all honest anti-Nazi Poles, and particularly by the Union of Polish Patriots, who remained in the USSR to fight after General Anders and

the bulk of the Polish Army were evacuated. In a message addressed to Stalin on June 12, 1943, the Union stated:

Being firmly convinced that the consolidation of Polish-Soviet friendship forms one of the most vital of Polish national interests, and also meets the interests and wishes of the Soviet Union, we assure you that we will not allow persons who strive to drive a wedge between the Polish people and the Soviet Union to trouble the waters, and that we will exert every effort for the consolidation of Polish-Soviet friendship as a necessary condition for the restoration of our independence and the consolidation of peace after victory over Germany.

Other forces defending the policy of alliance with Russia include democratic groups in this country, under the leadership of Professor Oscar Lange of Chicago University and the Reverend Stanislaw Orlemanski, Polish-American Catholic priest, both of whom went to Moscow in April 1944 and returned convinced of the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions to establish a democratic postwar Poland. Some groups in London, and of course the greater part of the Polish Underground movement, comprising Socialist, Communist, and other elements, also have condemned the official Polish policy and proclaimed that the consolidation of Polish-Russian friendship is an essential task.

Polish collaboration with Russia need not be at the expense of relations with other Allied powers. On the contrary, the advocates of Soviet alliance stress the importance of British-American-Russian co-operation in the war and in the peace. They denounce the attempts of Polish official circles to set the Anglo-Saxon powers against Russia, to exclude Russia from the future system of collective security, and to create a rift within the United Nations in order to force Russia to accept the demands of the Polish Government in London. The same Government-in-exile which has opposed Polish-Soviet collaboration is also responsible for the crisis in Polish-Czechoslovak relations—at a time when friendship and collaboration with Czechoslovakia are most needed.

Forced to abandon their Great Power dreams and the plans for the restoration of the kingdom of the Jagiellos, Poland will remain a small state, which may still, as a great creator of cultural values, play an important role in science, literature, and the arts. But if Poland wants to stabilize the situation in East-Central Europe, she must adapt her foreign policy to Russia's, as Czechoslovakia is prepared to do. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have concluded treaties of alliance and mutual assistance similar to the one suggested by Stalin for Poland.

The same kind of relations must be established between Poland and Russia as those which exist between the United States and Mexico and Canada. The basis of our relationship with our neighbors is the principle that no hostility shall arise against the United States, and that the states in question shall under no circumstances allow a third power to use them against us. An obligation of this kind is quite compatible with unrestricted sovereignty—unless that sovereignty is understood to mean the right to intrigue and to take part in a coalition against the “good neighbor.”

On such a basis the most satisfactory solution can be found for the problem of Polish boundaries, which so vividly occupies not only Polish but also international opinion. On the subject of Poland’s western boundaries, Polish opinion is practically unanimous, and some hope exists that it will be possible to find a solution acceptable to the other United Nations.

At Versailles in 1919 Poland received 17,825 square miles of German territory, with 3,855,000 inhabitants. The principle adopted at that time was a purely national one; the territories assigned to Poland had an incontestible Polish majority, which increased during the twenty years of Polish independence. The disputed territories in which plebiscites were held—Upper Silesia and two regions of East and West Prussia—also had a Polish majority, even according to German statistics. Nevertheless, the Germans received a majority in the plebiscites. Granted that the Germans stacked the cards by influencing the time of voting, by ensuring the participation of so-called emigrants brought from Germany, and so on, the fact remains that an important number of Poles voted for Germany.

Such an outcome is not astonishing, and could have been foreseen if the commission responsible for the establishment of the Polish-German boundary had considered the problem from the standpoint of Polish-German relations through the centuries. Theirs is a history of the constant advance of German elements and the retreat of Polish elements. In the eleventh century, the frontier was near Berlin. By the eighteenth century, the Germans succeeded in Germanizing the greater part of the territories west of the 1772 Polish boundaries. The subsequent partition of Poland started a new period of Germanization, with German settlers attempting to colonize the Polish land.

This new wave of Germanization was not so successful as those in the past. The awakening of national consciousness among the nations of Eastern Europe was one of the most important features of the nineteenth century. The Polish masses were no longer the inert body

into which the German master could pour the German spirit. The rebirth of Polish national feeling, especially after the revolution of 1848, was seen even in regions like Upper Silesia, which had been separated from the Polish state for centuries.

The Polish peasants began to form organized groups in the Polish regions annexed by Prussia; farmers' associations and credit co-operatives became more and more numerous. The Polish language, expelled from schools and offices, was secretly cultivated in classroom exercises, lectures, and meetings. The Germans became alarmed in 1866 when, for the first time, statistics did not show any progress in Germanization, but instead a slow retreat before the Polish element.

This change, which was the result not only of Polish action but also of internal evolution in Germany, became even more accelerated after 1871. The industrialization of West and Central Germany started a movement of the population toward the West, "the alluring West," instead of the traditional *Drang nach Osten*. Following the course of the workers, the middle classes also began to go West, where it was easier to make money than in the East. In the cities and towns of East Germany, Polish storekeepers and merchants replaced Germans. Consequently, Prussian hegemony could be maintained only by artificial means and state aid.

Bismarck started the fight against the Polish elements by placing the powerful economic and military resources of the Prussian state at the disposal of the Germans, but the results were negligible. The Polish peasants defended their land with exceptional obstinacy, helped by all the other Polish social groups. Despite the efforts of the Prussian Government, which granted subsidies to German settlers, Polish land-ownership in the Poznań province actually increased between 1886 and 1906, to the extent of more than 180,000 acres. The political result was an increase in votes for Polish Deputies in the German parliament, from 203,000 in 1884 to 453,722 in 1907. Thus the Prussians were beaten in their own state on both the economic and the political terrain. The only way to stop the return of the Polish workers and peasants and the middle class to Polish national existence was to use open and naked violence against them, dumping German settlers on Polish lands. This policy was actually started before the First World War, and later revived and perfected by Hitler.

But the Poles could never achieve complete liberation and national development so long as their German masters were able to dominate them economically, to influence their decisions, to exercise pressure on them by menacing them with unemployment or expulsion from the

land, and to use the clergy to keep them under the German yoke. All these factors must be taken into consideration in explaining the votes in the 1920 plebiscites.

The artificial character of the Germanization of Western Poland was later proved by the disappearance of the German elements in independent Poland, after state support was withdrawn. In 1931, the former Prussian lands showed the highest percentage of Poles in their population: 90.5 per cent in the Poznań vovoideship; 88 per cent in Pomorze (the so-called Polish Corridor); and 92.3 per cent in Silesia. Hence it is reasonably certain that if all the old Polish lands were returned to Poland and the population had no reason to fear its former German masters, the process of re-Polonization would make tremendous progress, and the traces of superficial Germanization would soon disappear.

The frontier between Germany and Poland demands rectification first of all in Silesia. Of the Upper Silesia population of over 2,000,000 in 1910, more than half were Polish-speaking, according to even the Prussian statistics. The Germans colonized this Polish land and in general established themselves in the towns; the rural areas and the working-class suburbs of the towns remained predominantly Polish. According to Dr. Paul Weber, the census of 1910 showed that the Oppeln district, mainly Upper Silesia, was the most Polish of all the provinces of Germany at that time.⁸ In the rural areas of Upper Silesia, there were over 1,000,000 Poles and only half as many Germans.

The original design of the Paris Peace Conference, as stated in the first draft of the Treaty of Versailles, which was presented to the German delegation on May 8, 1919, was to provide for the transfer of all Upper Silesia to Poland. But the German negotiators succeeded in having this plan changed, and a plebiscite was decided upon. It was held in March 1921, under conditions assuring a German majority. In October 1921, Upper Silesia was divided between Poland and Germany according to the results of the plebiscite. This division of the Silesian industrial district was economic heresy, as population statistics later proved. In 1931 the Polish part of Upper Silesia had a population of nearly 1,200,000 Poles and some 100,000 Germans. In 1925 German Upper Silesia, the Oppeln district, had a population of some 600,000 Poles and 300,000 Germans. Thus by 1930 united Silesia had a Polish majority of about 82 per cent of its population of more than 2,200,000.

Polish dominion over Silesia would have great importance from the

economic point of view. Upper Silesian resources are not necessary to German economy; Germany can get hard coal, iron, and zinc elsewhere. In German statements on the role of Upper Silesian heavy industry after the war, there is no suggestion that its factories are destined for conversion to normal peacetime production. The Reich uses Upper Silesian industry only for the production of military equipment. The normal needs of the German population are met by Westphalian and Rhenish industry. Within the boundaries of a highly industrialized Reich, which experience has proved incapable of consuming Silesian peacetime products, Upper Silesia would decline industrially. Germany would then be obliged to create an artificial demand for heavy armament, or to dominate Poland, in order to provide other uses for the resources of Upper Silesia. This region, with its tremendous coal deposits, gravitates economically toward Poland; its return to Poland would strengthen its industrial potential and allow the new Polish state to play an economically sound part in the system of European security.

Next in importance is the problem of East Prussia, separated from the rest of Prussia by the Polish province of Pomorze—a German isle in a Polish sea. According to the census of 1933, East Prussia had a population of 2,500,000 within an area of about 15,000 square miles. In the southern part of this region live the so-called Masurians, descendants of Polish settlers from the Mazowsze province. In order to prove that there were no Poles in East Prussia, the Germans invented this special Masurian nationality, patently an absurdity. In addition to the Masurians, there are considerable numbers of Poles in the western part of the district of Marienwerder (Kwidzn). Altogether, there were about 400,000 Poles in East Prussia, largely or partly Germanized; there were tens of thousands of people of Slav extraction who were wholly Germanized. In the districts adjacent to the Memel territory there were about 60,000 Lithuanians; the rest of the population was German.

The social structure of this region is very interesting. In 1933, 40 per cent of the land belonged to 3440 landowners possessing over 247 acres each. Of that number, 341 owned more than 1235 acres each. These Junkers constituted the ruling class. The masses of the rural population, having too little land or none at all, were obliged to work on large estates as farm laborers or find work elsewhere. Each year a significant number left East Prussia for the West. The unsound agricultural system of the country causes an almost permanent crisis among the large landowners, who were for so many years supported by the Prussian

state under the slogan of *Deutschtum* ("German National Spirit"). One of the reasons why the Prussian Junkers around President Paul von Hindenburg allied themselves with Hitler in 1933 was their wish to maintain the program of *Osthilfe* (literally, "Eastern help"), which poured gold into the pockets of East Prussian Junkers. The reconstruction of Prussia demands, first of all, the liquidation of the large estates and redistribution of their 2,500,000 acres. The difficulty of finding German settlers willing to accept the low standard of living, as compared with the rest of Germany, in East Prussia makes any radical land reform by the Germans themselves quite doubtful. Poland, on the other hand, would have little difficulty in liquidating the Junker estates and populating the land with Poles and Slavs after the Junkers and the merchant population of the towns were removed.

The next Polish-German boundary problem is that of the Free City of Danzig, which was separated from Germany and established under the protection of the League of Nations to provide a port for Poland within the Polish customs frontiers. Danzig is at the mouth of the Vistula. Of this German city, Frederick the Great said: "Who dominates the mouth of the Vistula and Danzig, is more master of the country [Poland] than the king who rules it."

The experiences of the period between the two wars showed that no friendly arrangement is possible with the present German masters of Danzig, nor even with the city in German hands, for it was the first German city to become Nazi. The best possible solution is the incorporation of Danzig into Poland and the removal of most of its German population.

The incorporation of East Prussia and Danzig into Poland would also solve the problem of access to the sea, for which the Versailles Treaty failed to provide adequately. While Germany after the Peace Conference had one mile of seacoast for each 315 square miles of national territory, and France had one mile for each 177 square miles, Poland was granted only one mile of coast for each 5248 square miles. Her shore line was 46 miles; the only Polish port built in the period between the two wars was Gdynia (renamed Gothenhaufen by the Germans), which was hardly sufficient for Polish needs.

But the essential reason is that of security. Owing to the location of East Prussia and the Free City of Danzig, the Polish-German frontier was 1263 miles long. With East Prussia in German hands, Polish Pomorze was absolutely indefensible; East Prussia was a German revolver directed against the heart of Poland. The release of East Prussia and the Free City of Danzig from Germany would shorten the Polish-

German frontier to 800 miles, a frontier which Poland could guard. This would definitely break German power in the East and destroy the cradle of Prussian militarism. The German *Drang nach Osten* stopped forever, Prussia would lose one of the essential bases of its force. This radical solution is, furthermore, in the true interests of the German people, for, as has been shown, the eastward expansion was made by the Junkers and other representatives of the German ruling classes, and was against the interests of the working population, whose tendency was to participate in the industrialization of West and Central Germany.

What will be the fate of the German minority in Poland? Before the Second World War there were 1,000,000 Germans in Upper Silesia, some 400,000 in Danzig, and 1,800,000 in East Prussia; the German minority in Poland at that time was about 650,000. The total in the whole region was less than 4,000,000, but the number of Germans now to be eliminated from Poland must be greater because of the German settlers brought in by Hitler—though it is probable that a great many will flee from Poland with the Nazi troops, and some will certainly perish in the process of abolishing German rule. The rest cannot remain in Poland; this question will have to be considered in the general solution of the problem of German minorities in Europe. Any solution, however drastic, will be humane in comparison with Germany's treatment of the Poles and the Jews during this war. Any concession to German nationalism in the name of false humanitarianism would be fatal. It is necessary to liquidate, once and for all, Prussian domination over the Slavic nations, and to create a boundary which will make impossible the repetition of similar attempts.

Some opponents of this solution argue that it will never be acceptable to the Germans.⁹ The frontier of 1919 was not acceptable to the Germans, either; and during the entire period between the two wars, German propaganda asked for the return of the "Polish Corridor" and Polish Upper Silesia. The aim of the German program is the Germanization of Pomorze and Silesia; Prussia is fundamentally hostile to Polish independence, for an independent Polish state on the boundaries of the Reich always constitutes a threat of revolt among the Slavic slaves. Only a boundary which puts hundreds of thousands of Poles under the Prussian yoke, closes Polish access to the sea, and transforms the rest of Poland into a German protectorate would be agreeable to the Germans. Hitler's present Polish policy—if we ignore for a moment his barbarous methods—is the one that is acceptable to the majority of Germans.

Any compromise will encourage the Pan-German and imperialistic tendencies of the Germans. Only a radical solution will put an end to German dreams of an empire built on Slav bones. And if the Germans again try to oppose this solution, Germany will have to be dismembered. In that case, the project of some Polish nationalists to establish the Polish-German frontier on the Oder, or even west of the Oder, near Berlin—which means the liquidation of Prussia—will have to be seriously considered. We can only hope that when the German people are liberated from Nazi domination and purged of their present ruling groups, they will be sufficiently reasonable to accept the proposed settlement, which is moderate in comparison with Hitler's "New Order." This acceptance will be the first step in their re-education.

The question of Polish-Russian boundaries is the most controversial problem in Polish politics. It has brought about a complete split in Polish public opinion; it is used by the adversaries of Allied collaboration to prejudice the Anglo-Saxon powers against Russia. The Polish-Soviet boundary as it existed for eighteen years—from 1921 to 1939—was established in March 1921 by the Treaty of Riga which ended the Polish-Russian War. Exhausted by six years of war, revolution, civil war, and intervention, the Soviet Union was forced to sign a compromise peace with Poland, surrendering the western part of White Russia and the western part of the Ukraine. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* says of this infamous treaty: "On March 18, 1921, a treaty was signed on terms favourable to Poland . . . which placed some 4,000,000 Russians under the Polish flag [exclusive of another 4,000,000 Russians in East Galicia which were not included in this transaction]. Again [as at Brest Litovsk] the Soviet Government had paid a heavy price for peace."

In September 1939, the Red Army occupied more than half of Polish territory and in the following month held plebiscites among the inhabitants. An overwhelming majority voted for incorporation into the Ukrainian and White Russian Soviet Republics. From that time until the German Army occupied the region in the summer of 1941, those territories belonged to the Soviet Union.

The section around Wilno was transferred to Lithuania, but it finally became Russian when Lithuania joined the Soviet Union as the result of a plebiscite in the summer of 1940. The Soviet Government has often stated that these former Polish regions are part of the Soviet Union, and that there can be no further discussion concerning them. Unofficially, however, it has been indicated in Moscow that some rectifications might be discussed with a friendly Polish Government. But

the present Polish Government-in-exile is unwilling to recognize any changes in Polish territory made since September 1, 1939, regardless of the results of the plebiscites of October 1939. The boundary of the Treaty of Riga is considered sacred, simply because it was recognized by the Soviet Government in 1921 and confirmed in 1932 and 1934.

If the Polish Government continues to be hostile, the boundary dispute can be settled only by force. Considering the relative strength of the present Polish Government and the Soviet Union, the result of such a conflict is easy to foresee—unless other powers place their forces at the disposal of Poland. Any such move would result in a Third World War between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union, which is the dream of the Polish "Great Power nationalists." They are discussing it; they are waiting for it; they consider it inevitable.

A realistic Polish policy must abandon the domain of juridical and legalistic fiction and consider the problem of Polish-Soviet boundaries in relation to general Polish-Soviet relations. The Riga frontier cannot be held forever inviolable. It was wrested from a Russia bleeding and weakened after six years of foreign and civil wars. It "is not based on any principle, it has no economic, no democratic idea. . . . It is an accidental frontier." So argued Mr. Feliks Perl, leader of the Polish Socialist party, in discussing the ratification of the Treaty of Riga in the Polish parliament on April 14, 1921: "This treaty breaks the peoples of the East, who have their rights; it divides them without having given them any voice in the matter."

The Ukrainians and the White Russians rejected the Riga treaty, just as the Poles rejected the treaties which partitioned Poland. A Soviet historian called the treaty imperialistic and unjust, charging that it violated the rights of the Ukrainian and White Russian peoples and established Polish domination over them. Friendly relations among the Polish, Ukrainian, and White Russian peoples are possible only if there is no domination, if the system of Polish landowners and masters is completely abandoned and no further attempts are made to perpetuate it. The Union of Polish Patriots makes a clear statement of policy on the question of boundaries. While a democratic Poland will wish to unite all Polish territories within the Polish state, it will not seek one square inch of Ukrainian or White Russian territory.

This conception of an ethnographic Poland, uniting all territories having Polish majorities, is the traditional program of democrats and socialists. In a book the translation of whose title is *The Polish Question and Socialism*, published before the First World War, Dr. Ludwig

Gumplowicz, one of the outstanding theoreticians of the Polish Socialist party, writes:

If the project of the reconstruction of such a Polish state [in its historical frontiers before the first partition] . . . were to be submitted to the general vote of the members of the Polish Socialist Party—not as a practical proposal, which can be or cannot be realized in a given moment because of some practical reasons, but as a principle—what would be the answer? Ninety-nine out of a hundred socialists would reject this project without hesitation as a nationalist dream contrary to the right of *each* people to decide its own fate. And the hundredth would perhaps say, after some hesitation: "If the Ukrainians, White-Russians and Lithuanians would themselves want to make a federal union with us, all right; but we have no right to force them."¹⁰

Gumplowicz formulates his positive program of Polish independence in the following terms: The necessary premise of democracy in Poland is the establishment of the independence of the three parts of partitioned Poland, in *ethnographic boundaries*. This program was also formulated by Woodrow Wilson in the thirteenth of his Fourteen Points: "An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations."

It is interesting to see why this ethnographic principle was violated, why the Allies agreed to give non-Polish territories to the new Polish state. In the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers of June 25, 1919, giving the Polish troops permission to occupy East Galicia *temporarily*, the aim of this occupation is defined: "to protect the possessions of the peaceful population of East Galicia from the danger of *Bolshevik bands*" (the italics are added). But even while surrendering to the demand of Polish nationalists who represented Poland as the only barrier possible against Bolshevism, the Supreme Council limited the Polish occupation to twenty-five years; after that a plebiscite was to take place. Instead, the Ukrainian population of this region was subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment.

In 1940 the Polish Government-in-exile reserved two places in the Polish National Council for representatives of the Ukrainians. But it was impossible to find any Ukrainian who was willing to accept an appointment to the Polish Council; even the most anti-Soviet among them was unwilling to approve the continuation of prewar relations between their region and the Polish state.

Under Soviet occupation in 1939 and 1940, radical land reforms took place in the Western Ukraine and White Russia. The property of the great landlords was confiscated and repartitioned among the Ukrainian

and White Russian peasants, who gained 1,800,000 acres of land. The average peasant family received more than 10 acres, and 33,000 agricultural workers became landowners for the first time. The peasants were also given horses, cows, and agricultural implements that had belonged to the great landowners.

The exiled Government in London apparently sees the restoration of these regions to Poland as a chance to set aside the agrarian and social reforms. They feel that the Polish landowners should return, along with Polish officials, Polish police, Polish courts, and Polish capitalists. That is the social meaning of the defense of the Riga boundaries. It is easily understood why Polish landowners, militarists, and former officials defend it; it is a matter of their property, of their social existence. It is less easy to understand how some Polish *democrats* can defend this policy, thus becoming tools of Polish reaction and militarism.

Polish democracy has parallel foreign and domestic policies. Those who wish to realize a "program for a People's Poland" * cannot support a foreign policy whose aim is to restore not a people's but a masters' Poland, or a domestic policy whose object is the oppression of Ukrainian and White Russian peasants under the yoke of Polish landowners. Nor can they defend a policy which aims to make Poland the nucleus of an anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire, whose aim would be to keep corrupted cliques and decadent social classes in power and to stop, at any price, the much-needed agrarian revolution.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, no strategic frontiers have to be considered, as they must be with Germany. There is no problem of a militarist ruling class. The eastern frontiers of Poland can and should be a meeting-place instead of a stockade between Poland and the Soviet Union, a source of strength, not of weakness, for the Polish state.

A purely ethnographic frontier between the two countries is impossible, but problems of minorities can easily be adjusted between good neighbors. The boundary between the Soviet Union and Poland as it existed in June 1941 constitutes, in general, an ethnographic boundary, but some important rectifications should be made. In the south the line follows the ethnographic frontier between the Ukrainians and the Poles in Galicia; then it follows the so-called Curzon line established by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers on December 8, 1919; in the north, above Brześć, it goes more to the west. The Curzon line has no special legal value, as it was never a recognized

* See page 38.

frontier; but in greater measure than any other line it constitutes the ethnographic frontier.

Even according to official Polish statistics, the territories incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had a Ukrainian majority before the Second World War; of 7,280,000 inhabitants in 1931, 56.7 per cent were Ukrainians and 32.5 per cent Polish.¹¹

In Western White Russia, the Poles had a relative majority—49.2 per cent—while the White Russians (plus the so-called local population—undeclared White Russians without any clear national consciousness) constituted only 37.7 per cent. The reason was that the frontier did not follow the Curzon line, but embraced some 6370 square miles of territory with a preponderantly Polish population. These are the regions of Ostrolenka, Lomza, and Bialystok, which had approximately 1,000,000 inhabitants, of whom 800,000 were Poles and the rest Jews. If the frontier were rectified and these indisputably Polish regions returned to Poland, the remaining region would be about 41 per cent Polish.

There is a very different picture in Eastern Poland, which has been incorporated into Lithuania. There can be no doubt of the Polish character of this region. Of some 500,000 inhabitants, 69 per cent are Poles and only 11.3 per cent Lithuanians. The Lithuanian claims to Wilno are based on historical reasons, Wilno having been the ancient capital of Lithuania and its only great city.

Unfortunately for Poland, the whole region constitutes a Polish enclave within White Russian and Lithuanian territory. A purely ethnographic frontier is very difficult to establish. Similarly, in East Galicia there are also Polish settlements in Ukrainian territory, including one of the most important centers of Polish culture, the predominantly Polish city of Lwów. Even a generous Soviet Government and a friendly Polish democratic regime would find it difficult, if not impossible, to hit upon a solution which would be equally fair to Soviet Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and White Russians, and at the same time fair to Poland.

Not even such a steady defender of Polish-Soviet understanding as the well-known Polish-American democrat Professor Oscar Lange has a ready answer, but in a letter published in the October 5, 1943, issue of the *New York Herald Tribune*, he acknowledges the seriousness of the problem:

The Polish nation must recognize the right of the Ukrainian and White Russian to national reunion with the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia . . . on the other hand, the Soviet government should recognize the existence of

ancient centers of Polish culture (such as the city of Lwow, for instance) which, though situated in ethnographically Ukrainian or White Russian territory, form such an integral part of Polish national life that they cannot be separated from Poland without serious detriment to friendly relations between the Polish and Soviet peoples.

The final Polish frontier problem concerns the Polish-Czech boundary. On July 18, 1920, the Conference of Ambassadors granted the Cieszyn (Teschen) district, formerly Austrian Silesia, to Czechoslovakia, in opposition to Polish claims. In 1938, after Munich, the Polish Government forced Czechoslovakia to return this region. This was at the peak of Józef Beck's policy of collaboration with Germany, one of the most shameful pages in the history of the Polish Republic.

The Polish Government considers that this region has a Polish majority; the Czechs deny it. The difficulty lies in the fact that an important section of the population considers itself neither Polish nor Czech, but Silesian. Each of the two articulate groups—Czechs and Poles—tries to claim them for its own. The Polish Government's refusal to cancel the treaty of 1938 has created strong anti-Polish feeling among the Czechs. We can only hope that direct negotiations between a genuinely democratic Poland and Czechoslovakia will bring about a compromise solution to this problem.

Of what will the new Poland consist, if her frontiers are established according to our suggestions? The following figures are only approximate:

A POSSIBLE FUTURE POLAND

	<i>Square Miles</i>	<i>Population</i>
Poland of 1939, minus		
Soviet-occupied region	74,000	22,000,000
German Upper Silesia	3,750	1,500,000
East Prussia	14,290	2,350,000
Danzig	750	400,000
Bialystok-Lomza region	6,750	1,000,000
	<hr/> 99,540	<hr/> 27,250,000

In this total are comprised the Lithuanian part of East Prussia and the Cieszyn region. Some boundary changes should be made in favor of Poland, while a part of the territory of 1939 ought to be returned to Czechoslovakia; hence these figures may be considered reasonably realistic.

Thus the future Polish state would be smaller than that of 1939; it would consist of some 100,000 square miles instead of 150,000. It would have a smaller population—a possible 27,000,000 instead of 35,000,000—but it would be more homogeneous. Taking into account the annihilation of a large proportion of the Jews by the Germans, the future Poland would be nearly 90 per cent Polish after the elimination of the German minority. Arrangements could be made to repatriate some of the fairly large Polish minority in the Soviet Union, to take the place of the Germans leaving Poland.

From an economic point of view, Poland could only gain by these boundary shifts. The poor eastern regions which she would lose have no natural resources, with the exception of some oil fields in the Drobohyecz district. On the other hand, she would gain by the resources of German Upper Silesia, the expanded access to the sea, and the facilities of the port of Danzig—all important assets, which would pave the way for industrialization and economic progress in Poland.

We now come to a consideration of the problems of domestic reconstruction and the internal political reorganization of Poland on a democratic basis. One of the paramount factors is the physical and biological destruction of the Polish people, which was the primary aim of the German occupation of Poland. This policy of extermination has, in large measure, already been accomplished with regard to the Jewish population of Poland; 1,600,000 out of 3,300,000 died before the autumn of 1943. In addition, 1,500,000 other Poles were murdered.

Despite Germany's efforts, there has not been a moment's doubt among Poles that Poland would be restored after the war. From the first day of the occupation, plans, projects, and ideas concerning Poland's future have been maturing among the émigrés and in the Polish Underground. The differences between the proposals and programs of the two groups express the deep disparity in their attitudes toward the essential problems of Polish life.

The Polish Government-in-exile in London has given much thought to the problems of reconstruction. Numerous commissions, offices, and institutions are dealing with them. A special ministry in charge of preparation for the peace conference has been established within the Government; another is studying the problems of postwar administration in Poland. It is sufficient to know who heads the "postwar ministry" to form an opinion of his plan. The man entrusted with the task of preparing Poland's case for the peace conference is Marjan Seyda, one of the leaders of the National-Democratic party (*Endeks*). Reactionary, chauvinistic, rabidly anti-Semitic, Seyda's ideals belong com-

pletely to the past. He was one of three ministers who resigned from the Government in protest against the Soviet-Polish treaty of July 1941.

Significantly enough, the plans for postwar administrative reform have never been published, although one study made in connection with this project attracted some attention in the Polish press in London. In a paper ordered by a government office, a "specialist" gave a detailed method for the execution of death penalties in the Poland of the future; he foresaw the necessity of increasing the number of hangmen, and made some practical suggestions concerning their work. Official denials of this policy contended that this paper was a purely private affair and had no importance; but it may show the direction of the thinking of the official London "brain trust."

An important role in the preparation of plans for postwar Poland is entrusted to the Minister of Education. Public instruction will perform a significant function in the restoration of Poland, which has been completely deprived of educational institutions since the outbreak of the war. This post has been entrusted to the Reverend Zygmunt Kaczynski, director of the influential Roman Catholic Agency, one of the outstanding representatives of reactionary Polish clericals. His ideas on the Jewish question were expressed in his speech before the Polish National Council (parliament-in-exile) in June 1942, in which he proposed to solve the Jewish question in Poland by forming a large Jewish reservation in Bessarabia. He expressed the hope that the interested governments "would consent to the repatriation of the Russians and Roumanians living in Bessarabia in order to make room for the Jews."

The official declaration of February 24, 1942, in which the Polish Government-in-exile outlines its programs, contains some good general statements, and little else. It expects a return to the status quo of 1939, except for a few reforms which would wipe out the worst features of the dictatorial regime of prewar Poland. The opening point reads as follows: "Poland will stand by Christian principles and culture." This is hardly a reassuring beginning. The role of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Poland is not customarily discussed, and the connection between Polish Catholicism and Polish anti-Semitism is not widely understood. But the hierarchy is both anti-Semitic and anti-Russian, and its role has been obscurantist. The presence of such a statement in the program serves notice that there is to be no change in the relations between Catholicism and the Polish state.

The implication of the opening point is borne out in the later pass-

ages of the declaration. True, it foresees that Poland will be a democratic republican state, with all civil freedoms guaranteed, but it will also "possess a strong and efficient executive power, capable of taking speedy and determined action to frustrate any intentions hostile to Poland." Consider Poland's history between the two World Wars, culminating in the ultimate triumph of the military leaders and Józef Pilsudski. It is certain that this last point has meaning only for these military leaders, who were associated with the late profascist Commander in Chief, General Sosnkowski. Their ideal is to restore Poland to her 1939 status, under the rule of a clique composed of the followers of Pilsudski.

The noteworthy feature of the program is the absence of any proposals for the economic and social reforms necessary to give the workers and the peasants an important place in Poland. Without reforms of this kind, no real democratization of Poland is possible. An illustration of the antidemocratic and reactionary tendencies of the Polish Government-in-exile may be found in its failure to repeal the anti-democratic laws enacted by the regime of Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz, such as the anti-Semitic Act of 1937 and the laws making membership in the Masonic movement and the Communist party a criminal offense punishable by several years' imprisonment. The legal basis of the present Polish regime in London is the fascist constitution of 1935, which gave President Wladyslaw Raczekiewicz the power to appoint General Sosnkowski Commander in Chief of the armed forces after Sikorski's death, against the will of the democratic groups in London. If the tendencies of the Government were truly democratic, it would be simple to return to the constitution of 1921, which established Poland as a republic with legislative powers vested in a Diet and a Senate.

Fortunately, the attitude of the Polish Government in London in this matter does not represent the sentiments of the Polish Underground movement—the labor and democratic movement which is the backbone of Polish resistance. A very interesting document published in 1943 by the Polish Labor Group in New York outlines the future of a Poland which is the hope and the goal of the workers, peasants, white-collar workers, and professional workers who represent the united democratic forces. This *Program for People's Poland* was drawn up in Poland by representatives of the democratic workers' and peasants' organizations, after numerous discussions at Underground meetings.

The program not only formulates concrete proposals for the recon-

struction of Poland on a democratic basis and on the principles of social justice, but it also shows the way to the realization of these aims. The authors of this program believe that the creation of a People's Government will free Poland from the German yoke. "The Polish Democratic Bloc must prepare both for an armed uprising against the occupation, and for a decisive struggle against domestic reaction. This is the only way in which the working masses of Poland will be able to overcome the resistance of those classes and groups which enjoyed social and economic privileges in prewar Poland, and which will undoubtedly attempt to regain these privileges in the new Poland."¹² Polish fighting democracy has no illusions about the coming struggle to overcome the obstacles which Polish reaction will place in the way of the creation of a "new epoch of peaceful domestic development and of fraternal co-operation with other free peoples."¹³

The program of the first People's Government of Poland comprises the following reforms to be carried out immediately after the liberation of Poland:

1. An audacious and radical agrarian reform.
2. Transfer to the state, local governments, or co-operative organizations of industrial enterprises which are ripe for socialization, and their utilization for social purposes.
3. Reform of the fiscal system in the direction of a just distribution of the fiscal burden among all social groups.
4. Annulment of all decrees of the enemy relating to the property and welfare of Polish citizens.
5. Proclamation of the criminal responsibility of all citizens who betrayed Poland and served the interests of the enemy.
6. Establishment of special courts to try the officials, civil and military, of the prewar regime who were responsible for the abuses perpetrated under that regime and for the ensuing resultant harm to the state and the people.
7. Elections to the Polish parliament through democratic suffrage.

This transitional program, to be realized immediately after Poland's liberation, will create the necessary democratic and social framework for the postwar rehabilitation of Poland. It is a bold plan for social reconstruction of the country based on the community of interest of peasants, workers, and professionals. It proposes a just redistribution of national income; the economic organization is to be modified to raise the volume of production and the general level of economic welfare. "This is the only feasible method of achieving a general improvement of the standard of living of the working masses, urban and rural."¹⁴

The representatives of the Polish Socialist party and the Polish Peasants' party in London have submitted this program to the Polish National Council, Poland's parliament-in-exile, as a basis for the post-war program of Poland. The majority of the Polish Council, however, refused the proposition as too radical. Especially shocking to the Polish conservatives and reactionaries were such ideas as the expropriation of big landowners, the nationalization of some branches of industry (despite the fact that the program stresses that only a limited number of great enterprises "ripe for nationalization," such as public utilities, will be put under state control), and the criminal prosecution of those persons in Poland's prewar regime who brought Poland to disastrous defeat in 1939.

The program found a better reception in Moscow, however. The Union of Polish Patriots discussed the problems of postwar Poland at their first conference in June 1943, and adopted the following program: Poland is to be a democratic, parliamentary republic, in which the agricultural system will be transformed by *giving* the land to the peasants. There will be no more domination by great landowners, capitalist monopolies, usurers, or speculators. The free farmer will till his own land. The workers and the professionals will have jobs, the protection of the state, and human living-conditions. Craftsmen, merchants, and industrialists will be aided by the state as part of the national economic plan. This program assures civil, political, and religious freedom, and the wiping-out of racial and national prejudices.

In both programs—that of the Underground democratic movement and that of the Union of Polish Patriots—special attention is given to the agrarian problem. Poland is primarily an agricultural country, and a sound solution of the problem of land distribution is the prerequisite of any reconstruction.

In 1931, 64.9 per cent of the entire working population of Poland was engaged in agriculture; to make a comparison, in the United States this figure amounted to 22 per cent, or one-third of the Polish figure. Thus it is plain that the distribution of land in Poland was extremely unequal. In 1921, two-thirds of the agricultural population had landholdings of 12 acres or less, which was not enough to support an average peasant family. Nearly 10,000,000 peasants owned only 15.3 per cent of the land. On the other hand, a handful of individuals owned almost one-half—43 per cent—of the total surface.

This discrepancy has always been the tragedy of the Polish village: peasants without land on the one hand, land without laborers on the other. Land hunger grows out of such maldistribution of property,

which on the smaller farms means actual want of bread; in larger landholdings it means shortages of other essentials; everywhere it hinders normal existence and causes misery such as has never been known in Western Europe or the United States.

The unsound structure of the Polish village shows itself in a large surplus of agricultural population, the so-called superfluous population that cannot be absorbed by agricultural work and cannot find any other work. According to calculations made on April 1, 1935, by Józef Poniatowski, who was the first to study this problem, "the number of persons who could be removed from agriculture without injuring the production was 5,000,000 actively occupied in farming; 8,000,000 of the total agricultural population." This means that nearly one-quarter of the total population of Poland was "superfluous."

Anyone attempting to improve the situation in Poland must consider the problem of landownership as essential. Since the rebirth of the Polish state in 1918, the peasants have been asking for land reform which would accomplish a reparation of property at the expense of the great landowners, for those who most needed the land were unable to pay for it. Actually, Polish land reform has been quite different. The big estates were curtailed, but the peasants who received the land were obliged to pay high prices for it. As a result, the debts of the already heavily burdened villagers were increased; also, part of the land went to those who had enough and therefore did not need the benefits of land reform.

As a result of this limited land reform, approximately 30 per cent of the land comprising the big estates passed to the peasants during the twenty years of Polish independence. This was an improvement, but considering the proportionate increase of the population in Poland, it was very slight. Moreover, the parceling of the land was so slow that its positive effects were weakened. Sixty per cent of the needs of the land-hungry peasants would be satisfied by a forceful and radical land reform, carried out according to calculations made in Poland before the war by the very competent Institute of Social Economy in Warsaw, which proposed the parceling of all estates over 125 acres, leaving their owners a nucleus of 125 acres. Any less radical measure would be only an opiate.

There is, of course, a direct connection between land reform and the program of general reconstruction of Polish economy. Only after liquidating the big estates, a survival of the feudal past, can the Polish village begin to solve the problem of raising the economic level of Polish life and introducing more progressive technical methods. With a

backward peasantry, Polish industry has no domestic market. The distribution of the land to the peasants will not solve all the problems of the Polish village, but improved social conditions will give the peasant human living-conditions and, with the help of the state, enable him to develop new forms of economic activity on his land. These will, in time, create a new agricultural system.

The *Program for People's Poland* defines the prospects of Polish agrarian evolution as follows: "The great landed estates will be expropriated without compensation—and turned into land reservoirs for parceling. Agrarian organization will rest on the basis of independent farms worked by the owners and their families. . . . All the technical, economic, and organizational deficiencies of the small-scale farming system will be remedied by the general co-operative system."¹⁵

Rural co-operation, which played an important role in Poland before the war—there were more than 1,500,000 members in the agricultural co-operative societies—was strengthened under the German occupation, as a convenient method of requisitioning crops. These co-operatives were under the complete control of the forces of occupation, but after Poland's return to autonomy they too will be liberated, and will have a tremendous role to play as democratic farmers' associations.

3. *The Balkans*

BALKAN politics can best be understood if they are projected against the background of their turbulent political, ethnic, and geographical history. Sixty million people live in the Balkan Peninsula, which lies south of the Danube and Save rivers. Politically, it includes the states of Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria. To these we should add Hungary, which just touches the northern boundary of the peninsula. Although not, strictly speaking, a Balkan country, Hungary shares the fate of the Balkans, as they share hers.

Geography has strongly influenced the history of the Balkan peoples. Unlike the other two Mediterranean peninsulas, the Pyrenean and the Apennine, the Balkan Peninsula is not separated from the European continent by any wall of mountains. The Danube is not an effective barrier, and the peoples on both sides of the river have always intermingled more or less freely.

In effect the Danube constitutes a corridor linking Central with Southeastern Europe, and Europe with the steppes and Asia Minor. From the earliest days, the Balkans have been a bridge between Europe and Asia, between the East and the West. They have been a link between different cultures, and also a theater of continual bloody conflict, easily accessible from both Europe and Asia. At Belgrade, three traditional routes converge: the first, the highway and waterway along the Danube Valley; the second, the line through Niš, Sofia, and Edirne (Adrianople), now followed by the transcontinental railway to Istanbul; and the third, the route through Niš and Skoplje, along the valleys of the Morava and the Vardar to Thessalonikē (Salonika), thence by sea or by the centuries-old coastal route to the ancient capital of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires. The armies of European and Oriental conquerors sweeping along these roads usually aimed not only at conquering the Balkans themselves, but at crossing them to go

farther. Great invasions and migrations have passed eastward and westward, each leaving straggling remnants in its wake.

From Alexander of Macedonia to Adolf Hitler, the Balkans have known little peace. War is the normal state and peace but an interlude. For the past hundred years, most of the wars between the Great Powers of Europe have arisen in the Balkans or have been connected with Balkan conflicts. Statisticians have calculated that the Balkans have been invaded three times as often as any other part of Europe, and that four times as many battles have been fought there as in that other historical theater of war, the plain of Flanders.

Although there is no wall of mountains to interfere with traffic between the Balkans and the rest of the Continent, much of this region is mountainous and very hard to penetrate. "Balkan" is the Turkish word for "mountain." The peninsula is corrugated by mountain valleys with difficult and scant communication between them. The roads from the seacoasts into the interior are poor. This topography has hampered the process of state-making in the Balkans. It is certainly one of the main reasons why the Balkan Peninsula, unlike the Iberian and the Italian, has been unable to attain political unity in our time. It is interesting to note, however, that a more or less complete unification of the Balkan Peninsula has been achieved at least four times in the past: first, under Alexander the Great and his successors; second, under the Roman Empire and during the first Byzantine centuries; third, under the Byzantine Emperor Basil II, "the Bulgar Butcher"; and fourth, under the Turkish Empire, from the fall of Constantinople in the fifteenth century to the "renaissance of the nationalities" in Europe in the nineteenth century.

The complexities of Balkan history and the continuous migrations within and from the peninsula have complicated immeasurably the racial and national picture of this region. The mountains have combed off remnants from each passing army and nation. Rival cultural, religious, and national tendencies have pushed into the peninsula and survived. There Latin, German, Greek, Slav, and Turkish streams have met, battled, influenced one another, mingled.

The title of "melting-pot" has been claimed by many regions of the world, from fifteenth-century Italy to the United States and South Africa of today. But there has rarely been a melting-pot equal to Hungary and the Balkans. Within an area not much larger than Texas live 60,000,000 people divided among five religions, seven states, and more than fifteen races and nationalities. The prevailing faith is the Eastern Orthodox Church, which creates a link between the Balkan

peoples and the Orthodox Russians. The others are Catholic, Protestant, Moslem, and Jewish.

The main national groups are: Southern Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes); Greeks; Romanians; Bulgars; Albanians; Turks; Tatars; Hungarians; Ukrainians; Jews; Gypsies; Armenians; Caucasian Circassians; Pomaks; Macedonians; Germans; and Italians. They do not live in separate groups, but are so intermingled that it is extremely difficult to distinguish them.

Some Balkan minorities are enclaves within areas occupied by other nations. For instance, 500,000 Magyars of the ancient Szekler stock form a sort of national island in the Carpathian Mountains, practically in the center of Romania. On the other hand, the bulk of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia is dispersed throughout the country, and about 1,000,000 Turks and Tatars are scattered through Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The latter are generally peasants or artisans, differing from their Christian neighbors mainly in that they raise no hogs!

The modern history of the Balkans starts with the French Revolution, when the peninsula was still under Turkish domination. The influence of "French ideas" awakened the national energies of nations which for centuries had not had any independent life. National uprisings followed one another all through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Finally, in 1912, during the First Balkan War, Turkey was deprived of all but a small part of her Balkan territory. The magnificent and amazing renaissance of language and literature among the Balkan Slavs began with that period.

The elimination of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy after the First World War created a historical framework in which the Balkan peoples were theoretically free to develop their national and social life. There were no longer any external hindrances to democratic evolution. There were, however, powerful obstacles within most of the Balkan states, as a result of their internal structure and the failure of the regimes established after the war. Aggressive foreign forces, taking advantage of these internal weaknesses, interfered in Balkan affairs and helped to prepare for the present catastrophe.

Co-operation between the Balkan nations and the Great Powers is an economic, political, cultural, and military necessity. Yet the Great Powers considered the Balkan nations not as sovereign political entities, but as an instrument for power politics. They were extremely mistrustful of the Balkan peasants. In their efforts to suppress Balkan revolutions, the Great Powers supported the most reactionary cliques,

fostered the spread of corruption, opposed all reasonable solutions of the conflicts between Balkan nations, created artificial frontiers, and helped military dictatorships to maintain themselves in office. Lombard Street considered the Balkans ideal terrain for exploitation, and played one ruling group against another. Thus the liberation of the Balkans from the foreign yoke—Turkish and Austro-Hungarian—did not bring democracy and liberty to the Balkan nations, but created several centers of fascist infection, which helped to cause the Second World War, as they had contributed to the First.

Russia's role in the Balkans has been basically different from that of the Western powers. There are two reasons for this difference: (1) the ties of origin and culture between the Slavs of the great empire of the East and those of Southeastern Europe; and (2) the fact that throughout the nineteenth century Russia was pregnant with revolution, a condition that influenced the internal as well as the foreign policy of Russian Czarism.

The great Ukrainian liberal writer of the nineteenth century, Michael Petrovich Dragomanov, defined the specific relationship of Russia to the Balkans when he wrote of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877:

If some one could yet doubt that it is difficult for Russia to make war on the Balkan Peninsula, a simple military war, and not a war for clearly defined principles of national, political and social freedom, i.e. a revolutionary war, he has only to think over . . . the role of Austria. . . . The march on Constantinople is essentially a revolution; therefore, in order to be successful, it must be associated with an open revolution of the Rumanian, Bulgar, Greek, Serb, Albanian peoples; even more, this revolution had to find support, if not a parallel revolution among the [Slav] peoples of Austria.¹

This revolutionary ideal retains its burning interest for the Balkan peoples today, nearly seventy years later. The tragedy of the Balkan states is that their liberation was accomplished without transforming their social structure. The Balkan revolution which is going on now has to complete the historical tasks which previous revolutions, directed solely against foreign oppressors, did not succeed in performing. The peoples of the Balkans have to pay for postponing this social revolution with indescribable economic misery. The responsibility for the failure to accomplish it sooner lay mainly with Czarist Russia, as Dragomanov points out in his excellent analysis:

The lack of political freedom in Russia and the existence in Russia of the Turkish regime . . . are the main causes of existence of Turkey in the nineteenth century. . . . Since the soldiers of Catherine the Great and the "Cos-

sacks" went . . . on the Alps to "save the thrones and altars shaken by the French subversive ideas" (at the end of the 18th century), the existence of the Turkish empire . . . was assured for a long time. . . . An absolutist state cannot serve faithfully the cause of freedom and self-government of Slav and non-Slav tribes even under Turkey. . . . This contradiction under the so-called "historical mission of Russia" [the expulsion of the Turks from Europe] and the Turkish regime in Russia itself is perfectly understood by all the "friends of Turks in the rotten West, beginning with Metternich and ending with Disraeli."²

Thus, in contrast to Austria-Hungary and to some extent Great Britain, Russia played a dual role in the Balkans in the nineteenth century: that of the big Slav brother and liberator from the Turkish yoke, and that of an ally of the other Great Powers—an imperialistic role. This duality sowed the seeds of conflict between Russia and the Western Great Powers supporting Turkey, who formed a kind of cordon sanitaire against the potentially revolutionary influence of Russia. A survey entitled *South-Eastern Europe*, made a year after the beginning of the present war by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, makes this statement:

With the emergence of Russia as a Great Power, the Ottoman Empire came to be regarded by some almost as a bulwark of the European "Balance of Power" in South-Eastern Europe, and Great Britain made its maintenance the cardinal principle of her foreign policy. . . . It is true that the Great Powers [after the fall of the Ottoman Empire] did not on the whole directly encroach excessively upon Balkan territory, but that was due in the first place to the determined resistance of the Balkan peoples themselves; and it was due in the second place to the inability of the Powers to come to an agreement as to how the spoils should be divided.³

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, German imperialism became the main aggressor in the Balkans as well as in Europe as a whole. The Hapsburg monarchy was merely a cat's-paw, and the Italian and Hungarian satellites played a negative role.

After the First World War, Russia, purged of her imperialist aims by the revolution, became the mainstay of all Balkan liberation movements. Today, as she emerges the greatest military power in Europe, Russia is in a position to fulfill her "historic mission of liberation" toward her South Slav brothers. Under these conditions, the traditional attitude of the Western powers toward the Balkans cannot be maintained. The policy of balance of power and of "Divide et impera"

is impotent in the face of the gravitation of the South Slavs toward the new Russia.

The basic economic factor in the Balkans is that 36,000,000 out of a population of 60,000,000 are peasants. While 72 per cent of the total Balkan population is either directly or indirectly connected with agriculture, in Bulgaria the percentage is as high as 80. Only in Hungary, where agriculture claims 50.8 per cent, is there anything like an industrial working class. Balkan workers are unorganized. Industry, commerce, and banking are still in the primitive stages and have often been in foreign hands or run directly by the state. Therefore the capitalist class as such has played a relatively small role in the real life of these countries. It has been merely the handmaiden of a combination of feudalism and colonialism. The native intellectuals are also few and, in general, poor. Almost one-third of the city-dwellers are bureaucrats.

It is difficult to describe the economic misery of the Balkan peasants. To say that they are underfed and poorly clothed and that they live under intolerable housing-conditions is an understatement. A medical survey made just before the Second World War disclosed that 40 per cent of all the young men in Dalmatian villages were unfit for military service because of tuberculosis or malaria brought on by malnutrition and poor housing. Thirty per cent of all rural dwellings in Romania are built of mud and clay and consist of a single room for both men and cattle. In every Macedonian village there are huts perched on four stilts, woven of switches, plastered with mud, and covered with straw. Even in Croatia, there is for the most part only one bed for each entire peasant family. In Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia, the majority of the peasants do not know mattresses or even straw sacks; their beds are mere wooden planks, often simply the floor, with a stone to serve as pillow.

To buy a pair of shoes the Bulgarian peasant must work thirty-five days; the Hungarian, forty-five; and the Macedonian, seventy. The Bosnian peasant has to give two pounds of wool for two pounds of nails, and 225 pounds of wheat for a pair of shoes. Matches are precious; each match is split into four sections for economy. In Dalmatia, two boxes of matches are worth forty-four pounds of barley. The use of flint for making fire is forbidden throughout the Balkans, because the government monopoly on the sale of matches is important to their revenues. If a Romanian peasant is caught using flint, he is fined from 1000 to 5000 lei, the value of from one to three cows.

Modern machinery is unknown to the great majority of Balkan

peasants, who are usually too poor to buy new farm implements without going to the loan sharks. For the most part, primitive tools are still in use. More than 750,000 wooden plows are still turning the fields. Before the war Yugoslavia imposed a customs tariff of 300 dinars on the smallest imported iron plow. This was supposed to "protect" the Yugoslav iron-plow industry against foreign competition, although that industry produced exactly fifty iron plows a year. This, then, is one of the main reasons for the incredible indebtedness of the peasants in Southeastern Europe: out of 800,000 peasant holdings in Bulgaria, only 400,000 have the use of a plow.

"Too poor to own a plough or even a horse, they are nevertheless not too poor to work for six months of the year for the benefit of the most corrupt bureaucracy in all Europe," writes H. H. Tiltman in a study of the living-conditions of the Romanian peasant.⁴ This statement holds equally true for the peasantry of the other Balkan countries.

In spite of many agrarian reforms and laws abolishing semifeudal conditions, the peasant of Southern Europe still lives like a serf. In Dalmatia, the *tezhak*, the tenant farmer, must surrender one-third of his crop to the *gospar*, the landlord. In 1933, 25 per cent of Bulgaria's population was composed of *bezkutchnitsi*, migratory farmers, the "Oakies" of the Balkans. The Macedonian peasant has to pay from 20 per cent to 50 per cent of his yield from sales on the market for taxes and bribes. In Greece, 60 per cent of the yield of vineyards goes for taxes. A Romanian peasant who wants to sell cattle on the market must pay a *baksheesh*—a bribe—above the tax. Thus, two calves may bring in 1200 lei, but taxes and *baksheesh* devour 760 lei, leaving the peasant barely 40 per cent of the sales price for himself.

Stoyan Pribichevich, the author of several books on the peasant in Southeastern Europe, has calculated that the average indebtedness of the Balkan peasant, translated into American terms and conditions, would correspond to a debt of \$50 for each member of his family. Against this staggering load, the migratory farmers of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary are able to earn an average of about \$55 a year.

The peasant's list of dependents is tragically long. To the tax collector, the landlord, the *baksheesh*-demanding official, must be added the Church. Even the Croatian peasant, who is better off than most of his Balkan brothers, has a saying "The monk is heavier than the tax."

Land distribution reflects many survivals of feudalism. This is especially true in Hungary, whose peasants have been nicknamed by their Balkan brothers "the three million beggars of Hungary." It is easy to see why. Thirty per cent of all the land is in large estates of more than

1400 acres, owned by 1232 wealthy landowners who constitute 0.1 per cent of the population. Eleven per cent of the land is divided into small holdings of less than 7 acres, owned by 1,142,294 peasants. Fully 40 per cent of the peasantry owns no land whatsoever. Not only these landless peasants, but many of the small landowners who cannot make a living out of their minute lots, are obliged to accept starvation wages as seasonal workers on the large estates. Thus about 3,500,000 peasants out of a rural population of 4,500,000 are living in dire poverty.

Even this inequitable distribution represents some improvement. Previous to 1920, only 34.5 per cent of the land belonged to those who cultivated it themselves. Four-fifths of the population owned less than 20 acres or no land at all. Twenty per cent of all the land was held by 324 landowners whose holdings averaged 41,000 acres. The Eszterházy family alone owned 570,000 acres, and the Church about 1,000,000 acres. In 1920 a so-called land reform was introduced. Officially, 1,000,000 acres were distributed, but in reality the peasants received only about 500,000 acres altogether. Their average allotment was 1 to 3 acres each, whereas a Hungarian peasant needed at least 12 acres to feed himself and a family of five. Most of the peasants who were given land under the land reform were therefore compelled to continue to work as laborers on the large estates for whatever wages they could get.

Ten years after the land reform was instituted, 1,000,000 rural workers out of a population of 8,500,000 still had no land of their own; in addition there were 600,000 domestic laborers on the big estates who owned no land, and 300,000 peasants owning less than an acre. Thirty-six big landowners still owned as much acreage as 1,184,783 peasants who had less than 5 acres each. The yearly income of a rural worker was not more than \$100, and whereas the big landowner paid 10.74 pengös (about \$2.25) land tax per acre, the small holder had to pay 16.79 pengös (about \$3.40).

The rural working class cannot hope to find work in Hungary's industries, which support only 600,000 industrial workers. The impoverished peasant has no choice but to work on the big estates for starvation wages—or to emigrate. In the last ten years before the First World War nearly 2,000,000 Hungarians emigrated to the United States.

It seems to have been the deliberate policy of the Hungarian ruling class to keep at the lowest possible level not only the standard of living but also the standard of education. Up to 1918, 31 per cent of the people could neither read nor write. Under the Horthy regime, the number of illiterates dropped to 10 per cent or 15 per cent, not because

of any special efforts on the part of Admiral Horthy but chiefly because the districts with the highest percentage of illiteracy had been surrendered to Yugoslavia and Romania.

Transylvania, a Hungarian province assigned to Romania in 1919, was essentially Romanian in character, as the statistics of both countries showed. The Hungarian census of 1919 revealed that Romanians constituted 57 per cent of the population; Hungarians and Jews, 34.3 per cent; and Germans, 8 per cent.

The fact that the Magyars have ruled this region for a thousand years influences the Hungarian attitude toward Transylvania. The Hungarians were always the warriors and the masters, the Germans the traders, the Romanians the peasants. Consequently, the Hungarian masters considered the Romanian peasant to be of an inferior race which could only obey and was unable to take part in the government. The Romanian peasants under Hungarian rule were subjected to a forced Magyarization; and most of them, no less than 78 per cent in 1914, were illiterate.

Ironically, the Treaty of Trianon, which was concluded in 1920 between the Allies and Hungary, placed more than 1,500,000 Hungarians under Romanian rule. They were not all concentrated near the Hungarian frontier—540,000 were located in the extreme southeast of Transylvania, exactly in the heart of Greater Romania—but the majority did not accept the new domination. Their attitude resembled that of the German minority in Poland; they could not agree to be ruled by a race they considered inferior. And the Romanian policy of discrimination against them did not ease the situation.

The Hungarians naturally utilized the Romanian crisis of 1940 to formulate their demands concerning Transylvania. On August 30, 1940, Ribbentrop returned to them the greater part of Transylvania—17,500 square miles with a population of 2,370,000. About 1,370,000 Romanians were thrown back under Hungarian rule. The Magyar landlords who had been dispossessed of their lands by Romanian agrarian reform came back to Transylvania eager to recover their properties, and energetic Magyarization was immediately resumed. The Romanian peasants were faced with the loss of their lands and a return to serfdom.

Since a democratic Balkan Europe can be based only on the liberation of the peasantry and the liquidation of the feudal land system, the power of the Hungarian landlords of Transylvania will have to be broken. Those who are unable to accept the status of equal citizenship with peasants under the Romanian Government may have to be

dealt with by an exchange of nationals between Romania and Hungary. Tens of thousands of Hungarians could be returned to Hungary as a result of minor rectifications of her frontiers. Even the 1919 frontier with Romania could be settled fairly easily if democracy should be established in the two countries. It cannot be emphasized enough that a solution is possible only on the basis of a democratic Hungary which would renounce any idea of dominating the Slav and Romanian peasants.

The structure of Hungary which makes her the most feudal country in Europe has already been discussed. As part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Hungarian state had a territory of some 125,000 square miles and a population of more than 20,000,000. Some 10,000,000 Hungarians ruled over some 2,000,000 Slovaks, 1,000,000 Ruthenes, 3,000,000 Romanians, 3,000,000 Serbs and Croats. There were also about 1,000,000 Germans scattered through the country.

The peace of Trianon left Hungary 35,740 square miles, with more than 9,000,000 inhabitants. Despite some injustices, these boundaries created an ethnographic Hungary which could in time play a useful role in the family of nations.

After the collapse in 1918, the Hungarian people tried to break with the past and make a new start. Both the Hungarian revolutionary popular government, with Count Michael (Mihály) Károlyi as Prime Minister and later President of the short-lived Hungarian Republic, and the soviet regime under Béla Kun, aimed at the establishment of a democratic state. However, the counterrevolution had the support of the victorious Allied powers, who were ready to join forces with anybody to fight Bolshevism. With the support of the Allied military commanders, the Romanian Army marched on Budapest and suppressed the "Bolshevik menace." It was then that Admiral Miklós Horthy established his dictatorship, restored the landlords to power, and immediately began his revisionist campaign. Unable and unwilling to satisfy the popular demand for social reforms, his government concentrated all its energies on a program of external expansion. Thus the Allies, by their counterrevolutionary policy in Hungary in 1919, laid the groundwork for Hungary's re-entry into war twenty-two years later on the side of German imperialism. An ultimatum demanding the removal of Hungarian troops from the border was tendered to Count Károlyi and his government on March 19, 1919, by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Vyx, head of the Allied Military Mission. This was the final blow to the Hungarian Republic.

Count István Bethlen, the Prime Minister who later became famous

for his revisionist policy and for the scandal of the forged French and British banknotes,* in 1919 called in the Romanians to crush the Hungarian Red Army. Like M. Thiers in 1871, like General Franco in 1936 and Marshal Pétain in 1940, he sought the help of the enemy against his own people. Together with Admiral Horthy, Bethlen was responsible for the aggressive policy which for twenty years prevented any kind of peaceful understanding with neighboring countries, and actively helped pave the way for the Second World War, for he continued to play an important part in Hungarian politics even after his resignation in 1931.

Today, no doubt, the Horthy clique would like to desert the sinking ship and accept any peace as long as they could keep their class in power. They may try to repeat their feat of 1919 by embarking upon another anti-Bolshevist crusade. The situation is more difficult today, but they might think the Allies could be misled once more by the fiction that the Hungarian counts and landed gentry were, are, and always will be the best of all possible democrats.

Early in the present struggle Hungary committed herself to active co-operation with Germany against the Allies. The victories of the Red Armies, the losses among the Hungarian troops, together with the decimation of the armies of Romania, her most dangerous neighbor, not only reduced Hungary's contribution to the new Europe and consequently her status in Hitler's world, but also made it essential that she reconsider her position. The most urgent needs were to get her Army home and to preserve the foundations of the regime. In order to maintain the power on which it rested, the parliament, which was controlled by the reactionary clique, was indefinitely prorogued. In April 1942 all nationalist bodies were combined into a single organization—the National Defense Association, under Horthy's one-time aide-de-camp, General László Magashazy. In July 1943 authorization was given to the Minister of the Interior to organize an armed auxiliary police force, with the aim of preventing another 1918. The following facts must be stressed:

1. As long as Hungary and Germany retain their present political, social, and educational structure, it is futile to think that they can be alienated from one another. Hungary is encircled by three neighbors who for centuries have had territorial and national claims against her. The only factor that for centuries has helped Hungary to survive this state of affairs has been the backing of the Germans, who in one way

* In 1929, Hungarian Government officials counterfeited French and British currency, with the knowledge and approval of Bethlen.

or another have exploited the Hungarians for their own aims, as they have done in the present war. Hungary, like Germany, must be re-educated; she must pass through a similar political and moral revolution. There is no other road to peace and co-operation in the Danube Basin.

2. Hungary began this war with the same aim as Germany, using the same methods. She wished to destroy the prewar states of Central Europe. She allied herself with two dictatorships and profited by their aggression and the violation of her own pledges. She then entered the war herself, and with the aid of Germany destroyed her freely undertaken pledges, first toward Czechoslovakia, then toward Romania, then toward Yugoslavia. Finally, she declared war on the Soviet Union, the British Empire, and the United States of America. Will Hungary after the present war be rewarded for all this by being allowed to keep any part of the territory of which she has robbed her neighbors who are today occupied by herself and Germany, and who are persecuted by the Germans and the Italians—a persecution in which the Hungarians themselves have a large share?

The common people of Hungary as well as everywhere else in the world want peace and social security. They want to live in amity with their neighbors and—they want to live. Like all nations of Europe, Hungary needs the help of the British, American, and Russian peoples. The Hungarian people need assurance that neither Horthy nor Bethlen will be appointed the Badoglio of Hungary.

Count Michael Károlyi, who now lives in England, might better be consulted as a potential Hungarian leader than the fascist Tibor Eckhardt, whom our State Department continued to encourage throughout 1943. He is better fitted to negotiate with the democracies, and his record of opposition to the fascist forces in Hungary's recent history indicates that he could successfully lead a democratic Hungary into a confederation of Central European states without antagonizing Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania.

The only other Balkan country in which there are large estates and farms is Romania, but here considerable redistribution was effected by agrarian reform after the First World War.* At the outbreak of the Second World War the average size of all holdings was only 9.63 acres, but large farms of more than 247 acres accounted for no more than

* The agrarian reform had not been completed by 1940, and the division of some 3900 estates was still pending. Allocation had not been made of some 1,071,980 acres scheduled for division into small holdings of from 24.7 to 37 acres, and in an equal area the process was not complete.

15 per cent of the area; 36 per cent of the farm land was in tiny holdings averaging 4.69 acres. Today, 80 per cent of the 16,000,000 peasants live on farms below the subsistence minimum.

In most of Greece, with the exception of Thessaly, small peasant owners predominate, as is usually the case in mountainous territory. In Thessaly, Epeiros, Macedonia, and Eastern Thracia, the large estates which existed before 1914 have been largely broken up as a result of agrarian reform and refugee settlement. The land is mainly distributed among the peasants, freed sharecroppers who have become small holders, and the Greek refugees from Asia Minor who came as a result of the 1923 exchange of nationals with Turkey. The farms vary in size, but there are very few with an area as large as 61.75 acres.

The distribution of land in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia is principally in small holdings. There are few large farms. Barely 6 per cent of the area of Bulgaria is occupied by farms of more than 74.1 acres. Fifty per cent of the population owns less than is necessary to maintain the barest existence, and the average holding is 13.33 acres.

Of the 15,000,000 inhabitants of Yugoslavia, 12,000,000 are peasants, but less than 4,000,000 own any more than the 12.5 acres of land estimated as the minimum for the subsistence of a family of five. The agrarian reform worked out in Yugoslavia after the last war was exceptionally drastic and complete, yet 1,500,000 Yugoslav peasants are unable to wrest an existence from their soil, hence have to work as migratory, seasonal laborers. The average income of a peasant family in 1938 was only 1100 dinars, and the average taxes were 350 dinars per adult per year.

In Albania, about thirty families own almost all the good arable land, while 1,000,000 peasants work on poor soil or as tenants on the land of the begs (squires).

The political structure of the Balkan countries is the result of such social and economic conditions. The predominance of the peasantry, the unimportance of industry and commerce, the existence of extensive serfdom and of strong national conflicts, are all factors which create conditions favorable to dictatorship and inimical to the progress of democracy.

The most solid base for democracy would be an alliance of the workers' and peasants' parties which have been systemically persecuted by the Balkan governments. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, strong peasant parties existed in Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Their platform was not communistic, as they favored private ownership of the land; but they proposed the development of co-operatives as

a means of eliminating the exploitation practiced by the middlemen and of introducing more progressive methods in agriculture. In general, their ideology was anticapitalist, their aim a kind of farmers' democracy.

Peter F. Drucker, a student of Southeastern European questions, has analyzed the Balkan peasants' attitude as follows:

The Mid-Eastern peasant . . . is anti-capitalist in so far as he opposes concentration of wealth and tendencies to make money the yardstick for the whole economic life. . . . The industrialization of the peasant countries and the invasion of finance capitalism after 1918 appeared to the peasants therefore as a brutal assault upon their hard-won liberties and as exploitation fully as bad as anything done by their former foreign rulers. The result of this clash between the principles and political and social realities of peasant-Europe is the deep gulf which separates not only the people and their rulers, but also the people and their state. It is a moot question whether the peasants in 1938 were worse off or better off than in 1913. But it is certain that the peasants resent what they regard as treachery of their own rulers more than the ill-treatment meted out by their former oppressors, of whom, after all, nothing better was expected. . . .

The [Balkan] dictators with their retinue of court officials, officers, bureaucrats, bankers, and industrialists, are as much foreigners in their own country as the Lombard bankers were in medieval England. They have therefore to fall back upon one or two of the many tribal groups, with the result that there is real discrimination against the members of other groups. . . .

The overwhelming majority of the population being peasants, no government could maintain itself in these countries against their organized opposition regardless of police terror, election maneuvers, and ballot stuffing. And in every one of the peasant countries except Hungary the peasant parties actually ruled for considerable periods. . . .

Since their fall the present masses have had no share in the government and no influence in the shaping of their own destinies. They are a sullen, bewildered, and embittered opposition in their own countries, which are run on principles which from the peasant point of view seem to deny the rights and even the existence of the human being known as peasant.⁵

All the Balkan countries are kingdoms—Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Hungary, and Albania. Balkan kings are a special breed of royalty: the Yugoslav and the former Albanian kings are descended from mountain peasants, and the others from venturesome German princes. Virtually self-made men, they are strong-handed absolutists, but they seldom head totalitarian parties, however desperately they may try to create them. The Army and the bureaucracy are their props. Some are quite wealthy: the King of Romania had a salary of over \$700,000 a year, while the King of Yugoslavia was even better off—he

received \$3,000 a day! Even in exile he continues to receive extravagant sums of money.

The Army became dominant in Balkan politics for a simple reason—during many decades leaders were needed to struggle against the foreign oppressor or defend national independence; they simply remained a ruling caste in peacetime. Romania is reputed to have a higher ratio of officers to men than any of the larger European armies. In prewar Yugoslavia there were about 170 generals to a population of 15,000,000. A comparable figure for the United States would be 1470 generals in command of an American peacetime army of 280,000 men!

The present Balkan revolution, which manifests itself especially in Yugoslavia's magnificent National Front of Liberation and the Partisans of Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), is simply carrying on the best traditions of the Balkan people, which were expressed earlier in rebellions against the Turks and internal oppressors, and in the peasant movements between the two World Wars.

An important new feature of the current phase is the collaboration of peasants with workers and intellectuals, who are all aiming toward national and social liberation. The Balkan Communists, who have secret organizations in almost all Balkan countries, play an important role in this revolution, though their role is exaggerated by the professional "anti-Bolsheviks." The revolutionary movement is larger than that. It is a united front of communists, nationalists, and rebellious peasants.

Michael Padev in a recent book, *Escape from the Balkans*, explains the true character of Balkan communism and its foes:

Those who now fight Nazism, and its synonym oppression, in the Balkans did not start their fight when the Germans occupied their territory. They are the same who waged war against Boris, against Carol, against Paul and against the many Greek dictators, including Metaxas, long before war was declared. And this fight was a more important one than the inter-Balkan bickering upon which Western European diplomats concentrated their headaches. What is more, it was a fight that was unknown to Western Europeans, from whom information was withheld and who were instead vouchsafed lurid glimpses of the Bolshevik hogey. Any struggle of the Balkan peoples against their governments was reported as a Communist rising and in consequence public opinion in the West showed no dismay at the quelling of "Communist rebellions."

The situation in the Balkans is more easily understood if one bears in mind that none of these countries have had any free elections in the last ten years. The "Communist" elements were proclaimed illegal, their leaders imprisoned or killed and their organizations paralyzed. No trade-union movement and no asso-

ciation of workers which was independent of the government was allowed to exist. All were "Communist" and disposed of accordingly.

I have never belonged to any Communist organization but I do not doubt that if I were a Balkan worker—Bulgarian, Serb, Rumanian or Greek—I would be a Communist. In other words, I would want to see my fellow workers organized in professional associations and I would insist on the defense of workers' rights. Which does not mean that I would be any more of a Communist than Ernest Bevin in England or William Green in the United States.⁶

The Partisan and National Liberation Front movements represent the future of the Balkans. The various Balkan governments-in-exile, which throughout 1943 and the first half of 1944 were attempting to restore the status quo ante 1939, represent the past, which is condemned by history. This was tacitly acknowledged by the United States and even more so by Great Britain after the Teheran Conference. Both powers made a marked shift in favor from the Yugoslav and Greek governments-in-exile in Cairo to Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia and the resistance movements inside occupied Greece.

The Yugoslav Government in Cairo maintains a Postwar Reconstruction Committee of five members, under the joint supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Food and Supply. But to date all attempts of this Government to work out some kind of program for postwar Yugoslavia have failed, because of the conflict between its Pan-Serbian majority and the Croat and Slovene members. The Government-in-exile is in a permanent state of crisis. Its authority is unconfirmed by the people, and consequently its plans have little political value.

The Greek Government in Cairo has set up a similar special agency, under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor, to study the economic and social problems which will arise in Greece at the end of hostilities. But opposition to King George is so general that the committee's efforts are probably destined to be wasted.

The focal point of Balkan and possibly European revolution is Yugoslavia, where all the elements of conflict exist in concentrated form. "The Balkans in miniature—that's Yugoslavia." This is the definition of Stefan Radič, founder of the Croatian Peasant party and outstanding leader of the Balkan peasantry.

Yugoslavia came into existence after the First World War as a union of three South Slav nations with a population of about 7,000,000 Serbs, 3,500,000 Croats, and 1,175,000 Slovenes. The idea of Yugoslavia was a revolutionary one; its defenders were obliged to overcome not only

the resistance of the Great Powers, but also prejudices and mutual distrust among the South Slavs themselves. Although the Serb and Croat languages are the same, the Serbs use the Greek alphabet and the Croats the Latin; and while there is a similarity of racial origin, there are important cultural and religious differences. The Croat and Slovenes are mainly Roman Catholics and are influenced by the Latin West; the Serbs, who are Orthodox Catholics, have quite different historical traditions. Despite the lack of homogeneity, the powerful revolutionary trend of 1918 succeeded in establishing the new state, but the old ruling groups soon overcame the democratic elements and reinstated themselves in power and office.

The Pan-Serbs considered Yugoslavia nothing more than a Greater Serbia, where the Serbs were to be the masters and the other Slav groups citizens of second rank. The royal-military oligarchy of Belgrade thus betrayed the Yugoslav idea by creating a deep-seated division in the new state and promoting separatist tendencies in Croatia and Slovenia.

The military collapse of 1914 unfortunately did not change the fundamental ideology of the Pan-Serbs. On the contrary, they considered that the present war provided a unique opportunity to repair the "fatal mistake" of 1918—the creation of Yugoslavia—and establish in its place a Great Serbia embodying an important part of Croatia and Slovenia. The Royal Yugoslav Government-in-exile—a group consisting largely of second-rate politicians, former police officers, militarists, and chauvinists—became the center of this Great Serbian conspiracy, combining extreme nationalism with the most outspokenly reactionary policy in internal and social affairs. Draza Mihajlović and his Chetniks represent the same trend in Yugoslavia; their activities are directed not so much against their country's military and political enemies as against the Yugoslav revolution itself, and the people who have the same aims as the revolution—namely, the establishment of genuine democracy in Yugoslavia, the overthrow of the monarchy and military dictatorship, and complete equality between all the Yugoslav nations.

The Partisans of Tito represent the new Yugoslavia. The Partisan Army combines deep-rooted patriotism with very definite internationalism and an audacious, though moderate, social program. Their touchstone is not community of membership in a master race or a master nation, but the community of interest between antifascists and all popular forces united against the Germans, who represent in Europe, especially the South and East, the principle of master race and slave.

Tito's Yugoslav Army of Liberation has established collaboration with guerrillas in nearly all the Balkan countries, and with groups who are fighting Hitler in neighboring regions. It has admitted one Czech, one Hungarian, one Italian, and several German brigades. But it is even more significant that the Partisans have succeeded in establishing complete co-operation among Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes, thus proving in action that Yugoslavia is not an artificial creation, but a potentially great union of three free and equal nations.

In addition to these three nationalities, prewar Yugoslavia had a German minority of some 500,000 to 600,000. The postwar Government will have no choice but to deport these Germans, for like their compatriots in all the Balkan states, they proved to be a fifth column which smoothed the way for the German invader. The German minority in Romania was even larger, numbering between 700,000 and 800,000.

The most important boundary problems of Yugoslavia are those involving Italian claims to the west. Italy's participation in the First World War was bought by the Allies at the expense of the South Slavs. In the Treaty of London in April 1915, Italy was promised a strip of Austro-Hungarian territory on the Adriatic coast, and despite Wilson's protests at the Peace Conference, she received Venezia Giulia, which comprised the provinces of Gorizia and Trieste, both of which still have a Slovene majority, and Fiume, which has a Croat majority. Yet Italy claims all these provinces as Italian.

The Italians argue that Dalmatia too is a historically Italian region, that Italy has played a great role in its civilization, and that some cities are more Italian than Yugoslavian. This argument is often met in boundary disputes, particularly in Eastern and Southern Europe; a great proportion of the Polish and Hungarian demands is based on similar arguments, not to mention German claims. Nations which have played a dominant role in earlier relations with the Slav peasant peoples and have at some time succeeded in establishing domination over them cannot accept the idea of their liberation and evolution into equal members of the international community. Despite the fact that these three nations—Italy, Hungary, and Poland—have a fine historical record of fighting for liberation from foreign rulers, especially Germany, in their own attitude toward the Eastern or South Slavs they too often apply "German methods" of national persecution.

There can be no doubt that the majority of the population of Venezia Giulia are Slovenes and Croats. During the period between the two wars, there were at least 500,000 South Slavs, who were subjected to cruel persecution and denationalization by the Italians. It is true that

this persecution was imposed by Fascist officials, but the annexation of the region was accomplished by the pre-Fascist regime, unfortunately with a certain amount of support from Italian democratic opinion, and the administration was infinitely worse than the Austrian rule. In 1913, there were 321 Slovene and 167 Croat schools. The Italians closed them all, and the Croats and Slovenes were forbidden to attend school. The printing of Yugoslav books was a crime.

Since Trieste and Fiume are the natural ports of Croatia and Slovenia, Venezia Giulia rightfully belongs to Yugoslavia. The Italians living there should be given the opportunity of returning to the homeland, for by their imperialist ventures between the two wars they have proved that their influence in this region cannot be trusted.

It is unfortunate that so few Italian democrats have had sufficient courage to oppose nationalism and renounce the territory of Venezia Giulia. Even Count Sforza has earned the distrust of the Yugoslavs. As Foreign Minister in the period when Italy annexed Venezia Giulia, he accepted the collaboration of the Pan-Serbs, who were not interested in the fate of Croat and Slovene minorities. It was to be expected that Badoglio and the King would uphold the traditions of Italian imperialism, but future relations between Italian and Balkan democracy will be handicapped if the Italian democrats continue to keep silent or to oppose the just solution of this boundary dispute.

Italy became a member of the Axis not by accident, but because the Italian ruling groups succeeded in winning over a large proportion of the population to an imperialist program of expansion, which involved transforming the Mediterranean into *mare nostrum*. Military defeats did not liquidate the sources and bases of Italian imperialism. These sources have to be destroyed if Italy is not to return to Axis tactics. The Italian people have to understand, once for all, that it does not pay to adopt an imperialist policy, that there is not sufficient economic basis for Italy's becoming a Great Power, and that Italy will have her place in the family of free nations as an equal member only if she abandons her efforts to play a dominant role in the Balkans and the Adriatic area. Any "appeasement" of the Italian "Great Power madness" will have serious results.

The dead center of the maelstrom known as the Balkans is the barren country on both sides of the river Vardar—Macedonia, which strategically dominates the entire peninsula. Well over 1,000,000 of its 1,300,000 inhabitants are peasants. The richest land belongs to the great landowners, the begs. The peasants live in a state that amounts to serfdom.

The Macedonian language is neither Bulgarian nor Serb, though the Macedonians are South Slavs. History has developed here a particularly rich mixture of populations, rich even for the Balkans. Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Romanians, Serbs, Jews, and others are dispersed throughout the region. In Macedonia special mixtures are to be found, as for instance Albanianized Slavs, Hellenized Slavs, Hellenized Romanians, Islamized Jews, and so on. Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks have all claimed Macedonia and fought for domination over the territory.

The Macedonians became conscious of their national existence only toward the end of the nineteenth century when fighting against Turkish rule. Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria aided in this struggle, but after victory in 1912, they were unable to agree on what to do with the liberated country. The Second Balkan War of 1913 was the result. Macedonia was partitioned and remained so until after the First World War.

Greece received the smallest part, including the port of Thessalonikē. In the cities the population was predominantly Greek, but the provinces contained considerable non-Greek elements, especially the semi-nomad Vlachs of Romanian origin and the Macedonians who claimed to be Bulgars. Offsetting these, however, was the enormous influx of Greek population from Asia Minor after the First World War. In 1923 nearly 1,500,000 Greeks were exchanged for her 200,000 Turkish inhabitants. It was the classic example of the compulsory resettlement of whole populations, and it resulted in a definite improvement in Greco-Turkish relations.

These Greeks from Asia Minor were settled in Macedonia. The Vlachs were transported to Romania, the Macedonian Bulgars into Bulgaria. Their place was taken by Greeks. As a result, Greek Macedonia has become a completely Greek territory. The 60,000 remaining Macedonians are attached to Greece; they have no separatist ideas. Thus the problem of Greek Macedonia can be considered solved. The solution brought much suffering to the people concerned and created miseries and resentments among the emigrants and settlers, but in view of the national hatreds in other sections of the Balkans, the price appears relatively low.

The Serbs received the greater part of Macedonia, while the Bulgars, whose ambitions were frustrated in the partition, continued to demand the return of all of Macedonia to Bulgaria. An understanding of this conflict requires some knowledge of the history of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).

Macedonia is a land of peasant uprisings and rebellions. Rebels

plundered and killed the Turks, and were treated as heroes by their compatriots. This tradition explains the success of the IMRO, founded in 1893 with the aim of fighting for the liberation and complete independence of Macedonia. Originally it was a popular revolutionary organization, and a network of IMRO committees soon covered all Macedonia. The IMRO troops were organized as a kind of army under the direction of the Central Committee. The IMRO collected taxes, organized courts, and executed its decisions by force. It became a state within a state. In 1903 its committees prepared a general uprising, which the Turks suppressed with extreme difficulty. During the First Balkan War of 1912, they organized an uprising against the Turks, hoping that the result would be Macedonia's independence. Instead, Macedonia was divided between Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece.

After that partition, the *Komitajis* (members of the revolutionary committees) turned against Serbia, which received the largest section of Macedonia. Later the IMRO became an agency of Bulgarian reactionary and ultranationalist groups, linked with Italian imperialism. After the First World War, terrorist groups of the IMRO became very powerful in Bulgaria and formed the nucleus of the Bulgarian fascist counterrevolution which in 1923 overthrew the agrarian democracy of Prime Minister Alexandr Stamboliski. The strip comprising Bulgarian Macedonia became the center of IMRO activity, through the establishment of a kind of state and a base from which to attack and terrorize Serbian Macedonia. In Bulgaria any minister who dared oppose the IMRO was killed without delay.

The Pan-Serb policy of the Yugoslav monarchy unfortunately created political conditions which fostered such an organization. The rulers at Belgrade were determined to Serbianize Macedonia. Bulgarian schools were forbidden. Any form of Bulgarian or Macedonian national movement was outlawed and its members persecuted.

In the twenties, the IMRO degenerated into an organization of mercenaries and criminals. Its chief, Ivan Mikhailov, concluded a pact with Ante Pavelić, the Croatian *führer*. The murder of Alexander I of Yugoslavia in Marseille in 1934 is known to have been organized by both; the killer was Mikhailov's man.

After the defeat of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, the Bulgars, with the active co-operation of the IMRO, occupied Serbian Macedonia and established a bloody terror unparalleled even in that unhappy corner of the world. Bulgaria has participated in two wars as a partner of German imperialism for the sake of dominating Mace-

donia, but this record seems insufficient reason for allowing her to keep any Macedonian territory. Its inhabitants are not Bulgars, and the annexation of Macedonia would scarcely improve the lot of the Bulgarian people. The situation is a classic example of how fascist rulers utilize extreme nationalist elements in their weaker neighbors in order to extend their power and so reinforce their hold on their own people.

Perhaps the greatest contribution made by the Yugoslav Partisan movement headed by Marshal Tito is that it has succeeded in eliminating some of the old antagonisms between the Bulgar and Yugoslav peoples. The fact that large Bulgar contingents have fought with Tito since the early days of his resistance is a happy omen, and permits us to draw the conclusion that a Yugoslavia organized along such democratic and revolutionary lines will be able to live at peace with a democratic Bulgaria, where similar tendencies are also at work.

Economic conditions in Bulgaria require a domestic solution similar to that which the Partisans have suggested for Yugoslavia. Three-quarters of its population are impoverished peasants, and half the entire population is illiterate. Traditionally, the Bulgar people have considered Russia the "big Slav brother." Bulgarian independence was established with Russian help in the war of 1877, which cost the Russians 200,000 men, killed and wounded. Ever since, despite her partnership with Germany, Bulgaria has looked on Russia as her protector.

The influence of Russian ideas and literature, facilitated by the similarity of languages, is very great in Bulgaria. Michael Padev in his book, *Escape from the Balkans*, reports a jest which was very popular in Bulgaria in the summer of 1941: "If six Russian soldiers land at Varna how many will reach Sofia? Six million!"⁷ The population of Bulgaria being 6,000,000, the implication is that if six Russian soldiers landed in Varna, the whole Bulgarian nation would join up with them before they reached Sofia. He also tells that a football match held in Sofia in August 1940 between a local team and one from Moscow became an occasion for pro-Russian popular manifestation that could not be forestalled by an extraordinary mobilization of fascist police and military forces.

The sympathy of the Bulgarian people toward Russia was not weakened by the Russian Revolution. On the contrary, it became even stronger when the Soviet Government brought about social and economic improvements which were very attractive to the Bulgarian

peasants. After the debacle of 1919, Bulgaria entered into a phase of popular-democratic evolution under the leadership of Alexandr Stamboliski, founder of the Agrarian League and the son of a poor peasant. As Prime Minister, he gave Bulgaria one of the most radical agrarian reforms in all Europe; 125,000 acres of private land, 375,000 acres of government land, and 70,000 acres of community and Church land were expropriated, and 90 per cent parceled out to landless peasants.

At that time the Agrarians and the Communists had an overwhelming majority in Bulgaria. In 1919, they polled 51 per cent of all votes; in 1920, 70 per cent; and in 1923, 74 per cent. A fascist coup d'état interrupted this evolution. With the help of Macedonian terrorists and White Russian officers who had found asylum in Bulgaria, a reactionary regime was established, and the Agrarian and Communist movements were repressed with the greatest cruelty. The methods used by King Boris and his hangmen were the first instance of the Nazi technique of mass murder in prewar Europe. But by 1933, despite the white terror and the fraudulent elections, the Agrarian party and the Workers' party were polling 47 per cent of the total vote. Still the fascists did not give heed to the popular will, and the subsequent history of Bulgaria is filled with the struggles of the people against the King and the fascist cliques.

The foreign policy of Bulgaria can best be understood in the light of her internal history. How could a people who had shown themselves so overwhelmingly pro-Russian twice—in the First and Second World Wars—fight as an ally of Germany against Russia? The explanation lies in the policy of Bulgaria's ruling caste, which is related to the German dynasty of Coburg. Ruling over a peasant country with great revolutionary traditions and a strong radical popular movement, they doubtless felt that their only hope of survival lay in the support of European and international reaction, German autocracy, and later the Nazi gang. The shortsighted policy of the neighboring states and the Western powers in disregarding Bulgaria's national demands and feelings, especially with regard to Macedonia, has fostered the revisionist and pro-German policy of the Bulgarian royal oligarchy.

On September 5, 1944, the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria. This crisis, plus internal political pressure on the reactionary government of Premier Konstantin Muravieff, cut through the crisscross maze of intrigue surrounding the peace negotiations which for some six months Bulgaria had been conducting with Allied representatives in Cairo. Within forty-eight hours, Bulgaria was pried loose from the

Axis. The new government of the anti-German Premier, Colonel Kimon Georgieff, immediately initiated certain basic reforms. What is now necessary is the liquidation of the dynasty, which still remains an obstacle to the unification of all the South Slavs into one state.

The fact that Bulgaria did not form a common state with other South Slavs at the end of the First World War was not the result of a historical situation, but was due to the tactics of certain powers—especially Russia and Austria—which were afraid of Balkan revolution, and also to the anti-Balkan and counterrevolutionary policy of the Balkan dynasties themselves. It was essential to cultivate the differences between their states if these dynasties were to keep themselves in power. A liberated Yugoslavia and a free Bulgaria would have every reason to join together in a common state based on collaboration and equality. Within the framework of this great South Slav state there would be an honorable place for an autonomous Macedonia purged of the gangsters of the IMRO and of their bloody protectors in Sofia.

There is no reason to minimize the difficulties of this solution. Many prejudices and resistances would have to be overcome. However, the revolutionary fires which have been kindled by the Yugoslav Partisan movement have provided a magnificent opportunity for the molding of a new social and economic system in which old antagonisms can be destroyed and new political forms created.

The Dobrogea (Dobruja) problem enabled the Coburg dynasty of Bulgaria to win popular support for its revisionist policy. The repercussions of that policy helped to strengthen the position of the Hohenzollern dynasty in Romania. The Dobrogea is the territory bounded on the north and west by the Danube River and on the east by the Black Sea. It is important not only for its stretches of rich agricultural land, but also for its geographical position with regard to the navigable waters of the Danube, and its Black Sea port of Constanta. The Dobrogea covers an area of 8978 square miles and has a population of 906,490 inhabitants. In Northern Dobrogea there are between 60,000 and 100,000 Bulgarian peasants, living for the most part in villages which retain their Bulgarian characteristics. In Southern Dobrogea, which has an area of 2791 square miles and a population of 380,000, about one-third of the inhabitants are Turks and Tatars. There are also from 130,000 to 150,000 Bulgarians—mainly peasants, though there is a small middle-class element. Many of these Bulgars were driven out of Northern Dobrogea during the First World War.

Despite its Bulgarian majority, Northern Dobrogea, which was previously under Turkish rule, was ceded to Romania in 1878 by the Treaty of Berlin, which was drawn up by Russia and the Balkan states. Under the terms of the treaty, the territory north of a line starting eastward from the fortress of Silistria and terminating in the Black Sea at a point south of Mangalia was assigned to Romania. Thus Northern Dobrogea never formed part of Bulgaria after she became an autonomous state. In the years following 1878, and again after the Treaty of Bucharest which ended the Second Balkan War in 1913, Romania expropriated land in Northern Dobrogea on a large scale and made the individual Bulgarian peasant pay for what he was permitted to keep. This move resulted in the successful Romanianization of Northern Dobrogea as a whole, although the Bulgars in the district retain to this day their national consciousness.

Meanwhile, the same treaty gave Romania also the fortress of Silistria, and in spite of its predominantly Bulgarian population, Southern Dobrogea, which had developed into one of the main wheat-growing regions of Bulgaria. The Romanian boundary was now roughly fixed by the line Tutrakan-Dobrici-Balcic.

The wish to reconquer Southern Dobrogea was one of the reasons for Bulgaria's collaboration with the Central Powers in the First World War, which, owing to the great valor of the Bulgarian soldier, had fatal results for the Allied positions in the Balkans and contributed to the lengthening of the war. Afterward Romania received all Dobrogea—Northern as well as Southern—by the Treaty of Neuilly, which was concluded by the Allies and Bulgaria late in 1919.

The Romanians resumed the Romanianization of the Dobrogea, a familiar pattern. Bulgar schools were closed, newspapers and societies suppressed. The tiny farms of Bulgar peasants were seized and half were given to Romanian settlers, some of them former convicts. These measures succeeded in reducing the percentage of Bulgarians in Southern Dobrogea, but in 1940, despite governmental support, the Romanians constituted only the third largest numerical group—fewer than the Bulgars and the Turks.

In the summer of 1940, after the cession of Bessarabia to Russia and subsequent Hungarian demands for Transilvania, the problem of the Dobrogea was also put on the table. On August 21, 1940, Romania ceded Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria; arrangements were made for an exchange of populations, Bulgars from Northern Dobrogea exchanging farms with Romanians in the south. Despite the fact that the settlement was accomplished under semifascist regimes,

it can be considered reasonable and acceptable to both sides. In 1941, Mr. Vionel Virgil Tilea, President of Free Romanians in London, met Kosta Todoroff, one of the leaders of Free Bulgaria (now in this country), and they agreed on the principle of the cession of Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria. This settlement was accepted also by Russia and Great Britain.

After the First World War, Romania emerged the biggest Balkan state, having nearly 20,000,000 inhabitants and covering 114,000 square miles. Thirty per cent of the population was made up of minorities, such as Hungarians, Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Germans, and Bulgarians. Although Romania is the richest country in Southeastern Europe, and has vast and precious reserves of oil, timber, salt, and coal and extensive fisheries, its inhabitants are economically among the most miserable of all Balkan peoples. The responsibility lies with Romania's traditional ruling class, the boyars—great landlords.

As late as 1913, 0.5 per cent of the population owned the large estates which constituted 42.5 per cent of the arable land of the country. In a discussion of the failure of the agrarian reform in Romania, Frederic W. L. Kovacs quoted from the minutes of the parliamentary debates this sentence on the great landowners: "If the Boyar could have laid his hand on the sun, he would have seized it, and he would have sold to the peasants, for money, the light and the heat of God."⁸

Revolutionary uprisings among the peasants characterized the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Under peasant pressure a substantial land reform took place after the First World War, and a great proportion of the large estates was partitioned. The peasants who received the parcels of land, however, had no money with which to cultivate their new properties. Though the power of the boyars was weakened, the power of all kinds of moneylenders, middlemen, and higher government officials increased. The Romanian bureaucracy grouped around the monarch was influenced in its attitude toward the people by the boyar traditions which dominated the country. The growing dissatisfaction of the peasants was utilized by the Iron Guard, which was easily able to create a fascist and anti-Semitic movement.

Only once—during the period 1928-30—did Romania realize anything like a democratic government, that of the National Peasant party, under Iuliu Maniu. Unfortunately, Maniu was not strong enough to fight the boyar regime. He concluded an alliance with King Carol, who used Maniu's good offices in order to return to Romania

from exile, and then expelled him from office and established the rule of a reactionary and anti-Semitic camarilla. This regime prepared the way for fascism and the advent of Ion Antonescu, the Romanian quisling. As in Yugoslavia, fear of revolution pushed the ruling groups into collaboration with the Axis, despite the fact that because of her territorial acquisitions Romania was opposed to the revisionist principle.

The policies of the Romanian oligarchy and monarchy were influenced by a conflict with Russia, which dominated Romanian foreign relations during the period between the two wars. Romania is the only Balkan state having a common frontier with the Soviet Union, and the conflict relates to Bessarabia, which covers 17,000 square miles between the rivers Prut and Dnestr, and has 3,200,000 inhabitants. Bessarabia belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years after 1812, though ethnographically it was even at that time predominantly Moldavian or Romanian. There was, however, no special separatist movement until the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the early stages of the Revolution, Kerenski recognized Bessarabian autonomy in principle, but the question of the separation of the region from Russia was never even discussed.

The Bolshevik Revolution offered Romania the opportunity to seize Bessarabia early in 1918. The Western powers eventually recognized this seizure of the "Alsace of the Dnestr"—Britain in 1922, France in 1923, and Italy in 1927—but the Soviet Government did not. The bridges over the Dnestr which were blown up in 1918 remained unrepaired for sixteen years, and no communication existed between the two countries. For two years, from 1934 to 1936, during one of his many terms as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Titulescu tried to reach an agreement with Russia and to achieve a peaceful solution of the Bessarabian problem within the framework of co-operation with Russia against the German plans, but the royal-fascist camarilla of Bucharest dismissed him and opened the way for collaboration with Hitler.

Romanian rule in Bessarabia had disastrous effects. "Bessarabia has not only failed to make any progress in the economic and social sense, but has gone back half a century during fifteen years of Bucarest rule," wrote H. H. Tiltman in his *Peasant Europe*.⁹ Between 1918 and 1924, no less than 135 peasant uprisings were recorded. By 1928, the end of the first decade, 30,000 Bessarabian peasants had been killed by punitive expeditions. The influence of the Russian Revolution was, of course, strong in the region, but the major cause of dis-

content was maladministration. Consolidation with Romania meant the reinforcement of the boyar regime and virtual slavery for the poor peasant. The anti-Semitism systematically practiced by the Romanian authorities made the Bessarabian Jews look with envy on the situation of their brothers in the Soviet Union, as the Moldavian peasant looked with envy on the Moldavian Soviet Region established on the other side of the Dnestr, where there were no big land-owners, no boyars, no *Sigurança* (Romanian police force).

In June 1940, during the period when the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was in effect, the Soviet Government demanded and was granted the return of Bessarabia. This and the former Moldavian Soviet Region became the Moldavian Soviet Republic. At the same time, Northern Bucovina was also transferred from Romania to the Soviet Ukraine. This area of 6000 square miles has a population of about 500,000, of which nearly 80 per cent are Ukrainians; hence Russia's claim is justified from the ethnic point of view.

Romanian democrats who refuse to accept this solution of the Bessarabian boundary problem because they are afraid of a possible nationalist reaction are mistaken. The Romanian people as a whole would not be sorry to part with the traditions of Great Power madness and the policies of the Hohenzollerns, the Antonescus, and the Iron Guard. A token of this rupture with the past and the first step toward friendly collaboration with the Soviet Union would be a sincere and wholehearted renunciation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. A national democratic policy of a renewed Romania should be directed not to the northeast, but to the northwest—toward Transylvania. The opportunity to establish such a policy came on September 12, 1944, after a week of excited cabals which bordered on the Graustarkian. On that day young King Michael of Romania, accepting the logic of the military situation which confronted him and being anxious to avoid a revolution which would sweep away his dynasty, took his country out of the Axis and into the Allied camp.

Of all the Balkans, Greece has the least complicated boundary problems. Greece has an area of 50,000 square miles and nearly 7,000,000 inhabitants, of which almost 90 per cent are Greek. Perhaps the most serious of her problems is her claim to the twelve Aegean Islands in the Eastern Mediterranean, which have 140,000 Greek inhabitants, mostly sailors, fishermen, sponge-fishers, and fruit farmers. The Dodecanese were annexed by Italy in 1912 and are still under Italian domination. Neither Count Carlo Sforza nor certain other Italian democratic leaders have advocated that Italy immedi-

ately and without reservation renounce these islands, to which she has so little claim. Professor Gaetano Salvemini, whose courageous internationalist attitude toward the Slav question prompts the Italian nationalists to call him Slavemini, feels otherwise:

We do not have to wait for the solution of the Chinese question in order to know that the population of the Dodecanese is Greek, that they do not want to hear of Italians, and that the Fascists have committed atrocious crimes against those unfortunate people in order to force them to change their language and religion. Instead of waiting until the Chinese question is settled in order to recognize that those islands have the right to join Greece, the Italians should solve immediately the problem of punishing in an exemplary manner the crimes committed by the Fascists in those lands. If those Italians who are truly democratic, and not in words only, will take the initiative themselves to propose just solutions, where these solutions alter the frontiers—I don't mean at the expense of Italy but at the expense of the nationalistic and Fascist prejudices—then they will have the right to protest against the injustices directed against the Italians.¹⁰

The social divisions in Greece go deep. A small capitalist minority, concentrated mostly in Athens and Thessalonikē, rules the country economically. Two-thirds of the farmers are very poor and miserable. In the twenties there were several attempts at agrarian reform, but only 45 per cent of the land available for distribution was parceled out.

From 1935 to 1941 Greece was under the dictatorial semifascist regime of General Joannes Metaxas, supported by King George II. Nevertheless, even during German occupation the Greek people expressed themselves clearly in favor of a republic. When Greece was finally liberated, the United Nations were treated to the deplorable spectacle of British armed intervention against the ELAS, the military arm of the EAM—the Greek National Liberation Front, which embraced the majority of the political parties from the Left to the Right. The background of British intervention, which reached its peak in the middle of December 1944, constitutes one of the sorriest chapters in United Nations diplomacy. By the time these lines appear in print, the military might of the British Empire may have smashed the Greek People's Movement for the time being. It is, however, safe to predict that there will be no social peace in Greece until the monarchy is abolished and a republican government is established with a program of thoroughgoing agrarian reform.

The smallest Balkan state, Albania, has only 10,630 square miles and 1,000,000 inhabitants. Eighty-four per cent are of Albanian na-

tionality; the rest are Greeks, Turks, a few Vlachs, Jews, and Serbs. The nation is still in the making; it is based, in great measure, on tribal organization. The methods of agriculture are medieval. The best fields are owned by the great landowners—the begs, or squires. The peasants have to turn over to them from 25 to 33 per cent of their harvests. In 1930, an agrarian reform was attempted, but the begs sabotaged it, preventing any practical realization of it.

Albania proclaimed herself an independent state in 1912, and as a result of the policies and rivalries of the Great Powers, was able to keep her independence after the First World War. Nevertheless, Italy continued to play a dominant role in Albanian politics, and settled upon Albania as the first of the Balkan states to be annexed in 1939.

There are some 600,000 Albanians outside Albania, mostly in Northwestern Greece and Yugoslavia. In Greece they constitute a minority and mix easily with the Greeks. In Yugoslavia they constitute a majority in one district near Kosovo. Traditionally there was an irredentist movement there, and in the years immediately following the First World War the Albanians from Albania undertook forays across the border. It is likely that without Italian interference a settlement would be possible, but it is doubtful if Albania can be maintained as an independent state. It would be advisable, perhaps, for Albania to league herself in some way with Yugoslavia, where, especially in Bosna (Bosnia), there are strong Moslem groups. Besides ensuring the overthrow of the begs and an end to Italian interference, such an association would offer better possibilities of progress for Albania herself.

The wisdom of a Solomon would not be sufficient to straighten out the problem of Balkan boundaries to the satisfaction of everyone concerned. Furthermore, even if an ideal solution could be achieved, it would in no way solve the basic economic and social problems of Southeastern Europe. The main causes of misery in the Balkans are not the arbitrary boundaries between states, but feudal agrarian regimes built on medieval social relationships. The most obvious manifestation of the agrarian crisis is, as has been noted, agricultural overpopulation. This does not necessarily mean that the available natural resources of the Balkans could not support an even greater population than they do now, and in better circumstances. It simply means that new agricultural techniques and a different system of social relationships are required. These would necessitate shifting some of the farming population to other trades.

Doreen Warriner, who is an expert in this field, expresses the opinion that, under existing conditions, about 50 persons to the square kilometer (approximately, .386 square miles) is probably the optimum density of farm population for those areas in the Danubian plain where cereal-growing is the main activity and stock-raising only subsidiary.¹¹ On the eve of the Second World War, the farm population per square kilometer of farm land was 47 in Hungary, 75 in Romania, 104 in Yugoslavia, 67 in Albania, 121 in Greece, and 82 in Bulgaria, giving an average of 82.6 people to the square kilometer throughout these states.

An average of one-third of the Balkan farm population is superfluous, even under conditions of maximum cultivation. In Greece this figure is even higher—60 per cent; in Yugoslavia it is more than 50 per cent. The only country where the situation is more or less normal is Hungary, where only a more rational distribution of land is needed. Something like optimum is probably approached in the Banat and Voivodina, which are divided between Romania and Yugoslavia. Though the population is denser in those two regions than in Hungary, somewhat more advanced methods of cultivation are employed. The worst situations are in the mountain regions—the Dinaric provinces of Yugoslavia and the uplands of Romania. The Greek overpopulation of farm land is due, in the main, to the 1922 immigration from Asia Minor. Before the Second World War, the usual outlet for overpopulation was emigration, particularly to the United States. This outlet has, of course, been considerably reduced in the period between the wars.

The most reasonable solution of the problem is a change in agricultural methods—more intensive farming, and corresponding industrialization, neither of which can be achieved without basic changes in the social and economic structure of the Balkan nations. The liberation of the Balkan peasants from the begs and the boyars and the royal oligarchies would lead to a technical revolution in agriculture. The peasants who now live on poorly equipped holdings, often too small for scientific farming, could then unite in co-operative organizations. Through their efforts, wooden plows and archaic agricultural methods would be superseded by modern farm machinery and practices. These advances should be complemented by a program of limited industrialization, also furthered by co-operative effort. There is no need for the Balkans to follow the Russian pattern, but the solution of their problems is not likely under traditional nineteenth-

century laissez-faire capitalism. Some kind of planned economy under a democratic political regime is almost essential to progress.

One of the primary prerequisites for the correction of Balkan economic and social troubles is the liberation of the Balkans from the domination of international capital. The fight of the Balkan peasants against German fascism is not only a national war for survival; it is also a war against economic slavery. In the last years before the Second World War, Germany succeeded in dominating the Balkan countries economically by the mechanisms of foreign trade. In 1938 Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia (the Greater Germany in 1939), took 46.6 per cent of the exports of Southeastern Europe and furnished 45.9 per cent of their general imports. The Balkans exported to Germany their foodstuffs and raw materials—livestock, meat, grain, oil, ores, timber, tobacco, bauxite, and flax; they received in exchange such industrial products as machinery, locomotives, motor vehicles, airplanes, electrical equipment, chemicals, and textiles.

This exchange tallied with Germany's plan of transforming the Balkans into a German colony in Europe. Germany opposed the development of any industry that could compete with her own, and any transformation of Balkan agriculture which would make that region less independent on her. By threatening to cut off purchases, Germany could dictate economic policies. This strategy, which Germany pursued with a combination of brutality, artifices, and pressure, has not, unfortunately, been a German specialty; the same tendencies can be found in the foreign-trade policies of the other Great Powers, though to a lesser degree. The liberation of the Balkans from this kind of "co-operation," the establishment of good-neighbor relations and foreign-trade policies based on mutual interests, and co-operation on an equal basis—these are essential conditions of the march of the Balkan peoples toward a better future.

It is clear that real and serious economic development is unlikely within the boundaries of small states which surround themselves with customs barriers in a vain effort to achieve self-sufficiency. The co-operation of all Balkan peoples in the economic field within a framework of a European economic organization is imperative. A realization of this need leads many Balkan democrats, and also political writers and students of Balkan affairs, to the conclusion that a Balkan Federation is the only reasonable solution of Balkan troubles. Even Balkan governments have been obliged to accept in principle the idea of a Balkan Federation, and between 1929 and 1935 conferences were

held in a futile attempt to organize one. The feudal Balkan rulers were, however, unable to put the idea into practice.

A federation of republican and democratic Balkan states is the aim of all sincere Balkan patriots. Whether it can be realized at the end of this war remains problematical. Romania and Hungary have sojourned so long in the Axis camp that their immediate admission to a postwar Balkan Federation as equal members might be extremely difficult. Unfortunately, also, collaboration between the Greeks and the Yugoslavs has not reached such a point as to make an immediate fusion possible. The differences between the South Slavs and other Balkan peoples are important, and any haste in this matter could bring only a later failure. Moreover, Yugoslavia, and to some extent Bulgaria, differ from the other Balkan countries in social disposition. Yugoslavia is now undergoing a powerful revolution; the pro-Russian sympathies of the people and their own revolutionary temper are pushing them toward radical solutions.

It is possible that a South Slav Federation comprising Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Slavs liberated from the Italian yoke could be established immediately after the war. Such a federation would be the backbone of the Balkan structure, and Albania might also be included. All the provinces of the new state should have extensive autonomy; they could perhaps even be constituted republics, after the Soviet pattern. Whatever the structure of the federation, close collaboration should be established with liberated Greece, Romania, and Hungary, and some kind of customs union and common planning offices envisioned. All these changes are possible in a general European reorganization.

Agrarian revolution remains a prerequisite for social, political, and economic stability in the Balkans. Once it is achieved, the free popular forces in the Balkans can institute methods of peaceful co-operation and eliminate the dynastic as well as the economic sources of conflict, guaranteeing a minimum subsistence level to the people. Then, and then only, will there be peace in the Balkans.

4. The Baltic States

ETHNOGRAPHICALLY, the Baltic peoples are very difficult to classify. Although the region has been under Russian control off and on since the sixteenth century, it has also been dominated at one time or another by Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and Poland. The last seven or eight hundred years have brought a succession of conquests, during which the inhabitants were buffeted by the rivalries of the German, Scandinavian, and Slav nations.

Their first foreign rulers were the Danes, but it was the Teutonic invasions, beginning toward the end of the twelfth century, which completed their real subjugation. Under the Teutonic Knights, feudalism was established; the German conquerors remained and became the ruling class of aristocratic landlords, and the populations were reduced to serfdom.

Subsequently, the Order of Teutonic Knights was itself weakened by struggles with the Church and wars with Poland. Its downfall came in 1558 with the invasion of Ivan the Terrible of Muscovy. Although the Teutons succeeded in repelling the Russian invaders after a twenty-five-year war in which they were aided by Poland, Sweden, and Denmark, the Order was so crippled that it had to be formally dissolved. The dissolution had little effect on the hardships of the Baltic peoples, however. They were still subject to the overlordship of the German landlord barons.

For more than a century Poles, Swedes, and Russians continued to struggle over Baltic territory, with the native populations as the victims, always bearing the burdens of this continual warfare. Areas were ceded to Poland at one time, to Sweden at another. Eventually, the contest narrowed to Sweden and Russia. As a result of the Great Northern War of 1700-21, the Swedish influence was at last broken and the era of Russian domination in the Baltic began.

Throughout these struggles, and subsequently during the period of inclusion in the Russian Empire, the German barons pursued one course of action—they supported whichever side would guarantee their feudal rights and assure their continuance in power. By supporting the Czarist regime, and in fact holding high places at the Imperial Court, the German barons kept a tight grip on their privileges in the Baltic. So brutal were their methods, and so wretched the conditions among the peasants, that even the Czarist Government—hardly famed for tenderness—felt impelled to protest. The German barons quickly responded with sham “agrarian reforms,” which purported to free the peasants, hitherto legal slaves, but actually did no such thing, since the peasants were denied the right to migrate. Uprisings occurred and were put down brutally. Every effort on the part of the Czarist Government to intervene was met with resistance by the barons, and that government ultimately withdrew its objections.

Eventually, the resistance of the peasants in Estonia and Latvia reached a point where they joined forces with the industrial workers, and formed strong ties with the Russian proletarian movement, which led them to participate in the 1905 revolution.

In Lithuania and Finland, where slightly different conditions prevailed, the struggle against the Lithuanian-Polish gentry and the Swedish-Finnish landlords was complicated by national enmity toward the Russians. In time, however, this traditional antipathy waned, as the Finnish and Lithuanian peoples began to realize that the Russian people shared their hatred of the Czarist Government. Once that became clear, they too cast in their lot with the liberation movement in Russia. When the Revolution of 1905 was put down, the peoples of Finland, the Baltic states, and Russia were ruthlessly crushed, but defeat confirmed the realization that they had a common aim in their fight against oppression—autonomy for their own countries within a free Russia.

When the First World War broke out in 1914, the Baltic area was entirely in the hands of the local German gentry. The Czarist Government, whose mainstay in the Baltic had become the Baltic Germans, was forced to revise its policy and create special Baltic units composed of native soldiers who had been mobilized into the Russian Army. When the German armies advanced eastward in the autumn of 1915, they occupied Lithuania and Kurland (part of Latvia), which remained under German occupation for almost four years. They were unable to occupy Estonia, Livonia (part of Latvia and Estonia), and the city of Riga until after the Russian Revolution had begun

and the Eastern front had collapsed, and then they held the territories for only a year.

Meanwhile, the Baltic Germans were calling for annexation to Germany. Through the years, the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian peoples had identified themselves with the people of Russia, and the Revolution of 1917 only strengthened the ties. The Royal Institute of International Affairs states: "In the spring of 1917, none of the Baltic provinces contemplated or desired complete detachment from Russia, although they certainly seized the opportunity of making a bid for a measure of autonomy and for much needed reform."¹

When the Bolsheviks took power, there was a sharp division of opinion between the wealthier circles and the majority of the Baltic populations, who were predominantly industrial workers and peasants and had for years actively participated in the Russian liberation movement. This conflict of political ideas soon assumed the proportions of civil war, and if the Germans had not been completely in occupation of the Baltic area, it would undoubtedly have resulted in the victory of the radicals over the small groups of social conservatives. The defeat of Germany on the Western front should have removed the major obstacle to Baltic freedom. Instead, it complicated the situation, for the Allies enlisted German aid to "defend" the area against the Bolsheviks. Article 12 of the Armistice terms provided that the Germans should evacuate all territories formerly belonging to the Russian Empire, but only "as soon as the Allies shall consider this desirable, having regard to the internal conditions of these territories." It is interesting to note that the danger in question was not from Russian Bolsheviks, since the Treaty of Brest Litovsk had not only taken Russia out of the war in 1917 but had also secured the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic, and they were in no position to return. Bolshevism could only arise from the native revolutionary workers and peasants. The action of the Allies therefore amounted to intervention in the internal struggle of the Baltic peoples. The Germans naturally used this opportunity to improve their military position in the East by wrecking the national movements in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

By the early part of 1920 no German soldiers or armed Bolsheviks remained in the Baltic area, and "national" governments were in sole power. These were headed by President Antanas Smetona and Premier Augustinas Voldemaras in Lithuania, President Karlis Ulmanis and General Karlis Balodis in Latvia, and President Konstantin Päts in Estonia, all of whom had sought German armed assistance in estab-

lishing themselves in the offices they were to keep for some years, except when a comparatively democratic regime ousted each of them for a brief time.

As soon as the Germans were out of the way in 1920, Ulmanis and Smetona turned to the Allies for support. But the Great Powers, still confident that Bolshevism would be destroyed and Czarism restored, hesitated to recognize the Baltic republics, whose existence impaired the territorial integrity of prewar Russia and deprived her of outlets on the Baltic Sea. Ironically enough, the new Soviet Government was the first to recognize the Baltic states. Peace treaties were signed with them in 1920, a year before England and France granted recognition, and two years before the United States took formal notice of their existence. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes stated on July 25, 1922: "The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territories, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which have been set up and maintained by indigenous populations."²

Political and economic progress in the Baltic states was doomed from the outset, owing to their leaders' decision, influenced and supported by England, to change to an agricultural economy, regardless of the fact that under the Russian Empire the area had been largely industrial. The possibility that increasing numbers of industrial workers would become socially and politically conscious may also have been a factor in the establishment of such reactionary policies.

At any rate, industrial cities declined; the development of heavy industry was retarded, and the foreign policy of the three states had to be oriented toward the powers who purchased farm products: England and Germany. The tremendous Russian market for heavy industry was abandoned, shipping declined, the once busy Baltic ports became practically inactive, and freight railways fell into decay. Baltic agriculture turned to foreign markets, in which it was subject to fluctuating price levels. Not being able to exist as independent units, the Baltics passed from one economic crisis to another. The resulting depressions and unemployment culminated in political disturbances in 1932-33.

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1926 Lithuania concluded a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, which caused a furor of fantastic proportions. England in particular brought economic and political pressure to bear. In November 1926 the democratic government was over-

thrown by a fascist clique which reinstated Smetona and restored the country's anti-Soviet policies.

Despite this outcome in Lithuania, the democratic government of Latvia adopted a trade agreement with Soviet Russia the following year, hoping to avert national bankruptcy by expanding trade relations with her big neighbor. Although this agreement was markedly advantageous to Latvia and contained no stipulations regarding internal affairs—the Latvian Communist party, in fact, remained illegal—it aroused the same kind of agitation as the Lithuanian pact the year before and bred the same kind of fascist plot. The Latvian Government, however, was able to uncover the plot, all clues to which led, strangely enough, to the British Embassy.

Every attempt by the Soviet Union to neutralize the Baltic states was met with resistance by the Great Powers. Until 1938, Britain continued to dominate the economy of the Baltic countries, though toward the end of that period the effects of Germany's economic penetration became quite plain. The Germans were even more successful in the political field, as a result of their long-standing influence with the local fascist governments. Before or just after the outbreak of the Second World War, the democratic regimes had been overthrown in all three countries—in Lithuania in 1926, in Latvia and Estonia in 1934. The democratic leaders had been arrested, drastic purges had cut down the ranks of potential leaders, and democratic and labor organizations had been smashed. In Lithuania, Smetona had dissolved the Diet and proclaimed himself President. In Latvia, the new order was openly admitted to be fascist; elections, the Diet, and municipal self-government were abolished, and Karlis Ulmanis was re-established in power. In Estonia, Konstantin Päts, supported by Germany and the Army command, had established a personal dictatorship and smashed the Democratic and Social-Democratic parties, rendering the Diet powerless.

The Baltic region became virtually a German province, and a military base for German aggression. Without protest or resistance, in March 1939 Lithuania ceded Memel (Klaipeda) to Germany. The Soviet Union warned the Baltic governments that their independence was essential to Russia's vital interests, but the warning had no effect. Russia requested the Moscow talks of June 1939, for the purpose of demanding international guarantees against German aggression, both internal and external, in the Baltic states. Although Neville Chamberlain's England still retained important posts and considerable influence there, the British Government rejected the demand on the

ground that it was "impossible to guarantee a state against its will." Even before the talks were ended, Wilhelm Untert and Karl Selzer, both Germans, who had become heads of the Foreign Ministries of Estonia and Latvia, concluded agreements with Germany which flouted the Russian demands.

Since it was obvious that Soviet national safety was threatened and every attempt to ensure the neutrality of the Baltic states had failed, the question automatically passed from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Commissariat of Defense. Joseph Stalin ordered units of the Red Army to move into the Baltic area. Rather than jeopardize the peace on her eastern borders, Germany evacuated her military forces but, acting through the puppet governments of the Baltic states, the Germans instigated anti-Soviet, anti-Semitic programs. The presence of Red Army men encouraged the opposition to fight the rising tide of fascism, and there were clashes in which a number were killed or wounded. The Red Army troops, however, were careful not to support the antifascists, as that would have constituted interference in the internal affairs of the states. They had been sent into the Baltic area solely to defend strategic approaches to the USSR.

Tension mounted. After the collapse of France, unable to predict which way the Germans would move next, and taking no chances, Russia struck the first blow and occupied the Baltic states. This was the signal for the popular opposition to rise. The fascist regimes collapsed, their leaders fled to Germany, and new People's Governments were set up, led by well-known popular democrats, prominent statesmen of the earlier parliamentary regimes, and bourgeois democratic and Social-Democratic writers, journalists, and scientists. While the Communist party had some representation, it was a minority.

In normal elections in the middle of 1940, the peoples of the Baltic states, faced with the alternative of Germany or Russia, voted to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Their choice marked the close of a historical cycle which began with the following recommendations from a memorandum prepared by Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, as a preliminary draft of the American peace proposals: "The Baltic provinces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia shall be autonomous states of a Russian Confederation."⁸ In 1920, when the United States State Department was considering the de facto recognition of the Baltic states, Evan E. Young, American Commissioner to the Baltic states, declared: "The leading men here [in the Baltic states] are under no illusions as to the future relation of these states to Russia and realize full well that with an orderly, well-estab-

lished government in Russia, the Baltic provinces will again become part of what will probably be a federated Russia." 4

Reincorporation into an imperialist or a strongly centralized Russia would not satisfy the citizens of the three Baltic states any better than a return to the status of German satellites under fascist leadership. In a letter to the *New York Times* on August 23, 1943, Mr. Henrikas Rabinavicius, former Lithuanian chargé d'affaires in Moscow, stated that the Lithuanian people "hope that . . . Soviet Russia will . . . treat Lithuania and the other Baltic States in the same manner as Great Britain treats Egypt, or as the United States will treat the Philippines."

The reactionary press in America and elsewhere continues to claim that any joint peace plans with Russia are doomed because of the Soviets' unwillingness to recognize the independence of the Baltic states. In the face of such predictions, on February 1, 1944, the Central Government at Moscow took the first step toward bestowing sovereign, independent statehood on all the constituent republics of the Soviet Union by granting them political autonomy.

By 1945, the Baltic states had been re-established as Soviet Republics, enjoying complete cultural autonomy. They could never again become a German base for aggression against Russia.

5. Finland

THE HISTORY of the two Soviet-Finnish wars would be confusing indeed without some knowledge of the history of Finland herself. The fact is that Finland owes more to Soviet Russia than to any other country in the world. Finland was subject to Swedish domination from 1157 to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1809, after sporadic warfare over portions of the territory, Sweden ceded the whole of Finland to the Czars. The transfer to Czarist hegemony was facilitated by the aid of the Swedo-Finnish aristocracy, for whose tastes Sweden had become too libertarian.

By 1916, the Social-Democratic party—which at that time was fighting for independence, a democratically elected Diet, and social reforms—had won a majority of 103 out of 200 seats, making Finland the first country in the world to return a Socialist majority. When the Czarist Government was overthrown early in 1917, Finland declared her independence, but this new Finnish state was not recognized by the Russian Government until the Bolsheviks came into power in November of that year.

Having been indifferent to independence up to that time, the Swedo-Finnish aristocracy promptly embraced the cause of independence in the hope that it would save them from the danger of Bolshevism. In the spring of 1918 civil war broke out. Baron Carl Gustaf Emil von Mannerheim's White Army attempted to wrest the government from the hands of the Social-Democratic majority. Mannerheim was at first defeated, but later won with the aid of English arms, Swedish financial assistance and "volunteers," and a German invading army under General Count Rüdiger von der Goltz. The *Encyclopædia Britannica* notes that Mannerheim's prisoners totaled 73,915, of whom 4600 were women. It also notes that "some 15,000 men, women and children

were slaughtered," though according to contemporary sources the victims were nearer 30,000.

Immediately, the victors disfranchised all opposing elements although they constituted a clear majority of the people. New elections, thus limited, were held in June 1918. The Diet resulting from this "election" was the predecessor of the present Finnish Government. Its first act was to declare Finland a German protectorate and invite a brother-in-law of the Kaiser to become its king. The Allied victory that fall prevented him from claiming the throne.

From its very inception the Finnish Government—established as a result of the Mannerheim putsch—took a fascist form, retained a fascist Civil Guard as a permanent check on democratic upsurge, and adopted an anti-Soviet outlook. The Finnish constitution reveals limits even in formal democracy. The voting age is set at twenty-four, thus barring hundreds of thousands of vigorous adult citizens from participating in the elections. The President, whose term is six years, is completely independent of the Diet, which is elected every three years. He has total veto power over its decisions, he may promulgate legislation without its sanction, and he even has the right to dissolve the Diet.

Article 16 of the Finnish constitution nullifies the Finnish equivalent of the Bill of Rights by providing that the "clauses dealing with the general rights of Finnish citizens shall not hinder the establishment by law of restrictions necessary in time of war or revolution, *or under any other circumstances*, or with regard to persons in the military or naval services." (Italics added.) This article is invoked at the first sign of democratic tendencies among the people. Various acts and amendments passed in 1930 and 1931 violated the freedom of the press, of assembly, and of domicile. The Social-Democratic party was permitted to survive, but only when it no longer bore any resemblance to the progressive party which was overthrown by Mannerheim and the Germans. When militant sections of the party broke away in 1922 to form the Finnish Labor party, that party was suppressed and its Deputies were thrown into prison. Again in 1930, all Left-wing and progressive parties were outlawed and their leaders jailed, and repressive action was carried out against labor unions and workers' newspapers. In 1919, trade-union membership had numbered 161,000; in 1939, after twenty years of Finnish "democracy," it had dropped to 90,000.

The undemocratic character of the Finnish Government is reflected in its leading personalities. Its military head, "Butcher" Mannerheim, aroused such world-wide horror by his atrocities that even Her-

bert Hoover recognized the "sinister shadow" cast by Mannerheim over the Finnish Republic, and in recommending recognition of Finland by the United States Government urged that the shadow be overlooked. The wartime President of Finland, Rysto Ryti, has been head of the Bank of Finland since 1923. He is an international financier connected with leading banking circles in London and Wall Street. Former Prime Minister Eljas Juho Erkkö, an officer in the fascist Civil Guard in 1918, is now the wealthy owner of the big Finnish newspaper *Helsinki Sanomat*, and a leader of the Right wing of his party. Vaino Tanner, Ryti's anti-Soviet Foreign Minister, who is chairman of the Advisory Council of the National Bank of Finland, has a reputation for excusing and condoning the excesses of the Lapuan movement, a fascist organization in Finland. General Kurt M. Wallenius, one of Mannerheim's chief military aides, was a White Guard officer in the Civil War and was active in the Lapuan movement.

While our State Department was not so hostile to revolutionary forces as the British, documents published in Volumes I-III of *Foreign Relations: Russia, 1918* and *Foreign Relations: Russia, 1919* reveal that the United States acted jointly with the British throughout the intervention period. Both nations virtually waged undeclared war against the new Soviet Government and the Finnish Provisional Government by supplying arms, food, and materials to the counterrevolutionists. American representatives did not support Finnish independence until after the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia, and then only when Finnish reactionaries were in control.

After the Soviet recognition of Finland's independence in December 1917, Mannerheim and his supporters sought help from the Allies and Germany against the Finnish revolutionary workers, and offered Finland as a base for anti-Soviet attacks. By the end of January 1918, however, the Finnish Bolsheviks were in control in the south, and the White Guards under Mannerheim fled to the north. Shortly afterward, Ira Nelson Morris, United States Minister to Sweden, advocated withholding recognition of Finnish independence as long as the Reds were in Helsinki, and urged that food be sent to the northern section, where the Whites were in control.

On February 19, 1918, David R. Francis, United States Ambassador to Russia, cabled that Mannerheim was in absolute control of all Finland north of the line Pori-Tampere-Viipuri. Helsinki was captured by the Germans for the Whites, and six days later the British recognized this Finnish Government which had been put into power by their enemy. Mannerheim then went to Stockholm to secure further

Allied support. A few weeks later United States Minister Morris cabled to Washington that he had had several conferences with General Mannerheim and that regarding intervention in Russia he (Morris) felt that this was "the correct thing to do."

Mannerheim consolidated his rule by terroristic methods that aroused an indignant protest throughout the world, but this did not deter the Allies from supporting him. On March 2, 1919, Robert W. Imbrie, American vice-consul at Viipuri, wrote:

Have had several conferences with . . . heads of Russian Whites. . . . [They] have, with the knowledge and consent of the Finnish Government, perfected a military organization numbering, they state, 10,000 men, volunteers. . . . The object of this organization is the capture of Petrograd and afterward Moscow and the overthrow of the Bolsheviks. . . . If the United States Government thinks favorably of sending food in support of the Whites, I cannot too strongly urge the necessity of immediate action. . . . Even a month's delay may be fatal to the project.¹

In due time, Herbert Hoover, as chairman of the Interallied Food Council, came to the aid of Mannerheim and of counterrevolutionist General Nikolai Yudenich. Foodstuffs intended for the starving Russian children went to the army of intervention. The Lansing documents, recently published by the United States State Department, reveal that the real aim of the Hoover relief mission was intervention in another guise, and show how deeply Secretary of State Robert Lansing was involved in secret financial support of the counterrevolutionaries.

Vice-Consul Imbrie, reporting to the State Department on July 11, 1919, outlined a plan by which the capture of Petrograd and the consequent overthrow of the Bolsheviks could be accomplished. The Finnish Government, he said, was aware that its political security depended upon the overthrow of the Bolsheviks before their own country became impregnated with the "leprosy" of Bolshevism, and only awaited the sanction of the Allied governments to launch an attack. Imbrie urged that he be permitted to communicate the sanction and approval of the United States Government to the Finnish Government. Permission to launch the attack came from the American Peace Mission at Versailles on July 16, and a month later Imbrie reported that the British had loaned £6,000,000 to the Finnish Government on condition that the Finns mobilize for an offensive on Petrograd. The United States loaned more than \$8,000,000. (It was Finland's repayment of the installments of this and not a World War loan that

contributed to pro-Finnish sentiment in the United States at the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939.)

The story of the American Military Expedition of 7000 men to Siberia in August 1918 has been fully told by General William S. Graves, its commander, in his book, *America's Siberian Adventure*.² General Graves tried courageously and honestly to carry out the ostensible purpose of the expedition, which was to protect Allied supplies and bring Czechoslovak deserters from the Austrian Army to the Western front, but he found himself expected to intervene in Soviet internal affairs and to use his forces to bolster the counter-revolutionary regime of Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak. On September 4, 1918, some 4800 American troops arrived at Archangel to help the counterrevolutionary government in the north, which had established itself there with the aid of Allied forces in an attempt to overthrow the Soviets from the north. Thereafter, American troops under British General Sir William Edmund Ironside shot or imprisoned many Soviet workers. On October 10, Ambassador Francis urged that the Allies take Petrograd and Moscow.

All attempts at intervention failed, however. With the White generals meeting defeat on all sides, the bulk of the American forces was withdrawn from Archangel in July 1919, and the British forces withdrew during August and September. But the anti-Soviet intrigues continued. Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long told the Finnish Minister in Washington in 1920 that he "might feel that the Government of the United States views sympathetically any action which the Government of Finland might take which would react to strengthening that Government, and which might also act as a barrier against the spread of Bolshevism."³

After Britain, France, and the United States signed the 1936 London treaty for the limitation of naval armament, Great Britain entered into a bilateral agreement with Germany, which in effect granted naval parity to Germany and enabled Hitler to secure complete mastery of the Baltic.

Thanks to pro-German and profascist leadership, Finland developed into a strategic and political German base of operations for possible aggression against Russia. Assisted by British and American finance, German labor and capital constructed airdromes and strategic roads in Finland, threatening the approaches to Leningrad.

It was this threat that figured in the negotiations between Russia and the Baltic states and Finland at the outbreak of the Second World War. Russia's proposals involved border revisions, mutual se-

curity pacts, and the garrisoning of strategic points which the four small nations might be unable to defend, or might be powerless to keep Germany from using as bases of attack upon the Soviet Union. The negotiations which were concluded with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in October 1939 secured the western approaches to Leningrad. For the complete security of the city, a corresponding agreement with Finland was necessary. The Soviet Government was arguing from experience, for all the land and sea approaches mentioned in the discussions with Finland had been used against the Soviet Union during the Interventionist and White Guard campaigns.

A frontier on the Karelian Isthmus brought Leningrad within artillery range; enemy control of the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland prevented defensive operation of the Red Navy and provided bases for the operations of hostile fleets; the Rybachi and Sredne Kolmynsk peninsulas in the Arctic provided potential submarine bases for operations against the new Soviet-developed Arctic sea route, the great port of Murmansk, and the new Arctic cities and harbors established by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government offered to transfer sizable Soviet areas to Finland in exchange for bases only half as large on the Karelian Isthmus and other strategic spots, and also proposed trade compensations and mutual defense pacts similar to those concluded with the Baltic states. It should be noted that the Soviet Union never included in its proposals any request for the strategic Aaland Islands, the possession of which is essential to the domination of the Baltic, and even agreed to Finland's fortifying these islands, provided Finland alone controlled them.

Finnish Premier Aino Kaarlo Cajander first issued a public statement favorable to the Soviet proposals. Then, after a conference of the Kings of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, a public pronouncement by the President of the United States, considerable diplomatic activity on the part of France, and a suggestion from Great Britain that an anti-Soviet-Scandinavian alliance be formed, Cajander reversed his attitude, though the negotiations continued. It is possible that without such interference Finland would have had little difficulty in coming to a prompt agreement with the Soviets.

The question of leasing Hanko (Hangö) as a naval base caused a deadlock. The Soviet Union modified its request by reducing the size of the proposed garrison and suggesting that Hanko be leased only for the duration of the war between the Allies and Germany. Finland rejected even this compromise.

Negotiations dragged on for five weeks, during which the Finnish Government ordered general mobilization of large forces on the frontier. Finnish newspapers favorable to the Soviet proposals were suppressed. Premier Cajander made a public attack on the Soviet Union's mutual assistance pacts with the Baltic states, expressing concern for the fate of the sister nation Estonia. Two days later, Finnish artillery fired upon a squad of Red Army men across the border. To prevent further border incidents, the Soviet Union proposed the withdrawal of Finnish troops for a short distance, but the Finnish Government refused to do so unless Soviet troops withdrew for the same distance. The Soviet Union pointed out that whereas a withdrawal of Finnish troops would leave no Finnish city or strategic point exposed, a similar withdrawal of Soviet troops would mean abandoning the outer defenses of Leningrad. While the full records of the maneuvers preceding the outbreak of Russo-Finnish hostilities will not be available for many years, there is some evidence that in thus resisting the Russian proposals Finland was yielding to British and French pressure.

A number of suspicious circumstances attended this provocative and reckless attitude on the part of the Finnish Government: 1. Finland's airdromes and landing-fields were capable of accommodating 2000 planes, and as her own Air Force consisted of only 150 planes, such airfields suggested long-term military arrangements with powers that had air fleets of that size. 2. Finland had roads and railways far in excess of conceivable traffic needs, built at strategic locations along the borders of the Soviet Union, presupposing long-planned military operations. 3. The Mannerheim Line—unlike the *defensive* Maginot Line—was a deep fortified zone providing cover for launching a strong offensive. 4. Large supplies of war matériel had been ordered by the already heavily armed Finnish Government some time before hostilities threatened, and Blenheim bombers were delivered from England during the negotiations.

A later United Press dispatch from Paris revealed that France and Great Britain sent war supplies worth \$40,000,000 to Finland shortly after this, and a press release of the United States State Department on November 25, 1939, disclosed that in the ten months ending October 1939 Finland was licensed for arms purchases of \$1,318,654—\$849,900 in October alone.

Faced with the alternative of either accepting a diplomatic defeat which would leave its single Baltic port and second largest city ex-

posed to such obvious danger or resorting to force, the Soviet Union chose force.

As soon as Russia broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, the Cajander government went out of office. The new government, which was a mobilization of known anti-Soviet forces, was headed by Rysto Ryti, with Vaino Tanner, the most belligerently anti-Soviet of all the negotiators, as Foreign Minister.

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Great Britain then invoked the moribund League of Nations, which had turned a deaf ear to China, Spain, Ethiopia, and Albania, and which Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier had forgotten when they gave away Czechoslovakia at Munich. Russia was expelled from the League and its members were invited to lend assistance to fascist Finland.

Mr. Chamberlain admitted that without waiting for the League to act Britain had already delivered the aforementioned Blenheim bombers to Finland. He went even further. Contrary to an act of Parliament passed in 1870, which prohibited the recruiting of men to fight against a country maintaining diplomatic relations with Britain, Chamberlain told Parliament on February 14, 1940, that "general license" had been given to British subjects to enlist in the Finnish Army, and a recruiting organization had been established under government authority in London. Only a few hundred volunteers applied, in contrast to the many thousands of Englishmen who fought for Loyalist Spain without "general license."

At a meeting on February 5, 1940, the Allied Supreme War Council had already approved plans calling for the outfitting of an expeditionary force of 100,000 trained men, heavily armed and equipped, to be dispatched to Scandinavia in March, part of whom were to arrive in Finland before the end of April. These plans were carried out with such dispatch that on March 12, Daladier could reveal to the Chamber of Deputies that 50,000 French soldiers had been standing by since February 26, ready to embark at Channel ports for transit to Finland under protection of a British naval convoy. In the meantime, on a smaller but by no means insignificant scale, Mussolini, Franco, and the Swedish leaders were supplying aid to their "fellow democracy," Finland.

This material aid to Baron Mannerheim was accompanied by a propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union unparalleled since the interventionist days of 1919. Official and unofficial spokesmen publicly foretold imminent war with the Soviet Union. On February 18, Leslie Hore-Belisha, who had recently resigned as British Secretary of War,

had published an article stating: "Leningrad is within fifty miles of the Mannerheim Line. . . . A blow struck against Leningrad might well leave Germany with a Soviet corpse on her hands."⁴ Alfred Duff Cooper, former First Lord of the Admiralty, told an American audience: "Britain will be at war with Russia very soon."⁵ In the February 1940 United States *Army Ordnance Journal*, Major General J. F. C. Fuller pointed out that the central aim of British policy in the war was to come to terms with Germany against an army "who today is Germany but tomorrow obviously must be Russia." General Sir Hubert Gough, and "Scrutator," the well-known English diplomatic journalist, and the military expert of the Paris *Temps* (unofficial organ of the French Foreign Office) all discussed the tactics to be used against the Soviet Union. The word from the French Foreign Office was that action could be taken at small cost to the British and the French, since they would be carried on in conjunction with the armies of certain friendly powers.

Some of these "certain friendly powers," however, had no desire to be drawn into the proposed conflict. Efforts had been made since the outbreak of the Second World War to involve Turkey and the Balkans in the Southeast, and the Scandinavian countries in the North. Britain went so far as to send to Scandinavia and Finland Sir Walter Citrine, chairman of the British Trade-Union Congress, to urge military support for Mannerheim and to consult with the Social-Democratic anti-Soviet leaders of Sweden and Norway on procedures against the Soviet Union. However, his effort failed. The King and the Premier of Sweden unequivocally refused to allow Sweden to participate in military intervention or permit her territory to be used for the passage of troops. A similar stand was taken by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvdan Koht, who stated: "I have said publicly, and it is a historical fact, that Russia has never made any demands whatsoever on Norway."⁶ These declarations were reaffirmed at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark in Copenhagen on February 25, 1940.

Though faced with the weakening of the Finnish defenses before the Red Army, the French and British governments refused to co-operate when the Finns approached the Soviet Union through the Swedish Government, to ascertain peace terms. Premier Edouard Daladier sent an urgent letter pressing Finland to appeal for help by invoking Article XVI of the League of Nations, under which the Allies could compel Sweden and Norway to open their frontiers to an Allied expeditionary force. But the Finns, negotiating a peace treaty in Moscow,

did not reply. Finally, Prime Minister Chamberlain on March 10 and Premier Daladier on March 11 revealed for the first time the existence of the Allied expeditionary force. Scandinavian sources characterized these announcements as "a last attempt to stop peace." When asked by a Labor member of the House whether the Government was proposing to send troops to Finland, and if so, whether it were prepared to violate the neutrality of Norway and Sweden in so doing, Chamberlain refused to answer.

Nevertheless, Norway and Sweden made no move to help Finland in any way. Finland was decisively defeated on the battlefield, and on March 12, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed in Moscow. Despite the advantage of its position as a victor, the Soviet Union resumed negotiations on the basis of the same territorial concessions it had asked for before the opening of hostilities, withdrew its troops from the rich Petsamo region, with its valuable nickel mines and ice-free port, returned that region to Finland, and repaired all damages; further, it still did not ask for bases on the Åland Islands.

Despite these concessions, on June 25, 1941, three days after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, the Finnish Government declared that she had been the subject of warlike attack from the USSR and that she had, in consequence, proceeded to take defense measures. In a broadcast the next day, President Ryti said that Soviet troops had attacked Finnish territory (this was denied in Moscow where it was stated that German concentrations in Finland were preparing an attack on Soviet frontiers). On June 27th, Marshal Mannerheim issued an Order of the Day to the Finnish Army, proclaiming a "holy war" against Russia on the side of Germany.

Mr. Vaino Tanner, Minister of Trade and former Foreign Minister, said in a broadcast on September 14: "The Finnish people long for peace, but we are sure that Germany will win and that Russia will lose, therefore any peace we concluded with Russia would be null and void" But there was great war-weariness in Finland, both in the Army and among the people, an unwillingness to continue military operations beyond the pre-1940 Finnish frontiers, and an increasing dissatisfaction with the manner in which Finland was tied to the German war machine.

On November 3 of that year, Secretary of State Cordell Hull announced that the U. S. Government had sent two notes, on October 27 and 30th respectively, through the American Minister in Helsinki, stating that if Finland desired to maintain friendly relations with the

* (*London Times*, September 15, 1941.)

U. S., satisfactory evidence must be given of her intention promptly to discontinue military operations against Russia. The Finnish reply on November 11th constituted a complete rejection of the American initiative which was described in Berlin as an "arrogant demand by the gangsters from the Washington ghetto." *

On June 4, 1942 Hitler paid a visit to Marshal Mannerheim somewhere behind the Finnish front. He returned to Germany the same day and issued the following communique: "As a sign of the common destiny of Germany and Finland and the close brotherhood in arms of the two countries, the Fuehrer presented Marshal Mannerheim with the Grand Cross of the Order of the German Eagle . . . in an atmosphere of cordial friendship."

The continuing Russian advance, the raising of the siege of Leningrad, the German retreat on the Baltic front, and the resumption of large-scale Russian air-raids, caused growing anxiety in Finland. On February 2, 1944, President Ryti, opening the Finnish Diet, said: "At the present moment our position is serious. The general situation demands from us great vigilance and courage, calmness and determination. Our aims remain the same—to preserve and ensure freedom for our people and independence for our State . . . We may meet with many difficulties and trials. We must be able to overcome them."

Russian peace terms to Finland were presented on February 28 and were considered in secret session the next day. These terms were rejected, a circumstance which caused much disappointment in all the capitals of the world.

Abandoned by her German masters, Finland reluctantly signed an armistice at Moscow on September 19, 1944. When the terms were published two days later, there was great satisfaction in London and in Washington at their mildness. The reparations imposed by the Russians, payable in six years, were \$300,000,000 instead of the \$600,000,000 they had demanded the previous spring. This amount was to be paid in kind: in timber products, paper, cellulose, ships, and machinery.

The Finns were not required to ally themselves with the United Nations or to engage in hostilities against Germany beyond their own frontiers, although they were directed to disarm all German forces which had remained within Finnish borders beyond September 15.

On November 17, 1944, Juho Kusti Paasikivi became Prime Minister, with the avowed intention of leading Finland back to a policy of genuine friendship with her Russian neighbor, the prerequisite for her independent existence.

* (*London Times*, Nov. 12, 1941.)

6. Czechoslovakia

Omnia sua sponte fluant, absit violentia rebus *—John Amos Comenius.

AS EARLY as 1934, the grand old man of British journalism, Mr. Wickham Steed, wrote a remarkable, prophetic book entitled *The Meaning of Hitlerism*.¹ In retrospect, the most significant sections of this book were two chapters entitled "Hitler and the State Absolute" and "Masaryk and the State Liberal"—a remarkable juxtaposition indeed. No other two countries have ever been so far apart as the state which was created by Tomáš Masaryk, the son of serfs, and the one produced by the unholy alliance of the German General Staff and the Western industrialists, with Hitler as a catalyst.

Indeed, if Europe were made up of states like Masaryk's Czechoslovakia, it would be almost a Utopia. If ever a state was built on ethics, it was Czechoslovakia, which has the most praiseworthy history of any country in Southeastern and Central Europe, if not in all Europe. The strength of Czechoslovakia is due to the fact that nowhere else in the modern world has a statesman succeeded so well in sensing the will of a people, and formulating it into a democratic government, as Masaryk did as the first President of Czechoslovakia.

His philosophy was essentially Protestant in that he believed in the responsibility of the individual and the dignity of man. Brought up as a devout Roman Catholic, as he remained for many years until he rejected the doctrine of papal infallibility, he finally became a disciple of John Hus and John Amos Comenius, two early Czech religious philosophers, and an ardent student of Plato. His influence as a philosopher spread throughout the Slav world long before the outbreak of the First World War. A combination of Tolstoi and Walt Whitman, he knew that the struggle for Czechoslovak independence was the struggle not only against Austrian domination, but also against the spirit of

* "Let everything flow of its own accord; force should be avoided."

the Hapsburg counterreformation which had oppressed the people of Czechoslovakia since 1620. The redemption of the Czechs and the Slovaks could not be achieved by political independence alone; it had to be accompanied by spiritual independence.

Masaryk looked on the First World War as a struggle between the ideas of the West—the legacy of the Renaissance and the Reformation, culminating in the English, American, and French revolutions—against the totalitarianism of first, the theocracy of the Holy Roman Empire, and later, that of Imperial Germany, inasmuch as the theocracy of the Imperial Lutheran Church differed only superficially from that of the Holy Roman Empire. It is startling to observe how this theocratic view of the state came to its full fruition in Nazi Germany with Hitler as the Chief of State and high priest of the new Nazi creed based on the God-given superiority of the Nordic (Aryan) German race.

According to Wickham Steed's analysis, Masaryk's writings trace the cleavage that rent Europe asunder after the Reformation, and point out that the German people accepted the Reformation only in part, and that the German Lutheran Reformation derived from Roman law and sundry principles of Catholicism. The result was first a sort of Caesaro-Papism with a monarch ruling by divine right over State and Church alike, then Pan-German imperialism, which supplanted the humanitarianism of Lessing, Herder, Goethe (although he was quite an opportunist), Kant, and Schiller, which in turn derived from secular and Western evolution. Its final fruit was Hitlerism.

As a matter of fact, long before Hitlerism became the expression of that philosophy which Masaryk summarized as a composite of the theories of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and William II, Masaryk had become the pre-eminent critic of the German philosophy of absolutism. He wryly characterized the Germans' belief in their own superiority as follows: "They mistake the hugeness of a colossal Tower of Babel for the grandeur of a humanity united in freedom."² This phrase is the key to Masaryk's own philosophy, upon which he built the Czechoslovak state—"the grandeur of a humanity united in freedom."

It was on that basis that he solved, better than any statesman before him, the many problems that arise when people of different races are associated in one state. Hitler called them minority problems; Masaryk realized they were merely problems of human relationship. He made this clear when he wrote:

We shall solve our own problem aright if we comprehend that the more humane we are the more national we shall be. The relationship between the nation and mankind, between nationality and internationality, between nation-

alism and humaneness of feeling, is not that mankind as a whole and internationalism and humaneness are something apart from, against or above the nation and nationality, but that nations are the natural organs of mankind. . . .

To a positive nationalism, one that seeks to raise a nation by intensive work, none can demur. Chauvinism, racial or national intolerance, not love of one's own people, is the foe of nations and of humanity. Love of one's own nation does not entail non-love of other nations.

We restored our State in the name of democratic freedom, and we shall only be able to preserve it through freedom increasingly perfected. . . . In the past [under Austria] our democratic aims were negative, a negation of Austrian absolutism. Now they must be positive. What we took as our ideal must become reality—and it will not be easy.³

The 3,000,000 Germans and 700,000 Hungarians who lived within Czechoslovak borders at the time of the 1930 census had more cultural and political autonomy than any other political minority in Europe. Czechoslovakia can look back on her record in the treatment of her minorities with a clearer conscience than almost any other nation in Europe. The Magyars in Czechoslovakia were better off than their conationals in the homeland across the border, especially the farmers and other common people. Only those whose revisionism overshadowed all other considerations were unwilling to admit these facts. The large German minority had all civil rights and freedoms; German schools, including two institutes of technology and a full university in Prague, and German theaters subsidized by the state. Yet among skeptics and the more nationalistic Czechs, the Germans were always regarded as a potential danger.

On the other hand, not all Sudeten Germans were irreconcilable. Many are still remembered by the Czechs with friendly feelings and even admiration. A number of Socialist workers stuck to Czechoslovakia to the very last in the fateful days before Munich. In the late summer of that year, at a common mass meeting in Ceská Třebová, there were two speakers. One, a Czechoslovak, addressed the meeting in German; the other, a German, made the closing address in Czech. Together the two speakers unveiled a statue of Masaryk.

The Czechoslovak state, to which Tomáš Masaryk gave so much, was a democracy built on the moral renovation of politics. Eduard Beneš, Masaryk's foremost disciple and successor in the presidency, and Jan Masaryk, his son, administered the state according to the principles he laid down, which constituted his political testament.

In direct opposition to Hegelian teaching, which holds that political

men need take no thought of ethical principles when the interest of the state is involved, Masaryk wrote:

No State, no society can be managed without general recognition of the ethical bases of the State and of politics; and no State can long stand if it infringes the broad rules of human morality. The authority of the State and of its laws is derived from general recognition of ethical principles and from general agreement among citizens upon the main postulates of philosophy and life. Once again—Democracy is not alone a form of State and of administration. It is a philosophy of life and an outlook upon the world.

The Greeks and Romans declared justice to be the foundation of States; and justice is the arithmetic of love. The law, written and unwritten, enables the State gradually to extend the injunction of love to all the practical relations of social life and, in case of need, to enforce compliance with it. Hence the old dispute about the relative value of morality and law. Though an ethical minimum, the law, as the embodiment of public right, carries great weight by reason of its definiteness and practical adequacy. In practice, the State approaches the ethical maximum—the ideal—through the ethical minimum—the law; and human evolution brings the minimum ever nearer to the ideal.⁴

Masaryk's Czechoslovakia was but the expression of the natural development and the political evolution of the peoples of the country. It was one of the most progressive nations in the world, and socially one of the best balanced. Since Czechoslovakia is better fitted than any of the other European democracies to become the intermediary between Slavic Russia and the West, she can make a major contribution to the security of postwar Europe. Her importance and significance are therefore out of all proportion to her numerical population. Czechoslovakia can become the moral, political, and military bulwark of the reconstruction of Central and Southeastern Europe, and the guiding state in a new confederation, provided the other Central European states are reconstituted along democratic lines. Nothing could be expected of a confederation that included the old Poland dominated by fascist colonels, or a feudal Hungary ruled by Magyar landlords.

It was with such an objective that the Polish-Czechoslovak declaration of November 11, 1940, was concluded while the German-Soviet pact of nonaggression was still in force. Nevertheless, statements made in the book *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*, which was prepared by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and published in the summer of 1943, indicate that throughout the negotiations with the Polish Government, the Czechoslovak representatives continually affirmed that they considered it essential for their two countries to adopt common principles and aims in foreign policy. Since the Soviet Union was

geographically the nearest Great Power, they obviously meant that Poland and Czechoslovakia should have a common friendly policy toward the Soviet Union.

With regard to controversial matters, particularly the question of frontiers between the Soviet Union and Poland, Czechoslovakia did not wish to interfere in favor of either side, hoping only for a friendly settlement between the two countries. It was essential, the Czechoslovak leaders maintained, that their respective governments be founded on the same democratic principles and that their internal economic and social politics be brought closer into line; that final decisions about confederation be reserved for the constitutional bodies of the two nations after liberation; and that the two governments prepare plans which would lead to the closest collaboration on a federation basis. Finally, on the question of frontiers between Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Czechoslovak representatives would strive to reach a reciprocal agreement on the assumption that Poland would make amends for the violation of Czechoslovakia at the time of Germany's aggression.

One difficulty was that, while Poland was in a state of war with the Soviet Union until June, 1941, Czechoslovak foreign policy always reckoned with the Soviet Union being drawn into the war and, in view of the traditional sympathy of the Czechoslovak people for Russia, constantly avoided anything that might threaten friendly Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. The situation was greatly eased when the Soviet-Polish agreement was reached in July, 1941, and when General Sikorsky visited Josef Stalin, later in the year.⁵

It is obvious that differences between Czechoslovakia and Poland already existed in 1940, when the first Czechoslovak-Polish declaration was published. A noticeable variance in the Polish and Czechoslovak appraisal of the future role of the Soviet Union was indicated in the same book.

The participation of the Soviet Union in the war had considerable influence on the affairs of Czechoslovakia. Soviet-Czechoslovak relations remained on a loyal footing even after the destruction of the Republic in March, 1939, despite the temporary neutrality policy of the Soviet Union based on the German-Soviet pact of August 23, 1939, and despite the fact that the Soviet Government in December, 1939, ceased to recognize the Czechoslovak Legation in Moscow and entered into formal relations with the so-called Slovak State.⁶

It is to be credited to Beneš's farsightedness that Czechoslovakia was not alienated by this diplomats' game which granted the Soviet

Union two more years to prepare for the struggle with Germany. Czechoslovakia, faithful to her belief in the importance of Russia's co-operation with Europe—a belief voiced by Tomáš Masaryk in a memorandum to the Allies as long ago as 1918, immediately after the Bolshevik revolution—carefully avoided any move that might hamper friendly relations between herself and Russia.

Meanwhile, this belief was not shared by the Polish Government-in-exile in London, some of whose members still played with the idea of a cordon sanitaire around Russia. The Polish-Czechoslovak declaration of November 11, 1940, was further weakened by the Polish Government's obvious hesitation to make any promises regarding "the Polish violation of Czechoslovakia at the time of Germany's aggression in 1938." As a matter of fact, throughout the three years that have passed since this declaration, the Poles have done nothing to satisfy this modest and certainly justifiable claim of the Czechoslovaks. It might be assumed that the Polish Government in London thinks that if Poland returns the controversial Cieszyn (Teschen) territory, she may be establishing a precedent for giving up Eastern Poland to Russia.

As reported from various sources, there were several other reasons which kept many Czechoslovaks from taking these Czechoslovak-Polish confederation plans too seriously. The impression prevailed that the confederation was a rather cleverly camouflaged plan for Polish domination. Some Poles suggested, for example, freedom of domicile for Poles and Czechoslovaks in both countries. This would have given Poland, which has a higher birth rate, the opportunity to colonize Czechoslovakia and even to Polonize her in some twenty or thirty years. Another factor not relished by the Czechs was Poland's obvious intention to build up a confederated region from the Baltic to the Aegean, first as a cordon sanitaire, second as a region dominated by the Poles in their ancient role of a Great Power.

All these differences came to the fore in 1943 when General Sikorski died, and later when the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London. The rift became even more obvious after the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance of December 1943. There was neither change nor inconsistency in the Czechoslovak foreign policy as explained in *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*:

A fundamental idea in Czechoslovak policy, confirmed by the present war, is that the German *Drang nach Osten* can only be effectively countered by collaboration on the part of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Long before the war, Czechoslovak foreign policy had been guided by the

conviction that collaboration between the great powers of the West and the great power in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, was essential. That is why the Czechoslovak people welcomed with real satisfaction the British-Soviet alliance of May 26, 1942, and the America-Soviet understanding reached after Molotov's visit to Washington.⁷

It may be recalled that the new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty contains an express reference to the German *Drang nach Osten*. As a matter of fact, the idea of co-operation between the West and Russia goes back as far as the First World War. Czechoslovakia, having liberated herself with substantial help from France, Great Britain, and the United States, was always tied up with the West, chiefly in her cultural development. On the other hand, being a Slav nation, she never lost contact with Russia, whose literary classics enjoy a tremendous popularity among her people. Owing to the fact that the autocratic and conservative Czarist regime had no sympathy for the Czechoslovak liberation movement, the Russian Revolution and the exit of the Czar were not a matter of regret to the Czechs. They were perhaps more familiar than most peoples with the backwardness and the social injustices of the extinct Czarist regime. During the years between wars, being herself a progressive country, Czechoslovakia was not afraid of Bolshevization, and always considered social progress the best medicine against this bugaboo that frightened feudal countries like Hungary.

On the contrary, many Czechoslovaks were alarmed by the fact that Soviet Russia was being driven into ever deeper isolation by the attitude of the Western democracies, many of whose leaders openly preferred Hitler to Stalin. Anticipating such a catastrophe as Munich, Czechoslovakia was eager to serve as intermediary between the East and the West. In principle, at least, she performed this office in the French-Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance, which was concluded in 1935 and broken off three years later at Munich, through no fault of either Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union.

In the opinion of Czechoslovakia's present leaders and representatives abroad, who are in close touch with the homeland, their country should and will resume this function of a bridge between the progressive East and an enlightened West, until the German menace is neutralized forever and a re-educated Germany can take her place once more among the nations of Europe. Czechoslovakia's relations with her smaller neighbors can be adjusted within the framework of a great European scheme in which not only Nazism and all forms of fascism must disappear, but also feudal backwardness as it existed in prewar

Poland and still exists in Hungary. It is the firm belief of Czech leaders, particularly Eduard Beneš, that the day of feudalism is definitely gone and that social progress can no longer be checked in any European country without grave danger of new frictions and finally a new war.

On December 22, 1943, President Beneš made a speech from Moscow to his own people. Even for a man of Dr. Beneš's frankness, it was a remarkably straightforward and precise expression of Czechoslovakia's postwar policy, a brilliant and dramatic forecast of the future in exact terms. Unfortunately the speech was not reported in the American press, but I am indebted to the Czechoslovak Government for the text, which I give here in part. Said Dr. Beneš:

Dear Czechoslovak citizens:

. . . My present visit to Moscow, just as that in 1935 is [thus] not a fortuitous opportune gesture of war policy which will change as a result of future events. This visit is in my eyes a natural outcome, a logical conclusion, and a final fruition of our policy during the whole of the last century which has been made possible precisely by the Russian Revolution. . . . My visit represents a significant step toward our enduring future international policy which will supplement the European policies of Great Britain and the Soviet Union as expressed by the Anglo-Soviet pact signed in London in May 1942, and as reasserted by the recent allied conferences at Moscow and in the Near East.

What is the sense underlying this treaty which is so vital for us, about which we have been conducting discussions with the Soviet Union since the spring of this year? . . .

The treaty jointly announces a lasting friendship of our nations. This friendship will be immediately resumed after this war in the shape of an extensive economic collaboration. We here and you at home, let us prepare for this now—let us draw up plans and make practical preparation. It will involve considerable re-orientation of our commercial and industrial prewar trends, but it will also represent a considerable economic safeguard for us, and new economic independence, particularly as to Germany and her future influence. We shall have to rebuild our railway, waterway, and air communications. It will not mean, however, that we are to give up our connections and economic interests in Western and Southern Europe as well as overseas. All this will represent merely an extensive supplement. Geographically, we are in the immediate vicinity and neighborhood of the Soviet Union, which has up to the present been economically neglected by us, but which will have so substantial an interest in our economic future. . . .

The treaty expressly states that our future collaboration will be that of two countries absolutely free and independent. The treaty respects our full sovereignty and the principle of noninterference in the affairs of either country. By this we both desired to demonstrate as clearly as possible before the whole world the

true character of stupid and immeasurably mendacious propaganda both of the Germans and of our treacherous quislings, both Czechs and Slovaks. We wish to demonstrate what has already been stressed at the conference of the three Great Powers: That these Great Powers and particularly the Soviet Union fully respect the independence of smaller nations and states. that it [sic] desires a strong Czechoslovakia, a strong Poland, a strong Yugoslavia, and, of course, an independent Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. Do not therefore take any notice, you at home in Czech lands and in Slovakia, of that unprincipled Nazi propaganda which is so stupidly asserting that the Soviet Union wants to swallow us up. Nor must you take any note of this propaganda as it concerns internal politics.

Our state, which will be re-created immediately after this war, will again build up its political regime entirely freely with a greatly limited number of political parties—I myself should like to see only three parties in our country—and the state will be truly a democratic and popular one. It will have a new government immediately after the fall of Germany, which will also represent our entire home front. Only Nazis, fascists, and all the treacherous culprits of this war will be excluded from it and from its advantages. All these must disappear in the abyss of their catastrophe and atone for all their mistakes, guilt, crimes, and treason, just as in all other liberated countries of Europe.

Our state will also carry out a number of changes in the domain of economic and social life. We shall have a planned system for our political and economic activities such as our economists desired prior to this war. I myself expect and shall endeavor to bring about speedily our entire postwar political, economic, and social reconstruction measures, and in particular a new minority policy of our state. We must have a program drawn up in advance of a well-thought-out and prepared first five-year plan. . . .

This treaty, together with all the developments which will occur as a result of this war in regard to collaboration of the Soviet Union with Western Europe, will once and for all prevent a repetition of Munich, a repetition of the betrayal by our fascists, of the betrayal of our Slovak fascists and their treacherous dismemberment of Slovakia from the Republic in the service of German violence. It will ensure above all the final disappearance from our land of German Nazism and treacherous and despicable Henleinism. This is one of the chief tasks and aims of this treaty. I say so clearly and openly. In other words, what we are doing here now represents one of the main safeguards of the existence for our entire future of a United National Czechoslovak State of Czechoslovaks and of the peoples of Subcarpathian Russia.

I told you in March 1942, after Molotov's visit to London—and I notified you later of the refutation of Munich by the British Government contained in its letter to Minister Masaryk—that Commissar Molotov assured me in London that the Soviet Union had never had anything to do with Munich and had never recognized any of its consequences, and that as a result, when he signed a treaty of alliance with us on July 18, 1941, in this war against Germany, he was signing the treaty with the pre-Munich Republic. The same holds too for

our two countries today and particularly for our present treaty. The Soviet Union sincerely desires a strong, consolidated, nationally fully homogeneous Czechoslovak Republic which will be a truly good and strong friend and collaborator of the Soviet people in future defense of a lasting peace in Europe. The same wish also applies to future Poland, and the Soviet Union not only desires good and friendly relations with Poland but also a strong Polish-Czechoslovak friendship and collaboration.

It is obvious that Czech leaders are convinced that some kind of rapprochement between Russia and the outside world will not only do away with the age-old German danger, but also initiate a new era of sincere and genuine co-operation between Russia and the whole of Europe, and with the Great Powers all over the world. In Russia too there is a genuine desire for this co-operation with the outside world, as was proved by Stalin's admission that without the Allies, Russia could not have withstood the German assault. It is now, in the opinion of the Czechs, up to the outside world to prove whether the Allies are equally willing to co-operate with Soviet Russia, without whose participation the military situation would not look so good as it does in 1945.

Czech leaders are convinced that Russia does not seek any aggrandizement in Central Europe and that it is her sincere wish to see Czechoslovakia and Poland re-established after this war as independent and strong nations co-operating with her and the West to safeguard the European peace. They also seem convinced that the Soviet Union will not be interested in the internal affairs of their own or any other country so long as no new kind of fascism develops. Since feudalism is the forerunner of fascism, it is obvious that Russia will refuse to deal with feudal regimes in Germany or in any other Central or Eastern European country. The problem now is whether the Great Western Powers will understand this and share in the inevitable historical development which will finally modernize Europe. Czechoslovakia would then quite certainly find her place on the Continent in keeping with the old tradition which links her with both East and West in her political, cultural, and economic relations. All the problems that will beset her as long as Europe is a house divided against itself would disappear under the influence of close co-operation with Poland and Russia, Central Europe, and Western Europe.

It should be made clear that notwithstanding Czechoslovakia's deep-rooted traditional friendship with Russia, she neither would nor could give up her equally deep-rooted sympathies with the West. Her people would be strongly opposed to any one-sided orientation to the East.

In her brief history Czechoslovakia has made social advances of her own, and a considerable majority of her people are convinced that communism is, to a large extent, a Russian order which cannot be simply copied in another country. In the opinion of most Czechoslovakians, Bolshevism was primarily a consequence of and a reaction to the indescribable social backwardness of Czarist Russia, where feudalism was at its height. But at the same time, Czechoslovakia is aware that the outside world has shown itself unable to understand the amazing phenomenon of Russian rebirth, chiefly because many of its capitalist representatives were more interested in the fate of the immense fortunes of the Russian feudal landowners than in the well-being of the average citizen. The Czechs know the people of Russia perhaps better than Russia's other neighbors do. They realize that Russia needs understanding and co-operation more than anything else, and that her attitude toward the outside world is a reflection of the attitude of the world toward herself. This knowledge enables Czechoslovakia to trust Russia and to be prepared to work with her in solving the problems of Eastern and Central Europe for the good of all nations without sacrificing the independence of any.

As far as the economic reconstruction and future of Czechoslovakia are concerned, situated as she is in Central Europe, her problems are closely interrelated with those of that part of Europe which, together with Germany, consumed nearly two-thirds of her exports during the first decade after the war. It is interesting to note that Dr. Beneš's speech emphasized Czechoslovakia's new economic relationship with Russia. However strong that relationship may be, Czechoslovakia's history indicates that she will continue to do more than half her foreign trade with the West. Owing to the high flexibility of her economy, Czechoslovakia may be expected to recover from the ravages of war and German occupation more quickly than any other European state. Czechoslovakia never had anything to fear from Germany economically, so long as it was a matter of honest competition. In 1937, Germany used only 13.7 per cent of Czechoslovakia's exports and provided 15.5 per cent of her imports. But without the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Germany would never have succeeded in her trading drive to the southeast.

The remarkable achievement of Czechoslovak economy during the years between the two wars is high-lighted by the fact that as a highly industrialized country dependent on foreign trade, she could succeed only as a freetrader; being a small country, she was not able to stimulate exports by government subsidies or high domestic prices. In other

words, the young state had to prove its ability in free and sharp competition in foreign markets. In this Czechoslovakia succeeded brilliantly. There is no reason to fear that she cannot do it again. Although, like all other European countries, she will need foreign assistance in the first period of reconstruction, she will need less of it than the others, and for a shorter period.

The firm foundation of a diversified Czechoslovak industrial economy could, of course, be used as an argument for pursuing an independent economic course. The leaders of Czechoslovakia are, however, fully aware of the vital political, social, and economic importance of a real consolidation of Central and Southeastern Europe—a territory with a population of about 120,000,000—on the basis of a modern free economy, unhampered by customs barriers.

The Czechs are right in insisting that there cannot be any equilibrium in Central Europe while Austria belongs to Germany. As new, democratic states, Hungary and Romania would constitute economically appropriate constituents of the consolidation, with Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, and perhaps Turkey comprising a second confederation. A considerable portion of this bloc—parts of Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Bulgaria—represents what may be called a backward area. Their basic problems, already mentioned, call for settlement. And the best solution is greater economic activity, planned industrialization, the development of natural resources, and an increase in agricultural production through the introduction of new methods.

This backward area is also the last big reserve of increasing consumption and production in Europe; its development and consolidation are therefore highly important for the whole of Europe, and will also *directly and materially enlarge trade with the Americas*. It may be objected that newly industrialized nations will create competition for existing industrial countries, reducing their exports. But a new international ratio of trade can be worked out as a result of the general increase in consumption and production. The United States, for example, with its superiority in all kinds of mass production, can exchange its products and raw materials for highly specialized goods from old industrial countries in Europe, where an abundance of labor is available.

The formerly backward countries can also change the structure of their foreign trade as they develop; the importation of raw materials and machines will increase, and growing domestic consumption will absorb a great part of their agricultural surplus, reducing their exports

in favor of overseas agriculture. Triangular trade will bring a general foreign-trade expansion.

Because of Czechoslovakia's economic structure and geographical position, she can continue to export highly specialized goods to industrial countries, and various other products to less industrialized Central and Southeastern Europe. At the same time, she will offer a good market for goods from the United States and overseas, as well as for many products from neighboring countries.

The development of backward countries can be most quickly achieved with foreign financial help. In the postwar reconstruction scheme, these undeveloped areas have an important role as an outlet for goods and a chance for investment, especially from and by the United States. The extent of such help should not be overrated; American investment in this part of Europe in 1932 amounted to \$650,000,000, which meant a great deal in economic improvement.

In any such international plan, Czechoslovakia can render very important services. The financial and commercial setup in Prague could serve as a link between foreign capital and these backward areas. Czechoslovak experts, who offer a thorough personal knowledge of the economic conditions in these countries, can act as advisers and trustees. On the whole, Czechoslovakia, with her good social and economic balance, could serve as the intermediary between the Western countries and Central and Southeastern Europe in organizing and developing this very important area. In this she would only be continuing what she started in the last years before the Second World War.

7. *Historical Roots of Pan-Germanism*

IT HAS BEEN SAID before, but the implications have not always been understood, that Hitlerism is but a manifestation of Pan-Germanism, which has its roots in what has been variously described as Prussianism and Prussian militarism. Yet comparatively little effort has been made to trace its historical and philosophical origins.

Germany, for instance, is frequently referred to as a country of thinkers and poets. Yet if we analyze the works of such philosophers as Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schlegel, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, we cannot help concluding that these thinkers were little more than journalistic propagandists for the virtues of Prussian militarism. These great stars in the constellation of German thinkers had a number of lesser satellites who translated their metaphysical circumlocutions into terms of "Realpolitik."

Heinrich von Treitschke insisted that to banish war was profoundly immoral, and that war was not only a "practical necessity" but also a "theoretical necessity and exigency of logic." General Friedrich von Bernhardi reduced these righteous sentiments to military formulas in his *Germany and the Next War*, first published in 1912.

The idea of the fifth column was really originated by Baron Dietrich von Bülow in the early 1790's. His discussion of economic penetration, and the bribing of businessmen and industrialists in foreign countries to be conquered later, practically provided a blueprint and a guidebook for the activities of Otto Abetz in Paris a century and a half later.

The historical failure of the Weimar Republic established at the end of the First World War lies in the tragic fact that it was unable or

unwilling, first to de-Prussianize the Reich, and second to destroy the economic foundations of the Junker class, who sent their younger sons into the German Army, where they traditionally administered the General Staff.

The history of Germany is its rape by Prussia, and the history of Prussia is dominated by the German Junkers, who have always used the state apparatus to enrich themselves at the expense of the general public. While the Junkers have exploited Prussia, Prussia in turn has exploited her neighbor states until they became weak enough to be dominated completely.

Starting with the sandy wastes of the Province of Brandenburg in the fourteenth century, the appropriately-named Hohenzollern * princes conquered the Reich by degrees, until the spirit of the grasping, overbearing Teutonic Knights and their descendants dominated the rich, easy-going, Rhine-wine-loving, open-minded Germans of the South and West.

There is a direct line from Teutonic Knighthood to Prussian militarism and the German General Staff, and more recently to Hitler's Black Shirts. The homosexuality of many of the SS (Schutz-Staffeln) Elite Guard of Hitler, and the personal bodyguards of Rudolf Hess, Ernst Röhm, and Heinrich Himmler, was but an echo of the perversion of the monastic spirit which occurred among the later Teutonic Knights.

General Friedrich von Bernhardi, a descendant of the Teutonic Knights, used the same medieval religious reasoning when he wrote in *Internationale Monatsschifte* early in 1914, "It is God's law that condemns the vanquished and it is, therefore, His will that the conqueror should dictate such peace terms as shall display his full strength." In 1893, another typical German Junker general, Count Dietrich von Haeseler, who was to become military Governor of Alsace-Lorraine nineteen years later, delivered the following order of the day to his troops: "Our civilization must build its temple on mountains of corpses, oceans of tears, and the groans of innumerable dying men."¹

While this sentiment may not necessarily be typical, it is probably correct to say that, contrary to popular assumption, the collective view of the German General Staff is scarcely that of Hegel, who conceived the state as an absolute end in itself. Rather, the generals look upon the state as a means of attaining an end, that end being the welfare of the German generals and the Junkers. The economic foundations of the Junker class must, therefore, be destroyed in order to break

* Literally, "high tariffs."

their hold on Germany and forestall another alliance with Germany's Western industrialists and another bid for a new order.

Yes, the economic foothold of the whole class must be broken. This will not be an easy matter. Three thousand Junkers own 6,498,730 acres of farming land, while over 3,000,000 families and small farmers, or slightly more than 60 per cent of all those occupied in agriculture, own altogether no more than 3,706,500 acres. Or, to put it another way, 0.15 per cent of the landowners own well above 24,710,000 acres of land, or almost 40 per cent of the entire land under cultivation in Germany. In a letter written to the Reich Statistical Bureau in August 1936 and published in the German press, Walther Darre, former Nazi Food Minister, declared that 412 Junkers owned as much land as 1,000,000 peasants.

The best solution would be to expropriate the holdings of the 3,000 German Junker families and distribute the property among farm laborers and small farmers. This measure would not only dislodge the Junker class, but would also neutralize the centers of political reaction, and perhaps make it financially impossible for the Junkers to have their sons educated for military leadership by the German General Staff. If the German cartels were internationalized and the German Junker class expropriated, this economic marriage of reactionary elements would be effectually dissolved and the German will-to-war would be broken.

At the start of the Second World War the twenty-four most important landowners in Germany were:

German Landowners 1933

	ACRES
Kaiser Wilhelm II's family	239,687.0
Prince of Pless	123,550.0
Prince of Hohenlohe	119,843.5
Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen	113,666.0
Prince of Solms-Baruth	95,627.7
Ernst von Stolberg-Wernigerode	90,685.7
Duke of Ratibor and Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingfuerst	76,848.1
Duke of Anhalt-Dessau	72,500.3
Count Thiele-Winkler	71,164.8
Duke of Ahrenberg-Nordkirchen	68,693.8
Count Schaffgotsch	66,222.8
Leopold, Prince of Prussia	61,775.0
Count von Brühl	56,585.9
Count Fink von Finkensteln	51,891.0
Prince Frederick Henry of Prussia	42,254.1
Prince Albrecht of Württemberg	39,783.1
Prince Schaumburg-Lippe	38,794.7
Prince Henkell von Donnersmarck	37,005.0
Family of Field Marshal von Kleist	37,559.2

German Landowners 1933—Cont'd

	ACRES
Grand Duke of Oldenburg	34,099.8
Prince Richard Sayn-Wittgenstein	29,652.0
Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha	25,698.4
Hereditary Prince Josias of Waldeck	24,710.0
Prince Philipp of Hesse	17,297.0

The Silesian magnates greeted with enthusiasm Hitler's war against Poland. By the partitioning of Upper Silesia in 1921, Count Thiele-Winkler had lost to Poland 44,288.9 acres, Count Schaffgotsch 6,424.6 acres, the Princes and Counts of Donnersmarck 91,427 acres, the Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen 46,207.7 acres, the Counts of Ballestrem 12,107.9, and the Duke of Ratibor 6,424.6. In 1940 all their property on Polish soil was again restored to them.²

The German General Staff of today is not only a military organization but a national institution, with far-reaching ramifications establishing it as a truly sovereign power in Germany. Comte Honoré de Mirabeau, French Ambassador to Berlin in the late eighteenth century, coined the famous phrase "Prussia is not a country that maintains an army, but an army that controls a country." That was true two hundred years ago, and it is even more true today. Frederick the Great had to take rich Silesia in order to support his army, because the technological advances of his time demanded more raw materials than Prussia could supply. Then in 1815 the Congress of Vienna bestowed a windfall on Prussia in the form of the Western German provinces of the Rhineland and Westphalia. This acquisition provided the economic resources for the wars of 1864 and 1866, by which Prussia gained Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, and other German states. These further territorial gains improved Prussia's position sufficiently for a war against France in 1870-71, which secured Alsace-Lorraine and Prussian domination over the other states of Otto von Bismarck's newly created German Second Reich, which was the successor of the First Reich of Charlemagne and the predecessor of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. The Second Reich set out for bigger stakes; the Germans adopted an international policy which eventually led to the First World War. The guiding force at that time was the Prussian Crown in combination with the Prussian Army.

The General Staff was created early in the nineteenth century and developed into a first-rate planning organization supplemented by an efficient high civil service. The personnel of both Army and civil service was drawn primarily from the Junker class—the Prussian landed gentry. In co-operation with the civil service, the Crown enacted legislation in that part of Prussia east of the Elbe River known as

Eastelbian Prussia which has defended the economic and political position of the Junkers to our own day. Special high protection of agriculture, certain inheritance laws, and other feudal laws kept the landed gentry economically secure, while special electoral laws favored their political domination.

The rapid industrialization of Germany in the nineteenth century created many problems, but soon a *modus vivendi* was found to permit a compromise between the interests of industry and those of the Junker class. The constant revision of this compromise became one of the major political necessities in Germany after the First World War. There is one outstanding difference between the Prussia of Comte de Mirabeau's time and Prussia-Germany today. The Prussian Army of the eighteenth century was supported by a relatively poor agricultural country; today the German General Staff has at its disposal the vast resources of a highly industrialized Germany.

Now the Treaty of Versailles never affected the balance of power within Prussia-Germany to any fundamental degree. Industry and the Junker class remained—if not professedly, nevertheless in practice—in undisputed control of the political, administrative, and economic forces of Germany. Industry took more of the limelight for international reasons, while the Junker class continued to man the General Staff, the High Command, and the high civil service. The same names are found in both the Army and the civil service today as two hundred, one hundred, fifty and twenty-five years ago: Von Arnim, Von Kleist, Von Bülow, Von Bredow, Von Bock, Von Zitzewitz, Von Brauchitsch, Von Bonin, Von Schwerin, Von Seeckt, Von Hammerstein, Von Waldersee, Von der Goltz, Von Lüttwitz, Von Leeb, Von Hardenberg, Von Wedel, and so on. The economic control is shared with industry, but ultimate decisions regarding the uses to which the national earning power and wealth are put rest with the Army; in the end, international policy is established by the General Staff.

Germany is not, as many people believe, a truly federated state. It is a conglomeration of states completely dominated by one state—Prussia. It has taken one scholar, T. H. Tetens, twenty years of uninterrupted and concentrated research to rediscover the history of Prussia's conquest of Germany. His memoranda on particularism in Germany were submitted to competent United States Government agencies throughout 1942 and 1943 as a suggested weapon in our psychological warfare. I am indebted to him for many of the facts concerning Prussia's struggle for supremacy in Germany between 1883 and 1933, presented here for the first time, I believe, in book form.

The Nazi-coined slogan "One People, One Reich, One Leader" represents an aggressive tendency not only directed externally toward the non-German world, but aimed with equal violence at the centuries-old traditions of the German tribes and the sovereignty of their respective states. When National Socialism came to power in 1933, the struggle for ascendancy ended in the triumph of the concept of the Prussian power state over the idea of federalism. Under the banner of the swastika, dynamic militaristic Prussia established her dictatorial overlordship over all the German tribes. Within a few years the whole of Germany, including Austria, became a Great Prussia. Thus the totalitarian power state was brought into being as the suitable instrument for an attack on Europe and the world, and Prussian militarism approached the execution of its most audacious dreams.

A fuller knowledge of the successive stages of Prussia's historical development in the rise from the void to the present world-threatening power is of tremendous importance. Out of this knowledge the Allies can (1) hasten the conclusion of the war by adroitly exploiting the inner German problems; (2) destroy the vestiges of dynamic Prussian militarism by working out a real solution of the German problem during the coming peace.

Prussia cannot be identified with any single nation or tribe, as for example Bavaria with the Bajuvarians, Saxony with the Saxonians, Hesse with the Hessians, and so on. Prussia is a system, which emerged during the East German colonial period. It was founded in plunder and slavery. German historians freely admit that territorial annexation and pillage were the motives which contributed to the development of Prussia. Volumes have been written on the subject of the so-called *Landnehmerheere* (land-taking armies) and the Prussian technique which demands that "war must be supported by war"—that is, that conquered territories must be looted. The origin of Prussia must be traced back to the colonial period in Eastern Europe, when German Knights penetrated into the Slavic regions east of the river Elbe and settled down in the conquered territories. The Slavic tribes in the region between the rivers Elbe, Oder, and Vistula were forced into military service by their German conquerors, who throughout the centuries used the most brutal means to Germanize them. The first "subjects" of the Hohenzollern dynasty were furnished chiefly by three Slavic racial strains: the Wends, the Pomeranians, and the Pruzzi.

Under Frederick the Great, additional large territories with pure Slavic populations were added to Prussia after the partition of Poland.

Thus in its entire development Prussia displays all the characteristics of a colonial state created by its conquerors. As Martin Spahn, the Pan-German historian, says: "The attention of the Prussian king, Frederick II, was focused on the East . . . he created the Prussian state at the Oder and Vistula rivers, extending from the river Elbe far up to the Memel river. . . . Frederick turned colonial Germany into a state."³

In the year 1411, Kaiser Sigismund of the Holy Roman Empire sent Count Friedrich von Hohenzollern into the district of Brandenburg ("Mark Brandenburg") as state administrator. Four years later, in recognition of his services, Electoral dignity was conferred upon him and the district of Brandenburg was bestowed upon him as a hereditary grant. By making clever political alliances, depending upon opportunities in their dealings with Poland, Sweden, England, or France, and by rendering military assistance to other powers in times of war, the Hohenzollerns managed slowly but surely to add to their possessions. Aided by the Knights or Junkers, they gradually consolidated their rule in the Slav-populated countries. As early as 1618 they acquired the Duchy of Prussia east of the Vistula, which had been founded by the Teutonic Order of Knights.

The Elector Frederick William, the Great Elector, became the real founder of Hohenzollern power when he ruled from 1640 to 1688. He became the Duke of Prussia, and out of his scattered possessions created the unified Prussian state. He was the first ruler to maintain a peacetime army of as many as 30,000 men, which was considered extraordinary at that time. The Great Elector thus was the originator of the standing army. In 1701 his son Frederick (I) was crowned King of Prussia. Since then all subjects of the Hohenzollerns have been called "Prussians."

During the reign of the Hohenzollerns, Prussia achieved her ultimate form as an absolute militaristic state. Through incessant predatory warfare Prussia continued to augment her holdings, first at the expense of the Slavic populations, and later through the annexation of other German states. In his *Weltgeschichte (History of the World)*, Heinar Schilling sums up the development of Prussia from its inception as a kingdom in 1701 to its emergence as a power under Frederick the Great:

The crowning of Frederick I as King in Prussia marks the beginning of the development of the Hohenzollern monarchy to the status of a Great Power. Engaged in rapid growth under its eminent rulers the state endeavors to round off its territory, which is spread over all of North Germany. There is a swift

development of the typically Prussian idea of state discipline, based upon the subordination of the individual. Thus, centuries after the consolidation of the rest of the European countries, in a process that is unprecedented, a new NATION is created, which assumed the task of gradually absorbing within itself the whole Germanic race. While during the first century of this struggle for German unity Prussia maintained its existence and made the first substantial acquisitions, the second century witnessed the absorption of nearly all of northern Germany, as well as the juncture with the South. The third century was characterized by the final assimilation of the latter and the regaining of the remaining Germanic groups.⁴

This is tantamount to an open admission of the facts previously noted: (1) that there is no such thing as a "Prussian" people; (2) that the "Prussian nation" is an artificial product of its conquerors, into which the other German tribes and independent nations have been forcibly integrated.

It is difficult to realize why most German historians are so disparaging in their attitude toward American colonial history and culture. There is little difference between the development of the "colonial city" of Berlin and that of New York, except that the German Kaiser's governor built his castle on the river Spree, while the Dutch and later the British governors administered their colony on the Hudson River. American colonial history does differ from Prussian in one important aspect. In 1776 the colonials in America successfully fought for their freedom and created their own state on a constitutional basis, while not only was the colonial system of the Prussian conquerors destroyed, but in the course of centuries it proceeded to absorb and suppress all the other German racial groups and finally all the other nations of Europe. The state which was once made up of Slavic subjects became a nation of slaves.

In 1806, after Napoleon I had put an end to the old German Reich under the rule of the Hapsburgs, and Prussia had reorganized her military power during the wars of deliverance, all the conditions were created which would some day permit the Hohenzollern military state to succeed to the Hapsburg heritage. At first the smaller German states were still jealously guarding their independence. For decades the sentiment of the masses and the rulers remained linked with the centuries-old traditions of the German Reich under the leadership of the Hapsburgs. There was no kinship of any sort with Prussia, either in culture or in common traditions. On the contrary, the South German states remained alien to Prussia, and distrusted Prussian politics. United

action in the fields of commerce and communications (that is, post and railroads) became imperative only as a result of industrialization.

Then, after prolonged resistance on the part of Bavaria and Württemberg, the German commercial league was founded in 1833. This German Zollverein (tariff union) really initiated the struggle for leadership in Germany, which ended with Prussia's triumph a century later, when the federated states lost their independence and the Anschluss of Austria with Great Prussia was accomplished. However, the Zollverein of 1833 did not include Austria. At that time King Louis I of Bavaria declared: "Prussia is a bolt of lightning striking through the center of Germany."

In vain did Austrian diplomacy endeavor to obstruct Prussia's attempts at unification; the bitterly anti-Austrian policy of Prussia became more and more strongly entrenched. Every state lived in fear of the mighty neighbor to the north. "Fear of Prussia" became the standard explanation of any and all submission to Prussian threats and demands. In his publication *Deutschland und die Hohenzollern* the historian Georg von Below says: "The organization of the Prussian army and the tariff union are the immediate requirements for the creation of the German Reich. Their common characteristic is the fact that they were not popular."⁵

The fact that the suppression of the revolutionary movements of the year 1848 was accomplished primarily by Prussian troops was utilized by Prussia to strengthen her influence among the German states. In November 1862, King William I of Prussia created the Junker Cabinet of Otto von Bismarck, which immediately raised the strength of the standing army from 150,000 men to 213,000. This act initiated the "blood-and-iron" era, resulting in a disturbance of European equilibrium.

The year 1864 saw the beginning of the war against Denmark, with Austria fighting as an ally of Prussia. The war was hardly concluded before Bismarck began a campaign of extreme provocation against Austria. At the beginning of 1864, Prussia concluded a secret offensive alliance with Italy against Austria, while at the same time Bismarck called upon the German federated states to sever relations with Austria and align themselves with Prussia.

When the federated states rejected this demand, in 1866 Prussian troops launched an invasion of Austria, Saxony, and Hesse without a declaration of war. Even at that time, the blitzkrieg strategy of the Prussian General Staff was already so well developed that within a few weeks the opponents of Prussia were beaten everywhere in Austria

as well as in Western Germany. Austria was forced to sue for peace and to renounce any further influence over the German federated states. Prussia annexed Schleswig-Holstein, the Kingdom of Hanover, Kurhessen (the Electorate of Hesse), and Hesse-Nassau, and also the Free City of Frankfurt-am-Main. The South German states were forced to pay the costs of the war and to place their armies under the Prussian High Command.

Thus Bismarck achieved considerable territorial gains for Prussia in Northwest Germany and at the same time built up the military power necessary for the war against France in 1870. After the defeat of France in 1871, Great Prussia's position in the new German Reich became a dominant one. Reichschancellor Bismarck, who was not elected by the parliament but appointed by the Kaiser, was made president of the Prussian ministry as well.

In the course of a discussion, Kaiser William II declared that Bismarck's brilliant policy had been successful "in preventing the special interests of the smaller states from assuming proportions detrimental to the furtherance of the Great Power concept by having the state of Great Prussia maintain a position of pre-eminence within the federal council, and by combining the office of the Reich chancellery with that of the president of the Prussian state ministry, thus enabling the Reich's chancellor to use Prussia for the neutralization of the Reich." ⁶

"Brandenburg-Prussia grew up to become the new hope of the world-mission of Germandom," says the historian Guenther Gruendel.⁷ He names industrialization, colonial aspirations, and commercial imperialism as the triple driving force of the new expansion. According to Kjellén, the Bismarck-created German Reich "was founded upon the militaristic state of Prussia, representing a convergence grouped about the Prussian bloc. . . . Its center of gravity lay in the feudal-aristocratic form of an agrarian, police-controlled state of a bygone age." ⁸

The preparations which the Germany of William II made for world conquest were amazingly systematic. This fact is abundantly demonstrated by the voluminous Pan-Germanic literature of the *Alldeutscher Verband* (Pan-German League), which, like the *Flottenverein* (Navy League), was an exponent of Prussian militarism.

After the failure of the first Prussian onslaught upon the entire world, the main task of the Allied nations should have been the elimination of Prussian militarism as a world menace and the destruction of the vital forces underlying the Prussian system. The victorious Allies have failed utterly in the execution of this task, to the amazement of the exponents of Prussianism. German literature between the

two World Wars shows that the military and political leaders expected to see the Prussian militaristic state and the Prussian feudal system irrevocably dissolved. They were fearful of a reckoning from two sides: from the suppressed masses inside Germany, and from the victorious Allies on the outside.

A detailed record of the thoughts and opinions exchanged during the First World War among the German princes, statesmen, diplomats, and militarists can be found in the various books of Viktor Naumann, who was for decades a diplomat in the Foreign Office in the Wilhelmstrasse and a confidential representative for a number of German princes. According to Naumann, the German federated princes were of the opinion that the war gave them their "last opportunity of proving the federal character of the Reich, and that they had to render suitable proof of their influence." In a talk with the King of Bavaria, Naumann emphasized that "the federated princes—at least those not under complete Prussian control—were duty-bound to align themselves for the purpose of finally presenting Berlin with an energetic front."⁹

Elsewhere in the same book Naumann declared that he had "heard from a reliable source that the Allies would be far more responsive to a federated Germany than to a fear-inspiring Great Prussia."¹⁰ Obviously, the damage Germany had suffered as a result of Prussian domination had already been felt, as well as the wish to be farther removed from the Prussian orbit. The fact that these rebellious forces and currents received no encouragement from the Allies was the result of misguided clemency. At the Peace Conference the French delegates, Georges Clemenceau and Jules Cambon, demanded that negotiations be conducted not with the representatives of the German Reich, nor with Great Prussia, but only with the representatives of the individual federated states. Robert Lansing, the American representative, then jumped to his feet to declare that he considered it monstrous to oppose the unity of the German Reich. After some hesitation the British took the Americans' side, and so it happened that the peace conference was opened to the German Reich dominated by Prussia.

Professor Friedrich Grimm, the Nazi historian, ascribes decisive importance to this incident, pointing out that the recognition of German unity saved from destruction all that Bismarck had erected after decades of endeavor. In other words, in negotiating with Prussia at the Paris Peace Conference instead of with the far less dangerous, federally organized Germany, the Allied nations showed extreme shortsightedness. Furthermore, Professor Grimm admits that only on the already existing basis of a unified German Reich was Hitler en-

abled "to complete the mission of Prussia at the point where Bismarck had left off." ¹¹

Whatever its imperfections, the Treaty of Versailles cannot be criticized on the ground that its conditions were too harsh, or impossible to fulfill. On the contrary, the treaty proved itself not sufficiently radical in eliminating the sources of Prussian militarism, and it was not enforced with adequate consistency and severity. As a result, it lost most of its value as an instrument for re-educating the militaristic cliques.

It is a fact that immediately after their defeat in 1918, the Prussian Junkers and Pan-German warmongers feared the worst for their future. They expected their domestic political opponents to take measures to oust them from their powerful position and expropriate their vast landholdings, and they feared that the Allies would insist upon punishing war criminals and thus overthrow the Prussian military caste. They assumed that the Treaty of Versailles would result in the "destruction of William II's world policy and world trade and beyond that, in the downfall of Bismarckianism in Europe and its foundation of Prussian pre-eminence." ¹²

The German military leaders soon realized, however, that they would be able to "get along" with the Allies, especially with the Americans and the British. With keen insight, the Prussian militarists immediately detected the weaknesses and differences within the Allied ranks. Organized German sabotage was launched without further delay. The German fleet interned in Scapa Flow off the coast of Scotland was scuttled by its crews in June 1919; the extradition of war criminals, beginning with Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, was refused; the war in the East was continued in the Baltic states and against the Poles; enormous quantities of war matériel marked for delivery to the Allies were hidden away; and a violent propaganda campaign against the "infamous Treaty of Versailles" was launched, not only in Germany but throughout the world.

In view of the irresolution displayed by the Allies it is not surprising that the Prussian militarists again began to make energetic attempts to restore Prussia to her erstwhile powerful position. Their clear-cut program was outlined in a speech by General Wilhelm Groener to the officers of the General Staff a few weeks after the signing of the treaty:

Starting out from the low-level plains of Northern Germany, a new Reich must be created. In the beginning it will be a state of only secondary rank. Once we have achieved this, a great deal will already have been gained. In fact, I believe we shall have won everything that is necessary for our future, provided we shall then be able to find among our youth the leaders who, in keeping

with the demands of the new times, will be capable of removing the foolish old German system of numerous political parties.¹³

While the attention of the Allies was focused on the speedy restoration of peace, the leaders of Prussian Germany were already concentrating upon a novel idea of revenge. Even before the signing of the peace treaty, the Junker Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, Foreign Minister of the ostensibly peaceful German Republic, had initiated a plan with the slogan "The enemies must lose the peace." The foreign policy of Prussian Germany during the postwar period adhered unflinchingly to this plan. Reich Minister Erich Koch-Weser, a member of the Democratic party, describes it as follows:

It is erroneous to assume that the policy of the period from 1919 to 1923 was dictated by pacific motives. I believe that many of those who were engaged in it at that time were clenching their fists in their pockets while carrying it through. . . . During that period all resistance had to be of an elastic nature. There was no yielding except at the last moment, when all representations had been of no avail, and when the threat of force seemed imminent.¹⁴

The course of history since 1918 has unequivocally demonstrated that the Allies were not equal to their task. Prussian Germany was able to realize her goal of continuing the war which was interrupted in 1918, and to do so in a manner never even conceived possible. In Hitler and his National Socialist movement the militaristic spirit of Prussia finally reached its culmination.

In 1919, Hitler's Pan-Germanic ideas took a specifically Prussian trend as the result of a "political educational course" given by the Reichswehr. Utilizing the historical example of 1813, when Prussia took advantage of European chaos to recoup her own strength, this course promoted the idea of Prussian regeneration, the theme which was subsequently developed in *Mein Kampf*. Under the influence of Ludendorff, Hitler became a fanatical Prussian and made the struggle for Prussiandom the "sacred task" of the National Socialist movement. "I believe that never in my life have I espoused a cause less popular than my early campaign against Prussia-baiting," he wrote.¹⁵

Hitler looked upon the Prussian militaristic state as the instrument and the source of power in the coming struggle for German world domination. Prussia to him was the "germ cell, the founder and the teacher of the new Reich,"¹⁶ typified by the Hohenzollern-created "cultivation of a specific state idea."¹⁷ This line of political thinking led directly to the totalitarian, National Socialist state: "National

Socialism must claim the fundamental right to force its principles upon the entire German nation, and to educate it in its ideas and thoughts." ¹⁴

These principles resemble those of Brandenburg-Prussia, whose leaders also advocated the conquering of territories and "the disciplining of the nation by the Prussian army organism." ¹⁵ According to Hitler, there is enough land available "for the nation possessing the strength to take it." His affirmation of the old principle of "Might makes right" reads: "We must not permit political boundaries to divert us from the boundaries of eternal right. . . . Whatever is being denied to kindness must simply be taken by the mailed fist." ¹⁶

This is how the Prussians practiced "colonization," and it is on the same basis that Germany expects to regain her position as a world power. Hitler calls attention to a historical precedent: "The period of 1806-1813 [when Napoleon was master of Germany] was sufficient to fill Prussia, which had broken down completely, with new life, energy, and fighting determination." ¹⁷ Hitler repeatedly points out the necessity of preparing for liberation, as General Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein did after the Prussian defeat of 1806.

Hitler's assumption of power signified the resurrection of the Prussian military state founded on the principles of conquest and colonization. Symbolically, President von Hindenburg paid a solemn visit of state to the crypt of Frederick the Great at Potsdam, where he adjured the ancient Prussian spirit "to continue to inspire the present generation." ¹⁸

For nearly a thousand years the old German Reich existed on the basis of federalism. Although the Bismarckian Reich was never able to ignore completely the old federalist traditions, it was nevertheless clearly understood from the first (and in Prussia frankly admitted) that Prussia-Germany was to be ruled by Berlin. Very soon a sharp contrast developed between North and South. If the South German states were to maintain even the last remnants of independence in the face of continued pressure from North Germany, they had no alternative but to oppose Prussian centralism with accentuated particularism. In Prussia the word "particularism" became an invective to use against all who refused to allow themselves to be overwhelmed by the splendor of the Prussian Hohenzollerns.

Particularist tendencies were in evidence not only in the Southern states, but also quite strongly in regions where absolute Prussian domination had already been established for fifty or even a hundred years,

as for example in the erstwhile Kingdom of Hanover and in the Rhineland. Even the fanatical Great-Prussian-minded historian Martin Spahn conceded that everywhere in Germany there were evidences of a tendency to "limber up the rigidity of the Bismarckian Reich." He also had to admit that Prussia encountered difficulties in assimilating conquered states:

The history of Hanover as a Prussian province throughout two generations should have taught us how much time was required even by the highly developed state power of the Kingdom of Prussia to effect the denaturization of another state, and to metamorphose it into a province.²³

Kaiser William II told Alfred Niemann that at the beginning of his reign he encountered a "widespread indifference on the part of the German masses in relation to the Reich concept," and that "an opposition group of people dissatisfied with the Reich was beginning to rear its head."²⁴ Rudolf Kjellen says: "Historically, particularism was centered in Bavaria and Hanover, with the addition of Alsace-Lorraine and its own new brand of separatism."²⁵ But German particularism had developed on the basis not only of racial differences and the ancient political traditions of the federated states, but also on that of religious confession. Originally the old Brandenburg-Prussia was Protestant, but in subsequent conquests the state took over territories that were principally Roman Catholic.

During the long years of the *Kulturkampf* of the Bismarckian era, the strongest and most pronounced variance existed between Catholicism and the new Prussian regime: "The center of the German Reichstag was formed by the Catholics, who founded a determined opposition party with strong particularist tendencies."²⁶ In later years, especially during the life of the Weimar Republic, the Center party yielded to the influence of the great industrial interests of the Ruhr Valley and Upper Silesia, and followed more and more the Great Prussian tendencies of Franz von Papen and Dr. Heinrich Brüning. Only the Bavarian Center party, which was Catholic, and the local Catholic organizations of the Rhineland remained faithful to the particularist traditions.

During the initial patriotic outbursts of the First World War the particularist tendencies in the German federated states were forced into the background. As early as 1916, however, dissatisfaction with the Prussian war policies was apparent among the working classes of Germany, and a number of the federated princes already foresaw the downfall of Germany as a result of Prussian dominance.

Dr. Viktor Naumann's reports frequently noted that "the contrast between North and South is assuming ever greater proportions, and monarchistic tendencies are constantly on the wane."²⁷ In a "strictly confidential" report of October 1918, dealing with the situation in Bavaria and addressed to Dr. Wilhelm Solf, the Foreign Secretary, Dr. Naumann says the following:

Opinion in the lower strata as well as in the highest circles is *dead-set against Prussia*. . . . Not only is the position of the Reich in danger, but also that of the entire Hohenzollern dynasty. Nobody wants to do any more fighting. . . . The Minister of War left me no doubt as to the sorrowful conditions existing at the various fronts. Democratization efforts likewise are looked upon with an extreme degree of doubt and they are considered unfeasible. . . . One sentiment is shared by all: *There will be no peace in Germany, either internally or externally, until the spirit of Prussia has been broken*. The struggle against this spirit is considered extremely important in South Germany, particularly in Bavaria. I am presenting this report to Your Excellency without any reservations, because I believe that Your Excellency should be acquainted with the situation as it is.²⁸

The collapse in 1918 seemed to indicate that the end of the Bismarck-created Reich had arrived. The memoranda and reports of all the prominent politicians of that time indicate that the leading monarchists as well as the Social-Democrats of that era were filled with one fear: that the German Reich would be broken up as a result of the violent antagonism toward Prussia. In 1918 strong groups in South and West Germany were beginning to feel that existing conditions should be utilized for the purpose of terminating Prussia's domination. A proclamation of the Bavarian People's party, dated November 12, 1918, reads as follows:

Concerning its relationship with the other German states the Bavarian People's party proclaims "Bavaria is for the Bavarians." Bavaria's erstwhile dependence upon the excessively powerful North must be brought to a conclusion at all costs. *We reject in every respect a one-sided, ruthless Prussian hegemony, because it is this hegemony which in the past has brought us ruin*. . . . We Bavarians have suffered enough and bled enough at the hands of the incapable, stubborn and brutal Berlin regime. As far as the future is concerned, we refuse to have even the smallest of our affairs ruled for us from one central location. Berlin must not become Germany and Germany must not become Berlin. . . . Nevertheless, in unison with our German brothers in the other German federated states, we fervently desire to maintain—internally as well as externally—that certain spirit which is in conformity with the federalist spirit inherent in the constitution of the German Reich.²⁹

A similar appeal by the Progressive People's party of Baden, dated November 24, 1918, contained a flaming declaration of war against Prussia:

*The chains of Prussian militarism have not been broken, so that we should continue to suffer under the whip of Prussian anarchism. . . . The real enemy sits in Berlin. Our slogan must be: Away from Berlin and against Berlin. To you, our brothers in Württemberg, Bavaria, and Austria, in Hesse and on the Rhine, we are sending our wholehearted greetings. Prussian militarism and Berlin anarchy are one and the same thing.*³⁰

Early in December 1918, the German-Hanoverian party issued the following appeal to Hanoverians:

At the moment there are two questions of supreme importance which engage the attention of every Hanoverian: (1) Is Germany to become a unitarian republic to be ruled from Berlin, or shall Germany remain a confederacy in keeping with her natural and historical development? (2) Is Hanover to regain her independence on a basis of federalist equality, or will she continue to be abused by the Berlin center of a unitarian state of government?

Prussiandom during the past, through the medium of schools and societies as well as Berlin newspapers of all political denominations, endeavored to educate their oppressed peoples in the belief that their natural striving for freedom and equality was retrogressive and particularistic. This concept penetrated deeply into the consciousness of the people, and there are still a great number of powerful Socialists who have not been able to disassociate themselves from this principle. They are in accord with Berlin's intention *to turn Germany into a unitarian republic. All of Germany is to be ruled by a uniform set of laws and methods on the basis of the earlier Prussia. This is contrary to the nature of the German people. Prussia's lust for annexation and her frantic efforts at centralization have now become the doom of Germany.* While the lust for annexation has faltered, the centralism of Berlin is still alive and will continue to dominate and exploit Germany. . . . The Hanoverian people are to remain dependent upon Berlin; Hanover is to see installed within her boundaries alien officeholders who know neither the language nor the people. As in the past, we Hanoverians are supposed to pay a tribute to our Berlin conquerors amounting to between 50,000,000 and 70,000,000 marks, over and above our regular contribution to the expenses of the state and the Reich. *They want us to remain silent as proof of our acceptance of the yoke imposed upon us by Berlin* for all eternity. To the Poles, the Lithuanians, and others, they accord the right of self-determination. To us it is denied. The people of Hanover insist upon their right and their freedom. . . . We demand a free Germany in which freedom and equality may be enjoyed by each German tribe in accordance with its historical development. We want to be free from Prussia; we want to become an independent Hanover.³¹

A movement far more dangerous to Prussia was initiated in Brunswick early in 1919. On January 13, the Brunswick Government issued an appeal to a number of federated states and also to the Prussian-conquered territories west of the Elbe River, asking them to open negotiations aimed at creating a great federated republic of North-west Germany. On January 25, 1919, a meeting of all delegates took place in the Brunswick parliament building, at which they agreed to draw up a constitution for the new Northwest German Federalist Republic, and voted to abolish the standing army immediately. The prospective republic further threatened that "as an independent state, utterly disassociated from the Berlin government, it would endeavor to make a separate peace with the Allied powers."³²

This advanced movement in the Rhineland and Northwest Germany naturally constituted an enormous threat to the Prussian General Staff and to the Social-Democratic party aligned with it, which was led by Friedrich Ebert, Gustav Noske, and Philipp Scheidemann. The strongest political pressure and in some cases even force were used to suppress anti-Prussian movements and agitation for independence. The central Government in Berlin was anxious to prevent the development of any individualistic activity within any of the federated states which might raise the hope of a separate peace within the ranks of the Allied powers.

Matthias Erzberger, who was chief of propaganda during the First World War and later head of the Armistice Commission, wrote of the effort to maintain German unity: "I successfully opposed the desire of some of the German states to be represented at the Peace Conference by special representatives. I did not even recognize the special privileges claimed by Bavaria."³³ In the same volume he stated that "the maintenance of the unity of the Reich constituted the prime consideration throughout the entire negotiations." He also declared that at that time Berlin had to operate with the utmost shrewdness because it was feared that the Allied powers "would negotiate, and come to an understanding, not with Germany [as a whole] but with the individual states of the Reich."³⁴

Prior to the signing of the peace treaty, Erzberger dispatched a memorandum to the German Cabinet and the Reich President in which he outlined the possible consequences of not signing the peace treaty:

The German Reich will fall apart. The individual federated states of Germany will not be able to withstand the pleading and the pressure used by the Allies to conclude a separate peace with them. In view of the fact that such tendencies are already in existence in Bavaria, in the Rhineland, and in the East, an even-

tuality of this sort would be even more likely once the complete breakdown of Germany will have come to pass. . . . The Allies will then tie the respective German states so securely to themselves that the German Reich will have ceased to exist. But there is even a tendency on the part of smaller German territories to become independent and to open negotiations with the enemy. The map of the German Reich would thus be wiped out forever. . . . If the peace treaty were not signed, and if as a result the Allies should march into Germany, the consequences would be as follows:

1. Destruction of the Reich, its dissolution and its reassembly in the form of individual states. The hatred of the individual states against Prussia, whom they would hold responsible for the catastrophic defeat of Germany, would render such a dissolution a permanent one.

2. This situation might continue for a while, after which a peace treaty would still have to be concluded, but concluded not by the Reich, but by the individual states themselves, upon whom the condition would be imposed [by the Allies] never again to become part of the German Reich. A peace of this type would be worse than the present one.³⁶

Erzberger further informed the Cabinet that there were also reports that a number of leading merchants "had decided to place [the city of] Hamburg under an English protectorate."

Though himself in favor of German unity, Dr. Naumann admitted in *Dokumente und Argumente* that he considered centralism in Germany unnatural and impossible, because that theory presupposed the homogeneity of a racial group as well as the feeling of belonging to a centralized nation. Thus he came to the conclusion that "a development of eleven hundred years can no longer be denied. Fundamentally speaking, the German citizen displays a leaning toward the principle of confederacy."³⁶

Hitler's coup rescued Prussia and the Reich from a severe crisis, for at the end of 1932 the governors of the South German states were insisting upon a revision of their constitutions and upon the autonomy of the individual confederate states. As Naumann expresses it:

The deepest concern felt by all friends of the fatherland was caused by the events in Bavaria. They listened with great anxiety to statements by [Heinrich] Held, president of the ministry, and Schaeffer, leader of the Bavarian People's party, who talked about an "activist federalism," and who even went so far as to advocate the immediate arrest of any Reich commissar crossing the border into Bavaria. . . . All this has now disappeared. Hitler's triumph has done away with this nonsense once and for all.³⁷

Hitler's assumption of power constituted a victory for Great Prussia, and brought about the annexation of Bavaria and the other federated

states. It would lead us too far afield to describe the caution with which the Nazi regime proceeded to consolidate the country and introduce the state reforms sponsored by Dr. Wilhelm Frick, Hitler's Minister of the Interior. The federal administrators of individual cities in the various states were named representatives of the Führer, in a measure designed to obstruct the separatist tendencies in the South German states.

But it would be a tremendous error to assume that the Nazis succeeded in turning Bavarians, Swabians, Hessians, Saxonians, Hanoverians, and Rhinelanders into Prussians. Neither the centralism of the Weimar Republic nor the dictatorship of Nazism has been able to change the federalistic leanings inherent in the German character. While the particularistic forces inside Germany are silenced for the time being, they are more active undercover than ever before. Observers who after closely watching developments in South Germany from Switzerland have arrived in the United States during the last few years are unanimous in declaring that the old dissatisfaction with Prussia has not undergone the slightest change.

The United Nations should learn from the mistakes made by the Entente during the First World War, and this time forge particularism into a weapon with which Nazism and militaristic Prussia can be struck to the core and destroyed. The first step is to make a thorough study of the federalist movement in Germany. The writings of the historian Constantin Frantz give a clear picture of the relationship between Prussia and the rest of Germany. Even before 1870 this outstanding critic foresaw that some day the entire German nation would become Prussian. In 1874 he warned of the inevitability of a war between Prussian militarism and the rest of the world. He believed that the only hope of avoiding this was the complete destruction of the Prussian military state and the consolidation of the German tribes on the basis of a confederacy. The doctrines of Constantin Frantz were still further developed by Professor Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster during and after the last war. The predictions of both men regarding the Prussian spirit and Prussian centralism have received hundred-fold confirmation in subsequent history. Though the world has paid little heed to their warnings in the past, the constructive ideas of Frantz and Foerster can still be applied to the solution of the German problem.

The step that gave truly sovereign powers to the German General Staff was taken during the second part of the First World War, while the theories of total war were being developed. When it became obvi-

ous that Germany could not win the war, a reinsurance scheme was hastily devised which would permit the Junker class and industry to retain their relative positions of power within Germany.

After ascertaining that the Allies had not worked out the principles of total war to the same degree as themselves or realized all its implications, the German General Staff decided to sacrifice the monarchy. This step was bound to be successful in view of Allied propaganda that the Kaiser and the Kaiser alone was responsible for the war. It was at this time that the idea spread internationally that there were such things as a good German and a bad German, and that if the bad German were removed all would be well, and one had only to deal with the good German. The German General Staff capitalized on this idea. They got rid of the Kaiser, the Allies were satisfied, and nobody at the Paris Peace Conference gave a moment's thought to the militaristic groups still in power inside Germany. As a result, the Junker class and industry, which were the sole beneficiaries of the Prussian system, remained undisturbed.

As a smoke screen, they permitted a mild Socialist revolution. As soon as it threatened to become a real revolution, the Army immediately intervened. This was the first evidence that the Allies had not interfered with or impaired the internal power relations in Prussia-Germany. During the last two years of the First World War, the German High Command had actually taken over all the prerogatives of the Crown and the parliament, and through the General Staff organized the closest administrative relationship with the high civil service. In addition to all their military qualifications, the General Staff became experts in political and economic administration. It was therefore perfectly safe to set aside the Crown and create a weak republic. The Allies made the task still easier by denying the Weimar Republic any international prestige while allowing the German General Staff to fall heir to the government. In spite of the haste with which it was concocted, the reinsurance scheme worked beautifully. Prussia had failed in the first bid for control of Europe, but retained everything necessary to try a second time. Essentially, the Army still controlled Prussia militarily, politically, and economically, and through Prussia, the rest of Germany.

The task of economic reconstruction fell primarily upon industry, which, with the aid of extensive foreign credits and loans, succeeded in accomplishing it in a relatively short period, by methods now known and understood better than they were at the time. Industrial corporations and banks placed a large number of staff officers on their pay

rolls for the transition period. An American visiting German heavy-industry plants reported that a large number of former German submarine commanders and staff officers were employed as head of the fire brigade or custodian of the wine cellar, or in some other inappropriate capacity. It was quite obvious that industry had decided to help the High Command conserve a very valuable asset. Nobody in Germany doubted that sooner or later these men would go back to their original vocation.

Now Soviet Russia was in special debt to the German General Staff, which had made the Russian Revolution possible by arranging for the passage of Lenin and Trotsky from Switzerland to Finland. It was therefore easy to arrange with Russia for special training camps where the German Army could continue to train officers and men in modern military tactics. For that purpose, the General Staff changed its name to Allgemeines Truppenamt (General Troop Department).

The reorganizer of the German Army was the famous German General Hans von Seeckt. Von Seeckt created an inner circle within the General Staff and manned it primarily with officers from his own regiment, the Third Guard Regiment, popularly known in Army circles as the "Third Sock"—*Der Dritte Hieb*. Some of them later became well-known: Wilhelm Heye, Kurt von Schleicher, Baron Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, Werner von Fritsch, and Walther von Brauchitsch. This department, politically the most important in the General Staff, made most of the decisions that have shaped German and world history since the First World War.

Relations of the Army with the high civil service remained excellent. Everything ostentatious was studiously avoided. When Hitler took over, everybody was surprised to see how little the high civil service was affected. A few men here and there had to go, but as a body it remained unchanged.

The High Command had learned thoroughly one lesson from the last war—propaganda. They became as much engrossed in propaganda methods as in economic affairs and ways of maintaining the balance of power in Germany. Highly successful and skillful propaganda was initiated at home and abroad, primarily utilizing the fear of communism. It succeeded all the better because organized Allied propaganda had ceased with the armistice and the Germans had the field to themselves. Their propaganda was supplemented by careful cultivation of useful foreigners—a task to which even the highest officers gave their time.

Their most important mission, however, was to study, plan, and

prepare for total war. No effort was spared. Money was no object. Since everything had to be done undercover, the General Staff became past masters in the art of deception. Again industry was most helpful, serving as fiscal agent, camouflage, and decoy all in one. New government agencies were established: the Geopolitical Institute in Munich, the Economico-Political Institute in Berlin, and later, the German Society for Military Politics and Military Sciences—*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaft*. And there were many others.

The General Staff developed a highly efficient Economic Section under the able leadership of Major General Georg Thomas. A senior officer from each major German firm or corporation was appointed special agent with the title of Economic Defense Leader, and made responsible to the General Staff rather than to the stockholders. This move automatically put the German General Staff in the closest relations with all important business organizations, and kept them up to date on the slightest technological improvements made anywhere. As a result of pooling all this information, some strange German laws were passed regarding patents, about which much has been heard. People had to sell patents at a designated price, on orders from headquarters.

The General Staff had undisputed control over internal affairs and wholehearted co-operation from German industry. But it was not easy to formulate policies and translate them into action. Imponderables hampered them. Policies had to be opportunistic until the great economic depression, which forced most of the rival political groups into preoccupation with their own economic problems. Through Kurt von Schleicher the Army had nursed along the ultranationalist Nazi party and kindred organizations. In the early thirties the time was considered propitious for reintroducing a strong autocratic and nationalistic regime. Again industry obliged and provided the necessary funds. Mr. Fritz Thyssen convened the leading industrialists in late January 1932 for a meeting at the Industry Club in Düsseldorf, where Hitler spoke and won over his audience.

Within a year Hitler was in power. Germany could again indulge in power politics, and the international situation became highly dynamic. The long-awaited opportunity presented itself, but conflicting forces immediately made themselves felt. The Nazi party had a will of its own and had created great political momentum. As a result, two schools of thought developed in the General Staff: (1) a short-range theory; (2) a long-range theory. The former was represented by such

men as General Werner von Blomberg, General Walther von Reichenau, General Wilhelm Keitel, and General Franz Halder, who favored the aggressive international policy of the Nazis. Also in this group was Major General Baron Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, who had been military attaché at London and Brussels and later commanded a panzer division.

The second and larger group was headed by Colonel General Kurt von Hammerstein, Commander in Chief; General Ludwig Beck, Chief of Staff; General Baron Werner von Fritsch, Hammerstein-Equord's successor; Major General Georg Thomas, head of the Economic Section; and Major General Bogislav von Studnitz, military attaché to Warsaw.

The policies of both groups agreed on one major point: the eventual elimination of first Great Britain, and second the United States, as major powers. It was on the question of timing and the role of Russia that the two groups differed essentially. The first group believed with the Nazis that world domination could be achieved at once with either the neutralization or the defeat of Russia. Their point of view has prevailed up to now—and has resulted in another defeat for Germany. The other group is therefore of greater interest, since they are bound to play their role before long, when it becomes more and more evident that Germany has lost the war.

The long-range group led by Hammerstein-Equord has always been keenly aware of the facts of technological development and of the great potential advantage the United States possesses in this respect. The exigencies of modern technical science have played a decisive part in all the planning of the General Staff and the work of Karl Haushofer's Institute of Geopolitics, and have inspired the theory of *Lebensraum*—Germany's need for living-space. At any rate, technological considerations were the keystones of Hammerstein's arguments. He always emphasized that it would be suicidal folly to attack Great Britain and the United States unless Germany were definitely assured that Russia had matured enough industrially to help her as much as he was sure the United States would help the British Empire.

The plans of Hammerstein's long-range strategists against the Western powers were timed to allow for the complete industrial mobilization of Russia, and they were quite content to wait a few more decades. They were convinced that they could bring about such a firm political friendship with Russia that the closest military and industrial co-operation would be developed between their group and the Soviet Army and Government. The advocates of this policy, which

was initiated by Von Seeckt, were quite confident that their point of view would prevail, and their opinion was shared by many industrial leaders until about the end of 1936. The attitude of German big business at that time is well illustrated by a reported conversation between an American and Mr. Fritz Thyssen. When the American pointed out that the rather heavy rearmament expenditures and their ever widening scope must inevitably lead to war, Mr. Thyssen replied that he could not agree with that conclusion, and that in his opinion a stronger and stronger German Army would only improve Germany's international terms of trade.

During 1937, Hammerstein and his associates changed their tune. They were obviously nervous. It was evident that something had happened, and a good guess would be that they had begun to realize that the other school of thought was winning. Hammerstein became most critical of the Nazis, and extremely outspoken. The explanation of this puzzling phase seems to be that he and his group expected another world war in the near future, and were not confident of a German victory.

It is significant that some members of the German General Staff were of that opinion even before the war. With the aid of hindsight, we can see their shift of policy as a move to create a new reinsurance scheme, the obvious purpose of which was to ensure the survival of the German General Staff and the political and economic foundations of their power if Hitler lost the coming war. For the Nazis this war may have meant to do or die, but for the Hammerstein group, it represented a premature undertaking which might fail. And every effort had to be made to keep the price as low as possible.

Beginning in 1937, this group organized a world-wide campaign, placing carefully selected, high-grade men in key positions abroad. Their object was to divorce the General Staff as much as possible from the Nazi conduct of the war, to build up a favorable popular impression of the men in the German Army, and to lay the foundation for another negotiated peace which would fail to touch the balance of power inside Prussia-Germany.

The story of the two Germanys was effectively revived. A great deal was said about the good and the bad Germans. Every assistance was given the world to discover the good and to make sure, quite sure, who were the bad Germans. Evidence was needed to prove that the High Command and the General Staff were very definitely in the class of good Germans. Advance information leaked out to the right people, and it so happened that whatever came from top-ranking offi-

cers was always confirmed by events, and moreover checked with Haushofer's publications.

This technique started with the Anschluss. A few weeks before the seizure of Austria, certain Americans were advised of it and given the exact date. This was immediately reported to London and New York. Why were these people told? The Hammerstein group may have hoped that Great Britain and the United States would take prompt action, but this is difficult to believe. They knew very well how completely the cards were stacked in favor of their operations. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the disclosure was part and parcel of the reinsurance scheme—that people in authority in other countries were to be coached as to the good and the bad Germans. Vague general information about the events leading up to the Munich crisis was also released as early as July 1938, and passed on to London and New York.

As for the German General Staff's conception of the present reinsurance scheme, all that can be offered is what has been gathered from conversations with many German officers, civil servants, and private citizens at their homes, clubs, et cetera. The General Staff considers two factors of primary importance: one concerns the United States, and the other, Russia.

They believe that the Constitution of the United States provides an excellent mechanism for them to exploit for their purposes: the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Senate for any major international decision. All that is necessary, therefore, is for them to see to it that enough American Senators disagree on the fundamental issues of peace, thus preventing the United States from playing any really decisive role in the peace conference. It is reasonable to believe that there are many German agents here and abroad who are busy spreading insidious propaganda to create complete disunity regarding our peace aims and so keep a two-thirds majority of the American Senate from materializing.

The Hammerstein group of the German General Staff was quite convinced that they could reach an understanding with Russia soon after the end of hostilities. They believed that if they offered themselves on a silver platter, Russia would be delighted to take them, because from the standpoint of her own power politics, she could use a German bridgehead in Europe under her own undisputed control.

There are, of course, a great many other aspects to this German reinsurance scheme. The philosophy of the German General Staff is important. They are planners in every sense of the word. Their ob-

jective is the development of the highest and most effective power for the German Army. Not being a welfare society, they favor only such economic, administrative, and political credos as are most suitable to this objective.

In the economic field that means a kind of modified state capitalism, allowing for private property, the profit incentive, and a sort of patriarchal socialism for the masses. In the administrative field it means a highly centralized civil service, thoroughly conversant with the objectives and the interests of the Army. In the field of politics it means not only the preservation of the feudal basis of their power, but also extreme nationalism and whatever supplementary conditioning of the public mind may be useful for the support of their power politics. Most of the Nazi philosophies, however exaggerated or distorted, stem from the ideas of the General Staff.

What are we supposed to do about it at the end of the war?

We must concern ourselves with the internal-power organization of Germany. In this case we cannot afford to say, "We must let every country decide its own type of government." We dare not say, "We must leave them alone." We may be able to do that with practically every other country except Germany. When the Second World War is over, we have to go to the very roots and destroy the political and economic foundations of the Prussian element that has held political power in Germany for two or three hundred years.

This can best be accomplished by creating a true federation of states within the German Reich, which would reduce Prussia to the provinces of Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia, and whatever is left in the East after Poland's claims have been considered. The next step would be to re-establish a larger state of Hanover, combine the Rhineland and Westphalia as a new federal state, unite Thuringia and Saxony in the same way, and leave the various Southern states as they are. Then one would have a truly balanced setup within Germany.

Now there are two kinds of Germans whose disparity is important—not the "good" and the "bad" Germans about whom German propaganda tells us so much, but those who represent the cleavage between West and East. The Germany west of the Elbe River is different from East Germany. The people who live west of the Elbe tend toward the same outlook on life as those of most Western countries. East of the Elbe River an essentially feudal mentality exists among the people, and conditions are more or less colonial except in a few Hanseatic cities that have developed independently.

A federation such as the one roughly outlined in this chapter would

make allowances for these differences and permit a fairly balanced system within Germany. National earning power, national wealth, and population would be so evenly distributed that in a federal parliament the various German interests would offset one another and so create a homogeneous state somewhat like the Western democracies.

8. *The German Economic Colossus*

TO ANYONE who takes the long view, one of the most sinister consequences of the German conquest of Europe is the penetration of German capital into every nook and cranny of the Continent. The way in which German control of banking, industry, insurance, and business in general has been forced upon the countries of Europe one after another is one of the fantastic chapters of contemporary history. And perhaps the strangest part of the story is that in organizing industrial and commercial Europe into one gigantic German cartel, Hitler has only applied the principles formulated by German theoreticians long before even the German Empire came into existence. Not only Germany's theories of military expansion but even the plans for the economic conquest described in the following pages were developed as long ago as the latter part of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth.

Friedrich List's *National System of Political Economy*, written in 1840, was one of Hitler's blueprints. Opposing free trade because it gave the same advantages to the weak as to the strong, List argued that it was permissible only if the economy of Europe were dominated by Berlin. He advocated a customs union for the German states, which was to be expanded not only by the conquest of Europe but also by German or Prussian colonies in Australia, New Zealand, and India. List called for a confederation of European states dominated economically by the Berlin powerhouse and controlled by Germany, the nation which, he insisted, possessed a greater stock of vital energy than any other, and superior economic ability.

The Netherlands Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Alexander Loudon, has suggested that Germany's industrial production after the war be supervised and determined by a group of international industrialists appointed by the United Nations. He further recommends that American and British big business acquire the majority stock control

in Germany's iron, steel, chemical, and textile industries, in her railroads, shipping, and banking business, and in other major commercial activities. Dr. Loudon feels that such an arrangement would prevent Germany from once more turning her industrial plants into one huge armament factory. In his penetrating analysis of the Loudon plan, Walter Lippmann agrees that this is the best way to prevent the German General Staff or the Junkers from once more utilizing Germany's industrial capacity for the purpose of military aggression. Both men feel that it is futile to try to destroy these leaders as a class, since they will either go underground or find other means of surviving until they can start another crusade to win a "place in the sun" for Germany.

The argument is sound as far as it goes. The difficulty lies in the assumption that we can expect international big business to act morally and with singleness of purpose. The German-Anglo-American cartel agreements of the past have unfortunately shown that this is not too likely. Furthermore, it is not generally realized to what extent German heavy industry in particular, and German business and finance in general, have taken orders from the German General Staff. As has been noted in the preceding chapter, for more than fifteen years the character of Germany's entire industrial production, export trade, and banking has been determined in the most minute detail by the German General Staff. Since 1934, there has been no commercial or industrial activity which did not serve their purposes. The German industrial plant has been used as an instrument of geopolitical warfare, nicely calculated to the last detail.

The major problem, therefore, is: Would American and British big business, as the senior partners in German industry and finance, accept the directives of an international agency set up by the United Nations? In other words, could there be a United Nations General Staff that would impose policies upon American and British firms which they could be relied upon to follow? The problem might very well resolve itself into one of profits versus safety. It did once before, and the industrial master minds chose profits. War was the result.

German industry and finance certainly would not object to taking in American and British big business as senior partners, particularly if management and operation were left to the Germans, as some have suggested. American and British partnership in German monopoly capitalism is the safest way for the German capitalists—who as agents and partners of the German General Staff are responsible for the war—

to protect their property rights in the German industrial plant and in German finance and banking.

These gentlemen would not worry about the proportion of control. They would be only too willing to be junior partners for the time being, for they realize that the physical pressure of 65,000,000 Germans would eventually help them to regain majority control.

As a matter of fact, German big business has already made its preparation to become the partner (junior or senior) of Anglo-American finance capitalism. The first concrete example has been in North Africa, where the two German-French African trusts have succeeded in placing their assets and interests under the benevolent protection of the American authorities.

International monopoly capitalism never had any illusions about the revolutionary character of this war. It was only natural therefore that it should take the necessary steps to influence the policies of the Allies to sidetrack the revolutionary elements of the war, certainly as far as the economic implications of the struggle were concerned. There were many indications before the end of 1942 that the destruction of German monopoly capitalism could not be safely left to Anglo-American monopoly capitalism. To be sure, British and American big business were determined to defeat Germany. Perhaps they even wanted to defeat Hitlerism as a political system. But they were not interested in the destruction of German monopoly capitalism. That would have been too bad a precedent.

To international capitalists it seemed more expedient to take over German monopoly capitalism, or perhaps make it a branch of American-British monopoly capitalism. Either transaction would be acceptable to German big business as a temporary expedient. By the end of 1942, the German General Staff and German capitalists knew that they could not win the war in a military sense, though in the appeasement period, with the help of the Prussian military class, they had actually succeeded in gaining financial control of Europe, thanks to the eagerness of British-American finance to participate in their economic expansion.

When it became obvious that the American-British-Soviet combine would triumph militarily, the German capitalists, with the approval of the General Staff, began to take the first tentative steps toward re-establishing contact with the American and British cartels. They revived their favorite bogey, Bolshevism, and held out promises of great economic advantages. London and New York capitalists made the mistake of disregarding two important factors: (1) that the Germans

were really out to conquer the world, and (2) that German monopoly capitalism was determined to organize into one gigantic world cartel every business that could be conquered or bought.

These were the stakes when German capitalism shifted its activities to North Africa, anticipating the Allied invasion and recognizing the possibilities of the economic background of military and political events as a proving-ground. These were the real factors behind the farcical struggle for leadership between General Henri Giraud and General Charles de Gaulle.

Darlan, Peyrouton, Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Giraud, Pétain, Laval, Badoglio—all were cat's-paws of the great cartels, in a sinister plan to steal the peace. These men and Austria's Otto of Hapsburg, the Italian House of Savoy, and Spain's Francisco Franco were and still are but the pawns in a great game to create a world-wide industrial cartel. By means of a gigantic financial monopoly, the property rights of German monopoly capitalism would come under the protection of a new Anglo-American economic imperialism and, if possible, a political situation would be created which would separate Russia from the Western world and re-establish the economic status quo ante bellum throughout that country against the will of the people.

Among others who played into Germany's hands were the little group of men in Washington who talked in terms of a series of clerico-fascist states stretching from Finland through Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Romania—the same men whose influence Mr. Sumner Welles protested against by resigning from the State Department in 1943.

What happened in North Africa is a fine illustration of the mechanics Germany employed in her attempt to re-establish contact with the Anglo-American commercial world. By 1942 everything of value in French North Africa, particularly the iron and phosphate outputs, was held by Nazi industrialists and financiers through their French collaborators. A gigantic Franco-German trust, reaching from Central Germany down to the Sahara, controlled the Moroccan and Algerian supplies of raw materials used by the French and German chemical industries. This trust, capitalized at 8,000,000 francs, had been formed in November 1941 by the German I.G. Farbenindustrie (the dye trust) in association with the four leading chemical concerns of France. The Berlin and Vichy governments gave official approval.

I.G. Farben, following the invariable practice of German industry, won dominance in the new trust by securing 51 per cent of the stock. The Nazi press hailed this gigantic new concern as the beginning of

the new era of "Eurafrica economics," a Nazi slogan signifying control of North African raw materials by huge European trusts. Eurafrica economics expanded almost at once with the formation of another huge Franco-German trust, the French Trans-African Company. The French concerns associated with the Trans-African Company included the two leading banks of France—the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and the Union Parisienne, both under the control of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin since 1940; the two biggest financial and insurance companies of France, which had been financing and supervising the North African market for decades; and French companies in Morocco and Algeria which controlled North Africa's copper and phosphate mines. The German concerns that participated in the French Trans-African Company were the Hoesch trust, already the owner of a good part of French heavy industry in Alsace-Lorraine; the Mannesmann mine works, whose interests in North Africa dated from the beginning of the century; and some representatives of the gigantic Hermann Göring Works. Thus since the end of 1941 French North Africa has been in the hands of these two great Franco-German trusts, which control not only production but also all financial transactions.

In October 1942, certain Americans in North Africa confided the big news of the coming Anglo-American invasion to their friend Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Gestapo paymaster for the Banque Worms in Paris and head of the French Taxpayers Association, also long-time lobbyist for the Comité des Forges, the French steel trust.

Lemaigre-Dubreuil informed his good friend and superior in the French business hierarchy, Pierre Pucheu. The latter, one-time member of the Vichy Cabinet, was a director of the Banque Worms and a representative of the De Wendel steel cartel. His bank represented one of the most influential Nazi banks, the Schröder Bank of Cologne, which served as the agency co-ordinating French and German business after the surrender of France in 1940.

In October 1942, Pierre Pucheu approached one of his colleagues, M. Yves Bréart de Boisanger, a bank director who served as Vichy's contact man with German industry, especially with I.G. Farben and the heavy industries of the Rhine and the Ruhr. Bréart de Boisanger was also one of the Vichy representatives on the board of directors of the Bank for International Settlements at Basel, Switzerland.

The meeting between Pucheu and Bréart de Boisanger took place in Geneva, to avoid arousing comment or suspicion. Pucheu informed the latter of the British and American plans to occupy North Africa in the near future and asked him to pass on this information to the

board of directors of the Bank for International Settlements, and to representatives of German industry and finance. By convenient chance, Baron Bruno Schröder, one of the Nazi directors of the Bank for International Settlements and the head of the Schröder Bank in Cologne, was vacationing in Switzerland at that time. Bréart de Boisanger got in touch with Baron Schröder, who immediately hurried back to Germany. Some days later, the two big German-French trusts in North Africa, whose headquarters were in Paris, were ordered to transfer all available money to the subsidiaries of the Banque de Paris and the Union Parisienne in Morocco and Algeria. At almost the same time, other French industries in which there was considerable German capital began transferring huge sums to enterprises in North Africa. In the last three weeks before the Anglo-American occupation of North Africa, French financiers moved about 9,000,000 francs out of France and deposited them in French banking houses in North Africa.

In the meantime, Pierre Pucheu and Pierre Etienne Flandin, who like Pucheu was a member of the boards of directors of both the German-French North African trusts, were sent to Algiers to tell the Americans that French industry would be willing to co-operate fully with the Allies in North Africa provided the latter would leave the administration of North African finance and economy in the same hands as before. The Americans accepted this condition, and more.

From 1940 on, Vichy officially pegged the franc at 50 francs to the dollar, but the value of the franc was purely nominal, and internationally the exchange was at least from 100 to 150 francs to the dollar. The American administration in North Africa at first made the generous offer of pegging the exchange at 75 francs to the dollar. But Lemaigre-Dubreuil (who although ousted from his official position in the French administration, continued to remain on the spot and supervise its financial operation from behind the scenes), Pucheu, Flandin, and some two dozen other French industrialists and bankers, most of whom were representatives of the French-Nazi African trusts, crowded to North Africa after the occupation and attempted to secure an even more favorable rate of exchange.

As a result of this pressure, American authorities fixed the official rate of exchange at 50 francs to the dollar. Within a few days, billions of francs were exchanged into dollars and placed in the vaults of the banking houses of Algeria and Morocco, under the protection of the Giraud administration. Officially the money belonged to the French industrialists, but since they were all representatives of Franco-German trusts, there is no doubt that part of it went to their German

colleagues. Nominally and "legally" everything in North Africa is owned by Frenchmen. As long as the United States authorities leave the economic and financial setup unchanged, the German-French trusts and also the deposited money belonging to German industrialists remain untouchable.

This rather complicated situation in North Africa should have served as an example and a warning of what was soon to come in metropolitan France and what might happen even in Germany. The Italian experience, too, was extremely discouraging in this respect. The complications began the moment Lord Rennell of Rodd was appointed head of the Allied Military Government. At once the Northern Italian end of the German industrial Axis began to breathe a little easier, and Italy was shaken by a series of Cabinet crises which led to the retirement of Badoglio and to the game of musical chairs Bonomi played with his Cabinet throughout the last quarter of 1944. The political thinking implicit in the appointment of Rodd was responsible for these crises. Francis James Rennell Rodd, second Baron Rennell of Rodd, after all, had been a partner in Morgan, Grenfell & Company of London. He was instrumental in getting Mussolini a \$100,000,000 loan from the United States in December 1925, and had many friends among the Italian monopoly capitalists, the most important being Count Volpi di Misurata.

These examples are nothing short of tragic, and it remains to be seen whether a general European settlement succeeds in defeating the aim of Germany's industrial and financial leaders to survive Hitler's defeat. So far, the United States has supported essentially fascist states in North Africa, Spain, and prior to November 10, 1943, Vichy France. Officially we have shown a pronounced disinclination to enlist the popular forces in Europe against German imperialism. This apparent unwillingness to turn America's fight into an all-out war against fascism gives the German industrial and financial leaders ground for hope that in the long run the price will not be too great.

The economic rulers of Germany are well aware that if Anglo-American policy dictates the maintenance in power of a series of fascist states throughout Europe, this policy will not change at the frontiers of Germany. Germany herself will have to be left under fascist rule. In a fascist Germany, whether disguised as a "Christian state" or a restored monarchy, economic power will remain concentrated in the same hands as at present. The German leaders of industry and finance have proved themselves in their own way to be better Marxists than most of those who call themselves by that name, for

they have understood and operated according to the principle that economic power is the determining factor in power politics. If they succeed in maintaining their prestige and influence despite Nazi defeat, they will again be able to organize for the domination of the European continent, since German industry is far more advanced than that of any nation in Europe outside the Soviet Union.

The bargaining power of German industry and finance is relatively great in comparison with the American. Germany today has the majority control of the economic structure of France, Italy, Spain, Norway, Finland, Holland, Denmark, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. In fact, Germany has "bought" into every business in Europe from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea and the Bay of Biscay, whether it be banking, commercial, or industrial.

The penetration of German capital into Europe admittedly constitutes the most complicated problem the Allies will have to solve after the war. This applies to the neutrals as well as to occupied nations, because the former are now being used by German capital in an intricate maneuver to transfer part of its assets to holding companies in such neutral states as Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal. It is the purpose of the Germans to interest American and British capital in these holding companies.

It may therefore be worth while to examine the extent to which German banks have succeeded in gaining control of the European banking system. The methods of achieving this control vary according to economic and political conditions in the individual countries, but the result is always German domination through the acquisition of key concerns. A few weeks before the Allied landings in Western France, the Inter-Allied Information Committee in London printed the following list which gives a general idea of German banking control over the finances of Europe up to the summer of 1943:

The Deutsche Bank now controls and administers directly or indirectly: Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Vienna; Banca Commerciala Romana, Bucharest; Böhmische Union-Bank, Prague; Kroatischer Bankverein, Zagreb; Union-Bank, Bratislava; Banque Nationale de Grèce, Athens; Kreditbank, Sofia; Greek-German Financo Company; H. Albert de Bary and Company, N.V., Amsterdam; Deutsche Überseeische Bank, Madrid; General-Bank Luxembourg, A.G. In addition, the Deutsche Bank has its own branches in Katowice, Bielsko, Danzig, Gdynia, Łódź, Poznań, Creozyn, Zoppot, Kraców, Lwów, Budapest, Novi Sad, and Brussels.

Dresdner Bank now controls and administers directly or indirectly: Landerbank A.G., Vienna (branch at Tarnova in Poland); Böhmische Escompte-Bank,

Prague; Kommerzialbank A.G., Kraców; Ostbank, A.G., Poznań; Oberschlesische Diskontobank A.G., Lonigshutte; Deutsche Handels- und Kreditbank, A.G., Bratislava; Kroatische Landesbank, A.G.; Società Bancara Romana, Bucharest; Handels und Kreditbank A.G., Riga; Banque d'Athènes, Athens; Société Financière Gréco-Allemande; Wechselstube A.G. "Merkue"; Ungarische Allgemeine Kreditbank; Bulgarische Handelsbank, Sofia; Kontinentale Bank, Brussels and Antwerp; Handelstrust West N.V., Amsterdam.

Commerzbank A.G. now controls and administers directly or indirectly: Hansabank N.V., Brussels; N.V. Rijnische Bank Mij; Banque Commerciale de Grèce; branches at Poznań, Łódź, Kraców, Zakopane, Sosnowiec, Katowice; branches at Riga and Tallinn; Rumanische Bankanstalt; Bankverein "Agram" A.G.; Allgemeine Jugoslawische Bankverein.

Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft now controls and administers directly or indirectly: Banca Chrissoveloni S.A.R., Bucharest; Badische Bank, which is connected with the Berliner; Handels-Gesellschaft also controls the majority of Alsatian business through the Allgemeine Elsassisch Bank-Gesellschaft.

Bank der Deutschen Arbeit now controls and administers directly or indirectly: Ostdeutsche Privatbank A.G., Danzig; Bank voor Nederlandsche Arbeit N.V., Amsterdam; Westbank N.V. (Banque de Travail S.A.), Brussels. The same bank has branches in Prague, Luxembourg, Metz, Strasbourg, and Riga, and plans to open a branch in Kraców and to extend its activities to Rumania and Bulgaria.

Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft now controls and administers, directly or indirectly the Rumanische Kreditbank in Bucharest.

The extent to which this situation has been changed by the liberation of the Continent remains problematical. It would take a bold man to state categorically who now controls what were formerly German assets abroad. The answer to that question lies in the archives of Swiss banking corporations, Swedish banking houses, and Spanish business firms which have branches in Buenos Aires.

The United States Office of War Information made a survey of Nazi economic plunder and control of German heavy industry. It was based on data supplied by various government agencies and analyses of the European press and radio. In June 1943 this survey revealed that giant combines such as the Reichswerke Hermann Göring A.G., Vereinigte Stahlwerke, and Mannesmann, Flick and Klöckner had transformed the economy of Europe into an enormous industrial empire which could maintain power despite changes in the leadership of Germany, the Nazi party, or the German Army. Not a single important industrial enterprise in the occupied countries of Europe had escaped the grasp of German domination. The large industrial and financial concerns of Germany and the German combines and monopolies had

extended their control over the entire European economy under the protection of the Nazi party and the German Wehrmacht, through the use of the severest economic pressure and political terror.

The key organization in Germany's network of exploitation throughout the industrial structure of Europe is Reichswerke Hermann Göring A.G., founded in 1937 to develop German iron-ore resources, later embracing almost every field of heavy industry in Europe—especially mines and metallurgy, machines and armament—and the commerce of inland waterways. Nazi conquest and exploitation has many times doubled the wealth and power of this combine. Reichswerke Göring is a strictly Nazi enterprise. The Nazi Government holds considerably more than 50 per cent of its stock. Nazi-party bosses have packed its directorate and management staffs. The extent of the wealth of these men is suggested by the following list of original capital and reserves of the combine's three main operating companies, all carrying Göring's name (figures from the 1943 OWI survey):

Reichswerke A.G. für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb, Hermann Göring: 560,000,000 marks, \$24,000,000 at German official rate of exchange, 2.5 RM to the dollar). Reserves, 118,000,000 marks.

Reichswerke A.G. für Waffen und Maschinenbau, Hermann Göring: 80,000,000 marks. Reserves, 13,500,000 marks.

Reichswerke A.G. für Binnenschifffahrt, Hermann Göring: 12,500,000 marks. Reserves, 11,500,000 marks.

At the time of the survey, the original capital of Reichswerke Hermann Göring A.G., the holding company, had been raised from 100,000,000 to 250,000,000 marks. Each of the three affiliates of the holding company in turn embraced a host of subsidiary and affiliated companies.

The biggest loot seized by the Göring combine was in Austria and Czechoslovakia. In Austria, the combine controlled Alpine Montan A.G., which held the richest iron ore in this region, with its subsidiaries, the Austrian Machinery Company, the Trade and Industry Corporation, the Marter Coal Works Corporation, and others. The Göring combine also shared in the financial control of Steyer-Daimler-Puch A.G. für Maschinen-Kessel-und-Wagenbau, a combine holding some of the largest railroad-car, machinery, and bridge-building factories in Austria, and had a hand in the financial control of numerous Austrian steel, oil-distributing, and bridge-building companies.

The combine's biggest holdings in Czechoslovakia were the Waffenwerke Brno A.G. and the giant Skoda Werke A.G., both of which were

subsequently controlled by the Göring interest. Through these companies the Göring combine controlled the Omnipol A.G., the Avia Aircraft Manufacturing Company, the A.G. für Automobilindustrie, and others. The Nazi "Aryan" laws served as the "legal" device by which the Göring combine acquired financial interest in the Fitkovice iron-ore mines, in which Baron Louis Rothschild was once a heavy shareholder, and the Petschek-owned lignite companies in the Sudetenland. In Slovakia, the Göring combine ruled the Podbrezova iron works and the Ruda Bergbau und Hüttenbetriebe A.G. in Bratislava.

The combine's grip on Czechoslovakian heavy industry was further strengthened by a tie-up with the banking system. Wilhelm Voss, general director of Reichswerke Hermann Göring and manager of Waffenwerke Brno, was also chairman of the board of managers of the Prager Creditbank, a large Czech bank subsequently controlled largely by the Deutsche Bank of Berlin. In Poland, the Göring combine did not trouble with legal procedures. Here the Nazis flatly expropriated practically all business from its Polish owners. More than 9000 large factories, even more smaller plants, some 60,000 commercial enterprises, and 2,000,000 hectares of land were seized by the Nazis without even the pretense of compensation to their former owners. The Göring combine's booty in Poland consisted largely of the rich coal-mining fields, especially those in Upper Silesia, where the former Schneider-Creusot interests were liquidated. The combine also appropriated the Ostrowitz Steel and Machinery Company and several large textile and machine-tool plants in Loda.

In occupied Russia, the combine set up the Göring Werke in Osten to absorb all heavy industry in the Ukraine. The holdings of this company included the great iron-ore and manganese mines at Krivoi Rog and Nikopol. In Yugoslavia, the Göring combine took over French interests in the Bor Company, the largest copper concern in Europe. In Romania, the Göring works split fifty-fifty with the Romanian Government on shares of Rumänische Deutsche Eisenindustrie und Handels A.G., which handles production and sale of iron, steel, and by-products. Through this company the Göring interests dominated the big Romanian locomotive, car, motor, and bridge-building shops and practically the entire aeronautical industry. The Göring combine also moved heavily into the shipping interests of Southeastern Europe. By the end of 1943, it controlled Danube shipping from the Black Sea to Germany and also the important Galati shipbuilding company. It was represented also in a new shipping company set up in Croatia.

In Lorraine, the Göring combine even took over the expropriated

holdings of a former colleague, Fritz Thyssen. This German industrialist, who fell out of favor with the Nazis, once owned the Union des Consommateurs de Produits Métallurgiques et Industriels in Hagendingen, and Les Petits-Fils des P. de Wendel et Compagnie in Hayingen and Moevern-Rosslingen. These foundries became the property of the Göring combine in the spring of 1941 when Nazi authorities put all Lorraine foundries "in trusteeship" to Nazi big business. The companies listed above were among the larger enterprises absorbed into the Göring combine.

More than a hundred major German industrial companies had been taken over by this vast organization by the end of 1943. The Göring combine was only the pack leader of the Nazi fortune hunt. Other big Nazi business houses were not neglected. German mining interests had steadily expanded their holdings in the Balkans, where two new German companies had been recently established—Rudar Company for mining, industry, and trade in Zagreb, and the Südost Montan G.M.B.H., Berlin, which was set up to acquire, establish, and operate mining enterprises of all kinds, including processing plants in Yugoslavia. Rudar Company was largely under the control of the Vienna banking firm, Krenschker and Company, and was allied through interlocking directorates with the Montan A.G. für Bergbau, Industrie und Handel. Big German mining concerns in Upper Silesia were also rapidly expanding their holdings in the Balkans.

In 1943, German shipping interests were getting a sizable cut of the spoils in the shipyards of occupied countries. State-owned shipyards in these nations were at first operated by the German Navy, but later transferred to the "care" of big German shipyards. Looting then took the form of the Nazi "godfather" system, by which the shipyards in the captive country became the "wards" of German shipyards. This technique of plunder was revealed by Rudolf Blohm of the Blohm and Boss shipbuilding company of Hamburg, in the *Hamburger Tageblatt* of March 22, 1943. The "godfather" system permitted virtual seizure of the "ward" company.

Other big German business concerns whose early services to the Nazi party were rewarded with the industrial booty of Europe included Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Mannesmann, Otto Wolff, Röchling, Flick and Klöckner.

Röchling, Flick and Klöckner appropriated all the large foundries in Lorraine not allotted to the Göring works. The United Steel Trust won control over the furnaces and steel factories of Holland and Luxembourg. The Otto Wolff concern controlled the Belgian foundries of the

Augres-Marihaye group, the zinc and lead mines in Bulgaria, and the firm of Ferre-Wolff A.G. in Zagreb, which dealt in machines and railway material. Mannesmann shared the profits with the Göring combine in the Vitkovice iron works and in the Prager Eisenindustrie Gesellschaft. German firms also controlled Hungarian bauxite and Yugoslav copper mines.

The story of heavy industry is only a segment of the total picture of the spread of Nazi control over the entire industrial, financial, and trade structure of Europe. The same German big business interests, for instance, had by the end of 1943 monopolized virtually the entire oil business of Europe, largely through Kontinentale Oel, set up in 1941 by Reichswerke Hermann Göring, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, I.G. Farbenindustrie, and a few other major firms in the synthetic-oil industry.

German big-business interests, led by I.G. Farbenindustrie, had absorbed a fabulously wealthy empire in the chemical-industry field, extending into not only occupied and Nazi-dominated Europe but even Spain. The electric-power resources and the light-metal industry of Europe had likewise fallen into the grip of this same German power group, with the major booty located in Norway and the Balkans. Europe's textile industry, including the artificial-fiber developments, comprised a rich segment of the German industrial empire, with I.G. Farbenindustrie, Phrix A.G., and Zellwolle Ring taking the biggest cut.

In every major field of industry, finance, and trade, investigation showed the same picture of German economic conquest as ruthless as the terror itself, and even more insidious. Each chapter of the story revealed the same process of an ever tightening monopoly in which German industrialists and financiers controlled and exploited the wealth and the resources of the entire continent of Europe. It is no exaggeration to say that Europe today is a single concern which operates exclusively for the benefit of the German war machine. To unscramble this gigantic economic omelet is a task which might well discourage the most competent economist.

Orthodox economy will not provide a solution. If it were attempted, the Allied commission charged with breaking up the combine would lose itself for many years to come in legal technicalities that would in the end benefit only the German principals. A genuine social revolution throughout Europe is the only way to untangle and tear apart German control of this structure. It is obvious that general revolution is not the objective of this war so far as Anglo-American monopoly capital is concerned, particularly now that the prestige of the Soviet Union has

risen so high among the peoples of Europe as a result of the victories of the Red Army.

This, of course, is the great card which German finance capital is going to play. The United States will be offered a chance to participate in the expansion of the already gigantic cartels operating on the Continent as an alternative to a social revolution which would deprive not only the German cartels but also international cartels of the fruits of economic exploitation in Europe. Certainly the only solution seems to be nationalization, or rather internationalization, of the cartels.

The Netherlands Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Loudon, has suggested, as has been pointed out, that an international body be created in which the majority of the capital stock of the German cartels would be vested. He has argued that with German production apparatus held formally in international trust, we could be sure that neither Germany or Italy could prepare for future aggression. This is all right as far as it goes, but such an arrangement would not only stake everything on the character of the trustees, but also establish a branch of Anglo-American monopoly capitalism on the European continent, with perhaps disastrous political consequences. Let it not be forgotten that Pan-Germans who are crying for a soft peace for Germany are already insisting that it was the economic injustices of the period between wars which drove Germany to aggression, and that these have only to be abolished and Germany will become peaceful. This is nonsense, for Europe has traditionally suffered far more from German economic aggression than Germany ever suffered from European economic pressure.

The problem is simply this: What social and economic system will make German economic aggression impossible? The answer is plain: A system whereby the means of production, the natural wealth below and above the earth, and the patented discoveries of twentieth-century science belong jointly to all the people of Europe, the wealth produced by these economic capacities being distributed and credited to the individual nations in accordance with the productive contribution that each makes.

This is not to be done overnight, nor can it be achieved from one day to another, but certainly the unraveling of the economic tangle which Germany has created in Europe would offer a great opportunity for a just economic reorganization of the Continent. Instead of fifteen years of wrangling in the international lawcourts over what belongs to whom in Europe, it would certainly be simpler and better to declare the cartels the joint property of the peoples of Europe, with Germany

participating fully in the profits arising out of their operation only after she has paid reparations for the destruction and havoc she has brought to the European continent. A radical solution along these lines will provide the best economic groundwork for the kind of European reorganization that will give us political stability.

9. *Pan-Germania Delenda Est*

In the days of the Great Frederick, the Prussians were feared and for a long time afterwards those days stood for everything heroic and triumphant. Throughout the country the soldier was everywhere paramount. This was partly due to his military achievements and partly to the favour shown him by the warlike king and the arrogance which that king had taught him. Prussia was a military state and the officers of high rank, particularly the generals, were lords over life and death.—Friedrich Eylert *

THE RESURGENCE of Pan-Germania, of which Nazism is but one of many historical manifestations, must be prevented for all time. The Pan-Germans never give up; they always want another try. The First World War was only a dress rehearsal for the German General Staff. They came very near victory, and so they decided, as early as 1918, to salvage enough out of the wreckage to enable them to try again twenty or twenty-five years later.

In 1929, the German General Staff ordered a study of the mistakes committed in the First World War. Fifty retired German generals and economists worked for two years, and produced a document which was handed over to General Hans von Seeckt, to be used as a guide for the German General Staff which was to conduct the next German war of aggression.

In that second war the German General Staff came even nearer to victory than in the first. After Dunkerque it looked for a moment as if they had won. Certainly the margin by which they lost was infinitesimal, but it was enough. Already the German General Staff is studying the mistakes they have made in this war in order to avoid them in the next.

* From a book of reminiscences by Rulemann Friedrich Eylert, Court preacher in Berlin.

The first thing the German generals do after losing a war, or when they are about to lose it, is to organize sympathy. One of the most remarkable political and intellectual phenomena of the latter half of 1943 was the extent to which Pan-Germania succeeded in mobilizing in behalf of peace terms favorable to Germany its unwitting allies as well as its admitted representatives and friends in the United States and Great Britain.

The intellectual pattern underlying the argument of these people, who would probably object to being called Pan-Germanists, is practically the same as the one that turned Allied victory in the First World War into an Allied disaster, destroyed France, and made the Second World War possible. They argue with conviction, but they completely misread German history and are unwilling to look facts in the face. But since this new German propaganda line searches out every potential weakness in the morale of the United Nations, it is important to examine it with the closest attention. By 1943 it had already begun to foreshadow the efforts which Germany will make—is already making—to escape retribution for the crimes of Nazism.

In 1942 and 1943 the Pan-German case was being presented in such well-meaning treatises as Dorothy Thompson's *Listen, Hans*,¹ and such naïve and superficial accounts as Howard K. Smith's *The Last Train from Berlin*,² and also the pseudo-scholastic *Conditions of Peace* by Edward Hallett Carr.³ Whether their authors like it or not, these were the forerunners of a flood of Pan-German propaganda. Broadly speaking, the Pan-German argument runs as follows:

Germany has a population of some 75,000,000. After the war it will therefore remain, except for Russia, the most numerous and hence potentially the most powerful nation in Europe. Therefore three alternatives are suggested to the Allies for dealing with Germany:

1. They can try to "exterminate" the German people—which is patently absurd.

2. They can dismember the Reich. "But," say the apologists of Pan-Germanism, "to dismember a great nation which has achieved 'cultural unity' [whatever that may be in Germany's case] would only intensify nationalism and eventually lead to another war."

3. The Allies can try to impose a sort of democratic federalism on the German people. "But this, too, would fail," say the Pan-Germanists, "for the German people are not educated for democracy."

These arguments are very clever indeed, for they are set up specifically to be knocked down. Having reduced each of the three procedures to theoretical impossibility, the Pan-Germanists ask the seemingly

innocuous question: "Since you cannot destroy the Germans, cannot dismember their nation, and cannot impose democracy upon them from without, how will you deal with them?"

They have their answer ready. You must find a receiver in Germany with whom to deal. Since German liberalists, Social-Democrats, and labor leaders have been wiped out, there is obviously only one alternative. The only people with whom we can possibly deal, runs the Pan-German argument, are certain ones in the Army, some of the Junkers, certain spokesmen for German Protestantism, exemplified by such religious Nazis as the former submarine commander Pastor Martin Niemöller, and some representatives of the Roman Catholic Church. To make the argument more palatable, the Pan-Germanists insist that in this fashion you make the German conservatives responsible for cleaning up their country after defeat, and by so doing make the conservatives incur the same unpopularity which they were able to saddle on the Weimar Republic after the First World War.

Territorially, the Pan-Germans contemplate a Germany intact except for minor border revisions. They might concede Alsace-Lorraine to France and Königsberg to Poland, and magnanimously they would have Germany withdraw from the Sudetenland. They might even go so far as to recognize that the German colonists planted in the looted and ravaged neighboring lands would have to be withdrawn and repatriated within Germany. But when it comes to Austria, they revert to the untenable argument that Austria is not an economic unit, and therefore it must remain part of the German Reich.

As far as the Allied Army of Occupation is concerned, its object, as the Pan-Germans see it, is not to punish the Germans but to protect them from the vengeance of the people of Europe whom they have so grievously wronged. The frustrated master race would certainly be the first to demand such protection. If this point of view exercises any appreciable influence upon the peacemakers, the result will be disastrous and the world may very well be faced with another resurgence of Pan-Germanism twenty-five years from now.

To salvage Germany is not the responsibility of the victorious Allies. To salvage the German people—yes. The Germans will tell us as they did before: "We did not want this war. We are a poor misled people. Give us another chance." They had that chance during the period of the Weimar Republic, but they did not use it. The German nation stands convicted as a criminal nation, and as such will have to expiate its crimes.

Two German traditions must be broken before any real peace is

possible. These are the myth of German invincibility in arms and the belief in the Nordic master race, which originated long before Hitler. The Germans must be made to understand that war is not a profitable business. The myth of the invincibility of their armies must be destroyed at home. Their doctrine that the highest glory of man is to die on the battlefield, and to live thereafter in a militaristic Heaven called Valhalla, must be banished from their minds. They must be decisively defeated by military power. The might of their armies must be crushed.

Now that that prospect is in view, it behooves the United Nations not to permit the Germans to forestall impending defeat by a negotiated peace. It is a commonplace that the German military caste never acknowledged their defeat in the First World War. They blamed the liberal forces in Germany for the surrender. Militarist and industrialist Junkerdom began to sabotage the peace and the Allied victory before the ink was dry at Versailles. Whatever the distaste of the German military caste for the Austrian corporal who now commands them, they have worked for and with him. They used him to maintain themselves in power as he later used them to safeguard his own position. To permit the German Army to jettison Hitler and then control the Reich would be letting the Junkers off at a price which they would pay with derision.

The best solution for Germany is one which the Pan-Germanists prefer to call impossible. Politically, culturally, and economically, it is not only possible but desirable to dismember the Reich. Austria and Bavaria have always been poles apart from Prussia. Even the war dispatches have given more than a hint of Bavarian bitterness at the way their soldiers have been sacrificed on the Eastern front by the Prussian High Command. The German Reich is not a nation of slow and organic growth, but a state created by Bismarck with the aid of force and violence. Many of its inequities would be relieved by dismemberment.

As for German population strength, a number of factors will doubtless reduce it. The first of these is the Russian Army. The second is the existence of the peoples surrounding Germany, whom the Germans have butchered, tortured, looted, and enslaved. The third is the incidence of starvation and disease, due to low resistance and to epidemic scourges which the Germans themselves have unleashed on Europe on the assumption that they alone would escape them.

After this war Germany need not necessarily constitute a threat that must be appeased with all the sweet reasonableness which the Germans

themselves have always denied. One of the primary aims of this war is to reduce Germany to the point where she can no longer menace the lives of all men. That can be accomplished by:

1. Complete, ruthless destruction of the German armies.
2. Total disarmament of the German people, and execution of those persons in the Nazi regime whose responsibility for and participation in Nazi crimes can be proved. These measures, which are in the interests of international safety, can be carried out by the occupying army of the Allies.
3. Dismemberment of the German Reich so that it will cease to be a political or military threat.
4. Integration of German industry and productive power within a European scheme controlled by groups outside Germany, to make sure that the conditions of the peace treaty are carried out, a minimum standard of living to be provided for the German people.

Nothing in this program offers any ammunition which the Nazi extremists are not already using for themselves. In any case, they must fight to the last ditch. Any propaganda toward accord is wasted on Nazis and the German youth they have indoctrinated. The terms outlined here are harsh. But no punishment imposed on the Germans will ever approximate the unrelenting brutality of their behavior toward the nations they have subjected. No punishment short of the most drastic will teach them an unforgettable lesson. They invited the world to let the decision rest with the only authority they can understand: force to the utmost. After that same force which they wanted to impose on the world has taught the "master race" their lesson, the German people may some day achieve a glimmer of what it means to live at peace with other people.

It would be a fallacy to assume that the liquidation of the Nazi party would automatically fit Germany to enter the community of civilized nations. The Italian experience is indicative—the dissolution of the Fascist party by Marshal Pietro Badoglio certainly changed nothing.

At the beginning of 1945, Washington and London still had not revealed any complete and practical plans for the treatment of Germany after the inevitable military collapse. At the same time, the experts who were working on the problem were under heavy pressure from various pronunciamentos delivered by unrestrained sentimentalists on both sides of the Atlantic who insisted that merely abolishing the Nazi party would restore Germany to a place in the civilized world.

Such sentimentalists are but a pale reflection of the German plot to

steal the peace. The pattern is simple, and it has been used before. In 1918, when the Kaiser abdicated, the generals remained to rebuild the German military machine behind the flimsy façade of the Weimar Republic. If the German people were to be given the right to self-determination immediately after this second German war of aggression, they would "self-determine" themselves into a similar German militaristic state that would inevitably lead to a third German war of aggression.

It is an error to say that Hitler's militarism was the result of the Allies' failure to give German democracy a chance. Two German Social-Democrats, Curt Geyer and Walter Loeb, say in their book *German Wonderland*, published in 1942:

It is absolutely untrue that Germany was ever disarmed. Whilst the old stores of weapons from the days of the first World War were being sold all over the world, Germany was already busily engaged in preparing that industrial reorganization on the basis of which her war machine functions today.

Hitler had nothing to do but to set in motion the machinery provided for him under Presidents Ebert and Hindenburg throughout the long years of preparation.⁴

Many American and British publicists are currently deceived by a disingenuous German effort to build up a special character for some Germans. German soldiers who surrendered in North Africa told American correspondents: "We have never been Nazis. We are just German patriots." This hypocritical disavowal of Nazism belongs in the same category of "character-building" as that of the Gestapo when they forced German Jews who managed to flee the country before 1939 to leave letters saying something like this: "I hereby willingly certify that Gestapo Captain Hans Schmitt always treated me in a very correct fashion. He was always very helpful to the Jews and was as lenient as possible in the execution of Nazi laws." No doubt when the Allies enter Berlin thousands of similar letters will turn up.

It is a particularly unattractive aspect of the German national character that, like all bullies when they are faced with real strength, they cringe and abase themselves before those who have their measure. It is possible that many of the German soldiers in Africa surrendered for the sake of American or British protective custody, knowing that the blood of the 3,600,000 civilians slaughtered by the Germans in nine European countries was crying for vengeance.

This figure of nearly 4,000,000 comes from the Inter-Allied Information Committee in London, which has estimated that by the end of

1943 at least that many civilians had been executed by the Germans or had died in Nazi prisons. By the latter part of 1944, the German terror in occupied Europe had grown worse every day, in direct proportion to the speed with which the doom of Nazi Germany was approaching. Heinrich Himmler, head of the German police and Minister of the Interior, ordered his henchmen to suppress ruthlessly the slightest resistance, and if necessary to resort to mass public executions.

Throughout 1943 and 1944, the people in German-occupied territory stirred restlessly at the sound of shots in the night. In Brussels, it might be a Belgian patriot eliminating one of his oppressors. In Holland, there were nightly splashes in the deep canals. Himmler's answer was mass arrests and mass terror. Two million more Jews were designated for Hitler's charnel house, and the Allies were powerless, unable or unwilling to take steps to save them. The Anglo-American Conference on Refugee Problems held in Bermuda in April 1943 had proved little more than a farce.

Perhaps some of those lives could have been saved if the Allied radios had broadcast for twenty-four hours, informing the German people that the population of Germany would be reduced by the exact number of civilians who were killed by the Nazis. Public opinion might have halted further massacres, particularly if these broadcasts had been accompanied by a leaflet-bombing of important German cities, spelling out the warning in so many words. It is too late for that now. By the end of 1944, the German people as a whole were so degraded that not even the fear of retribution could galvanize them into attempting to stop the blood bath.

"But, ah!" the sentimentalists may say, "the German people as a whole were not responsible for these mass murders. Only the Nazis were responsible, and of the Nazis, only a few." This is questionable. The news of the murder of 4,000,000 civilians cannot be kept from 70,000,000 people. Furthermore, at least 1,000,000 Germans must have been personally involved in the destruction of these 4,000,000 civilians—the men who worked out the plans, those who gave the orders, and those who did the actual killing.

Can anyone forget that the German nation as a whole did not protest against the barbarities committed by the Nazis against the Jews? Surely 70,000,000 people could have stopped that—had they really wanted to. A minority was certainly against it, but they were not strong enough to make their protests effective. We want to give them credit, but on the other hand, they cannot compensate for the overwhelming majority who approved the slaughter or at least lacked

the courage to stop it. Where was the protest of the German people as a whole? When did the Germans protest against waging total war on women and children?

The 1,000,000 Germans involved in these mass murders were the men who were always willing to accept Hitler's program for the collective destiny of all Germans, and the Germans as a whole failed to disassociate themselves from these crimes. Let them, therefore, also accept collective responsibility. Let them be held accountable for every murder of a civilian during Hitler's regime. Make them pay for rebuilding Europe, or have German labor battalions rebuild every Yugoslav city they have burned down, every Greek city they have wantonly destroyed, all the Russian cities they leveled before the Red Army could recapture them. Make them indemnify every Jew whose property has been stolen by the German Reich.

Toward the end of 1943, German authorities began using a rubber stamp for unclaimed letters: "Died in the process of the liquidation of the Jewish problem." The German problem too must be liquidated. In order to achieve that, we must shoot without trial:

1. Persons holding Nazi party membership books numbered from 1 to 100,000.
2. Every German Army officer above the rank of colonel, and their equivalents in the Air Force and the Navy.
3. Every Gestapo officer above the rank of lieutenant.
4. Every SS Black Shirt leader.
5. The Gauleiters of the occupied countries.
6. The Gauleiters and district leaders inside Germany.
7. Every member of the German People's Court.
8. Every member of the German Reichstag.
9. Every member of the German Cabinet.
10. The members of every puppet state government.
11. Every German and Italian official who at any time has signed an order for the execution of hostages anywhere in the European continent.
12. The heads of the Racial Extermination Commissions.

We must put on trial before an international court, to be sentenced to death or heavy prison sentences within six months after the peace treaty:

1. The administrative officials of the occupied countries who are accused of looting.
2. The officials in the occupied countries who collaborated with the

German and Italian oppressors and the leading quislings—intellectual, political, and social.

We must also put on trial before a United Nations court for their share in the destruction of democracy in Europe and the creation of fascism:

1. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht and his financial associates in Germany, Italy, England, and the United States.
2. The directors of the German banks.
3. The directors of the German steel trust.
4. The directors of the German I.G. Farbenindustrie.
5. The directors of the French steel trust, the Comité des Forges.
6. The directors of the Italian Montecatini interests.
7. Messrs. Franz von Papen, Guy de Wendel, Georges Bonnet, Camille Chautemps, and so on, and the men who did the same kind of work in Italy and satellite countries.
8. The directors of those British, French, and American monopolies who gave substantial sums of money to the Nazi party before Hitler came to power.

Perhaps Germany's greatest tragedy is the political failure of the Germans who left their country. Absolutely none of the exiled Germans has established a valid claim to leadership by developing an alternate political program. The German emigrants, while anti-Nazi with a few notable exceptions, have not been able to rid themselves of their deep-rooted Pan-Germanism. The peace settlement to come will be immeasurably complicated by this lack of any political leadership which has the confidence of either the Allies or those Germans who have a sense of responsibility about what has happened.

Late in October 1943, a man who had escaped from Germany a few days before told agents of the British Secret Service in London that the Germans had already written off the Second World War and were thinking in terms of a third war, which they were confident would bring them victory. The German General Staff now believed that its big mistake in this war was in leaving England so late on their agenda of victims, and they were agreed not to repeat that error in the Third World War.

During the winter of 1943 and the spring of 1944, the politically minded emigrants in the United States, becoming aware of their own impotence, stepped up their far-reaching campaign for a soft peace. At the same time the Germans at home began to demonstrate with unmatched effrontery the German technique of "organizing defeat" so

that they might try again later when the chances for ultimate victory were better. That was the true meaning of the rumors in Madrid and Stockholm of unrest in the Reich, and dispatches from neutral sources to the effect that anti-Nazis were reported secretly occupying some of the highest posts in Hitler's party.

One of the startling facts about the German plot to steal the peace is that it is being helped along here in the United States by what may be described as the Pan-German element. These Pan-Germans insist that they are anti-Nazi, and so they are—in the sense of disagreeing with some of Hitler's methods. But their belief in German world domination and German nationalism in a Germany *über Alles* is identical with the fundamental tenets of Nazism.

The key figure in the Pan-German conspiracy in the United States is Dr. Heinrich Brüning, former Chancellor of the Reich. He is now a professor at Harvard University, where he has kept pretty much under cover in the past few weeks. During the last week of October 1943, *Newsweek*, in speaking of Dr. Brüning, said that while this fine and upright German deprecated any talk of being Chancellor of Germany again, he could be drafted for the job. This was something of an understatement, for Brüning had already spent three years quietly and skillfully advancing his cause in university circles and among other intellectuals throughout the United States.

Who is Heinrich Brüning? On March 15, 1933, this former Chancellor of the German Reich, one of the heads of the German Center party, called upon Hitler at the German Chancellery to advise his successor concerning the line the Nazi Government should take in foreign political affairs. Adolf Hitler properly expressed his gratitude. On March 23, 1933, when the German Reichstag met for the last time, Brüning led the Center party in voting for the so-called "empowering enactment" giving Hitler dictatorial powers by parliamentary procedure.

On May 17, 1933, Brüning led his party to join with the unanimous vote of the Nazis, the German nationalists, and the remaining Social-Democrats, in the adoption of a resolution which read: "The German Reichstag, as the representative of the German people, approves the declaration of the Reich Government and in this vital question appertaining to the life of the nation and the equality of the German people in the world, it places itself unitedly behind the Nazi Government."⁵ The "vital question" to which the resolution referred was totalitarian German rearmament. Hitler had really clinched his political victory. On July 5, 1933, Dr. Heinrich Brüning pronounced the complete and

voluntary liquidation of the Center party of Germany, thus removing the last stumbling block of parliamentary opposition to Hitler.

After that Brüning remained in Germany for a year. On June 15, 1934, he turned up in London as a visiting diplomat. A fortnight later—on June 30, to be precise—Hitler staged his blood purge. The list of victims included not only Captain Ernst Röhm and General Kurt von Schleicher, but also one of Brüning's own close associates, Dr. Erich Klausener, head of the Action Committee of the Center party. Realizing that he had been double-crossed, Brüning, the diplomatic visitor in London, became a pseudo-political exile overnight.

Dr. Brüning's arrival in the United States practically coincided with the British declaration of war on Germany. Since then, no word of condemnation of Adolf Hitler and his crimes of aggression has crossed his lips. Today Dr. Brüning is the darling of those columnists who insist that there must be an "economically strong, united postwar Germany" or there will be chaos on the continent of Europe.

At the end of 1943 a certain Herr Gottfried Treviranus hit Wall Street, where he lunched with a number of important people who exercise considerable influence in the formation of American policy regarding the future of Germany. Among the many suggestions made by Herr Treviranus was that after Germany's defeat her heavy industries in general and her war industries in particular should be kept intact for the purpose of: (1) preventing unemployment and economic instability in Germany; (2) manufacturing armaments which the Allies could use to defeat Japan. This is as neat a plan for letting Germany win the war economically as has yet been advanced by any member of that gang of Pan-Germans who currently infest Washington and are active on the fringe of the State Department, the Office of War Information, and the Office of Strategic Services.

Gottfried Treviranus is no accident. A former member of Dr. Heinrich Brüning's Cabinet, he helped the former Chancellor of the Reich pave the way for Hitler by first introducing to the Weimar Republic the principle of government by decree. Treviranus has attempted to set up a committee in opposition to the German Moscow Committee. Other members of this group include a number of Pan-German reactionaries of the same stripe as Brüning and Otto Strasser. Their idea seems to be to promote one of themselves as a "German Badoglio," or at least a man who can help find one. They evidently hope for a German duplication of the Allies' Italian performance, and also wish to smash the coming German revolution.

During the months of September and October 1943, Herr Treviranus

not only visited Wall Street but called upon many New York newspapermen, columnists, and radio commentators, and openly boasted that he had succeeded in establishing contact with many distinguished liberals, including Professor George N. Shuster, president of Hunter College in New York City. While it is impossible to confirm the boasts of Mr. Treviranus, it was certainly an interesting coincidence that in an article entitled "Our Relations with Germany," which appeared in the October 15 issue of the *Foreign Policy Reports* of the Foreign Policy Association, Mr. Shuster suggested that America had better redeem herself in the eyes of the German people. He apparently overlooked the fact that the world would be considerably better off if the Germans had indulged more in our American "vices" of "cheap automobiles and tile bathrooms" than in their German "virtues" of aggression, rape, murder, and plunder.

The group of Pan-Germans now active in the United States also includes the mysterious Herr Paul Scheffer who was expelled from Moscow as a convicted and admitted espionage agent of the German Army. At one time or another Scheffer has been under arrest in this country, but is now perambulating freely. Scheffer's unsigned articles appear with alarming regularity in certain sections of the more reactionary New York press. These articles are unadulterated Pan-German propaganda, pleading what is innocently described as the cause of a "strong, united, economically sound postwar Germany with all its territories intact."

Then there are Mr. Ernst Franz Hanfstaengl and the Reverend Josef Spiecker. The latter, who was once press chief of Germany, is now working in Canada with Hitler's former associate Otto Strasser, whose "advice and counsel" on what to do with Germany after the war are being eagerly sought by certain of our government agencies. "Putzi" Hanfstaengl, who used to play the piano for Hitler in his most Wagnerian phase, worked for some months in 1943 as a special adviser to our State Department. Furthermore, Hermann Rauschning, a former Nazi henchman and still a vigorous protagonist of a strong postwar Germany, was hired by Hollywood at the State Department's suggestion to supervise an anti-Nazi movie, *The Hitler Gang*.

In itself there is nothing objectionable in the fact that American government agencies should use nationals or former nationals of Germany to help us formulate policies for the future. It is, however, remarkable that, as in the case of Italy, the liberal, progressive, and sincerely anti-Nazi elements are not being consulted, and only the Pan-Germans have found the doors open in Washington.

German prisoners of war are permitted to read the American German-language weekly *Neue Volkszeitung*, the editorial policy of which is chiefly remarkable for its none-too-subtle propaganda against Russia, one of our allies. This weekly paper is edited by Mr. Gerhart Henry Seger, who in the not distant past expressed himself to the effect that "at this very point I fail to see all the guilt on the side of Germany."

One of the most interesting aspects of the Pan-German conspiracy is the way it pervades many American universities. In addition to Brüning, Harvard has also Professor Carl Joachim Friedrich, a disciple of the geopolitician General Haushofer. Professor Friedrich is the sponsor of Professor Arnold Eberhard Bergstraesser, a former member of Haushofer's geopolitical institute at Munich, and a friend of the former Nazi consul general in San Francisco, Captain Fritz Wiedemann, who was Hitler's espionage contact with the Japanese agents on the West coast. Professor Bergstraesser is an assistant professor of German at the University of Chicago, and although he has been detained twice and questioned several times by Federal authorities, he is the head of the "German Areas Study Group," teaching geopolitics to young American officers.

The University of Chicago has another distinguished German geopolitician on its staff, Dr. Fritz Ermarth, whose chief occupation seems to be writing letters to the editors of American newspapers protesting against the Roosevelt-Churchill formula of "unconditional surrender." The Herr Professor is the author of a book, *From the West to the East*,⁶ which describes a plan for Germany to subdue Russia and then use that country as a base for the conquest of the rest of the world. Another Pan-German professor is Dr. Arnold Brecht, whose papers appear in the *Harvard Law Review*. He advocates a united Europe governed by a general European parliament in which Germany would have a majority of seats and Great Britain and Russia none.

The Pan-German propaganda plot is, however, not confined to academic circles. Also active here in the United States are a number of German political exiles who, although they are against Hitler's methods, still would like to see a Greater Germany. Perhaps the best-known of these figures is Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein. The draft classification of this titled German is 4-C, a convenient category for refugees who want to defeat Hitler but do not want to shoot Germans. Perhaps the Prince wants to be able to explain when he goes back to Germany that he never fired on any German and that while he is an anti-Nazi, he is a good nationalist, which is like being a first cousin

to a Nazi. Prince Loewenstein writes frequently for the Catholic weekly *America*, urging a strong postwar Germany.

The most naïve of the Pan-Germans seems to be Wolfgang zu Putlitz. He is the author of an article in *Harper's Magazine* for February 1942, "Your German-American Neighbor," which certainly did not help to instill any hatred into the American soldier who still has to defeat the German Army in Western Europe.

Among the exiled politicians is Herr Max Brauer, the former Mayor of Altona, a large city near Hamburg, who is currently lecturing in the United States. Brauer has said he prefers the dictatorship of Hitler to the dismemberment of Germany. Another of our guests, Albert Greszinski, the former Minister of the Interior of Prussia, and former Prefect of Police of Berlin, has similar sentiments. Among the former politicians of the Weimar Republic currently writing in the *Neue Volkszeitung* is Herr Friedrich Stampfer, former editor of the Berlin paper *Vorwärts*, who did his share in sabotaging the Weimar Republic but now pleads for a strong postwar Germany as a bulwark against Russia.

Last but not least among the galaxy of Pan-German agitators, there is a charming, elegant middle-aged lady, the mysterious Countess Waldeck (full name, Rosie Goldschmidt Graefenberg), who makes excellent social use of her title. Countess Waldeck lived for many months in the Balkans under the protection of Hitler's occupation armies. Recently she wrote a book entitled *Meet Mr. Blank*,⁷ purporting to describe for us the German leaders of tomorrow. Among her suggestions are Prince Louis Ferdinand of Hohenzollern and, lo and behold, former Chancellor Brüning's protégé, Dr. Spiecker, the former press chief and, of course, Herr Otto Strasser, who is working so closely with Spiecker and Treviranus.

Looking beyond the inevitable downfall of Hitler, the German generals and the Junkers, the "eternal trustees of the Pan-German ideal," are attempting to see what can be retrieved from the disaster. It is clear that "a political time bomb" is being manufactured in the United States which it is hoped will save the Germans from the worst consequences of their defeat in the Second World War so that they can try again. There is real danger that the current public debate on "What to do *with* Germany after the war" may degenerate into a debate on "What to do *for* Germany after the war." The basic issue is rather what must be done with Germany so that she will not go to war again twenty-five years hence. If Germany must die so that Europe may live, let Germany die!

It is too late to worry about the future of Germany alone. Our problem is the collective future of Europe. The Allied problem is not how to educate German children to be decent Germans, but how to educate them to be good Europeans. To make good Europeans out of Germans, it is necessary, as has been said before, to dismember Germany politically. This need not affect the cultural autonomy of the German states. On the contrary, once free of the domination of Prussianism, they may well experience a renaissance of that German liberalism which disappeared the moment Bismarck superimposed the artificial structure of a centralized Greater Germany upon a group of loosely federated states.

As long as Germany remains a territorial entity, the German worker will continue to pay four times the world price for wheat, as he did under the Weimar Republic; and Ruhr steel will be dumped on world markets, depressing the living-standard of workers in Sheffield, Birmingham, Charleroi, and the Saar Valley. As long as the geographical concept of Germany prevails, the German spirit will be ridden by the nightmare of Prussianism. But perhaps the most acute danger is that the reactionaries will make excellent use of the current debate over the German problem to drive a wedge between the Western Allies and Russia before Germany is altogether beaten.

To this purpose, the reactionaries insinuated in September 1941 that Stalin was negotiating with the Nazi generals and was contemplating a soft peace for Germany. In February 1944, however, they insisted that Stalin had better not be so harsh with the Germans; otherwise there would be another war twenty-five years hence. At that time, Mr. Kingsbury Smith, writing from Washington for Hearst's International News Service, reported that there was a growing belief in Washington diplomatic quarters that Russia wished to acquire Königsberg, capital of East Prussia, as an outlet to the Baltic after the war.

The anxiety of the Hearst press over the possible partitioning of Germany as a result of unilateral Russian action is really touching. This anxiety has almost driven them into a position of objecting to the annexation of Silesia and East Prussia by Poland, about whose eastern frontiers they have worried so much.

10. France

THE KEY to the future of France lies in understanding what became of the French Revolution. In 1789, fourteen years after the first skirmishes of the American Revolution, the French Revolution achieved far more than its prototype and, in a sense, its inspiration. The symbolism of the "Marseillaise" made it the song of liberty on the Continent. In fact, it became the clarion call of men who longed for freedom everywhere, and for a while it seemed as if the "*jour de gloire*" had really come. Before long, however, the monarchs of Europe attacked the Revolution in an attempt to stifle it at its very birth. In a sense, Waterloo was the deathblow not only to the tyrant Bonaparte, but also to the Revolution, although by that time most of the liberties which had been won by Georges Jacques Danton and Camille Desmoulins had long vanished.

From 1815 to 1848 France was under the yoke of the French kings whom the European coalition had brought back in the wake of its armies. In 1848, after innumerable minor attempts, France revolted in earnest and drove out her kings. Only four years later, however, the President of the young republic, Louis Napoleon, a nephew of Bonaparte, succeeded in bringing off a bloody coup d'état with the aid of the generals and the bankers, and proclaimed himself Emperor.

The fascist dictatorship established by Napoleon III under the name of the Second Empire lasted until 1871. After Sedan, the most disastrous battle of the Franco-Prussian War, popular anger forced him out, and in the midst of war his power was taken over by the republicans in order to avert utter disaster. During the siege of Paris, the Commune attempted another revolution. But President Adolphe Thiers, the Badoglio of his time, drowned it in blood with the approbation and the passive assistance of Bismarck, whose armies stood ready to intervene for the reactionaries. In 1875 the French parliament, never favorable to a republic, voted a constitution which was intended to

stand only until a monarchy could be re-established. But the French, who have always held liberty sacred, took naturally to the republican form of government, and the temporary device endured. Hence that old constitution was still in effect in 1936, when it prevented France from completing needed reforms, and in 1940, when it allowed her to fall into the hands of Hitler's quisling, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain.

The present temper of France, resulting from all her sufferings and the heroic struggles of her Underground groups, will certainly lead her back to the sources of her spiritual strength. The moment Hitler and Pétain were driven out, France began recapturing the glorious traditions of her Revolution.

In 1789, France was one of the most thickly populated countries in Europe. Her wealth and her military strength made her very powerful. At that time Great Britain had a much smaller population than France; Germany had not yet fallen victim to centralism and Prussian domination. The United States—that is, the young thirteen states—was just entering national existence, and the world was scarcely aware of South America; China did not yet count among the powers of the world; Russia remained in Czarist isolation. France had not only the spiritual leadership due the land of Racine, Voltaire, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, but also redoubtable material power. In 1945, her material strength will be seriously diminished in comparison with the rest of the world, and she will not have, as in 1918, the prestige of valor and military success, nor, as in 1789, the weight of a large population. However, her intellectual pre-eminence will be less impaired; her contribution to the world of tomorrow can be as great as it was in the days of Voltaire.

In any effort to understand the France of today, two memorable dates must not be overlooked—February 6, 1934, and the first week of June 1936. Failure to grasp the significance of these two occasions led some commentators to accuse the French of decadence, and their soldiers of being unworthy of the heroism of their fathers at Verdun. We must honestly accept the fact that there was treason, and seek to identify the traitors. Those who are in the pay of the same financial interests, the same companies that bought the traitors, may have excellent reasons for not looking in the right direction; but many liberals in the United States have been equally blind.

On February 6, 1934, French fascism made its bid for power by sending armed action groups against the Chamber of Deputies to take the parliament by storm. Blood flowed in the streets of Paris that night, the first in many a decade; and the shock to public opinion was pro-

found. Civil war was imminent. The much-publicized Stavisky affair, a financial scandal which had resulted in the resignation of the Chauvignac government late in January, was only a pretext arranged with the connivance of the fascist Prefect of Police, Jean Chiappe, himself an "apache," and launched at the right moment to give a semblance of reason to an outright attempt at counterrevolution. French fascism hoped to duplicate at home what it had seen successfully executed in Italy and Germany. The fascists banked on deceiving the country as to their motives, with the aid of a corrupt press; and then, after a sudden violent move, they would present France with a *fait accompli*.

They did not succeed that night, and within a week they knew they had lost. The National Confederation of Labor declared a one-day general strike for February 12, and the French workers carried it out. This token manifestation saved France from the danger of a fascist coup from within, by giving warning that if fascism tried again, a real general strike could be successfully called. A general strike sufficiently prolonged had every chance of turning into a revolution; the reactionaries knew that only too well, and retreated.

This silent vote of the workers was confirmed two years later in June 1936—the second of our important dates—by an unusually large majority of all Frenchmen, when a general election gave them the opportunity to express themselves. In order to win the election, most of the candidates took the oath of the Front Populaire, a consolidation of the liberal French political forces. Thus a majority in the new Chamber of Deputies were pledged to vote for a program of reforms that would render fascism impossible in France. As far as the decision rested with the voters, France had chosen to become a far more democratic country than before, and to hold firmly in check the reactionaries of the banks, the General Staff, and heavy industry.

In the face of that warning, the French fascists too had to make a choice. Should they, in accordance with republican principles, yield to the incontestable decision of a majority whose will was clearly expressed, and serve France honestly, as good Frenchmen? Or should they take their stand with the Bourbons and, like the French nobility exiled at Coblenz just after the Revolution, ask the reactionaries of other countries—the "Fascist International"—to restore to them the power they had legally lost? The French people had no way of knowing that the reactionaries would take the latter course, even at the risk of the conquest of France by the German Army.

Those who voted for the Popular Front had no hint of this danger from the outside which was soon to threaten them. After 1918, despite

considerable English and some American protest, France had been able to disarm Germany to some extent through the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Furthermore, reparation payments had used too much of Germany's industrial output to permit her rearming. In January 1923, on a pretext of protecting French engineers who were sent in to ensure industrial production and resumption of reparation payments, Premier Raymond Poincaré had engineered the complete occupation of the Ruhr by French and Belgian troops. Yet not a shot was fired. Germany's only protest was passive resistance. In the end, it was not the Reichswehr which forced Poincaré to recall the troops in 1925, but rather a crisis at home, brought about by the financial power of London, which reduced the value of the franc by one-half for a few weeks. The French people, therefore, still believed Germany to be weak.

The French electors of 1936 were too innocent to realize that a conspiracy existed, or to imagine that a working-class victory at the polls could drive the reactionaries of all countries to help in the rearmament of Germany. In other words, in 1936 they supposed France to be mistress of her own destiny; and on that basis the Popular Front program seemed sufficient. It was not a revolutionary program; the majority of those who voted for it saw no necessity for a revolution to achieve and defend these social gains. Men of a logical race, they preferred an evolutionary process which would reduce the danger of serious mistakes, and would provide opportunity to correct any that had been made before they could become tragic.

These were the historical reasons which made Léon Blum Premier of France. He and his young wife had been beaten almost to death by a fascist mob some months before his election. He was far from being a revolutionary, but his political rise was a threat to the status quo. French reactionaries realized that even slow evolution would bring about certain profound changes which would reduce their chances for counterrevolution. They realized very well that if Blum failed to execute the full program which was intended to rearm France, he was sure to be replaced in the 1940 elections by a more virile leader who would be willing to try direct action. Unable to defeat him politically at home during nearly two years of office, the reactionaries broke his heart and his spirit by frustrating his attempts to take a stand on the Spanish Civil War, although he had the backing of the French majority, and crowds surged through the streets of Paris shouting, "*A l'action, Blum!*" Realizing the seriousness of his failure to give official French support to the Spanish Republic, Blum salved his conscience by dis-

patching dozens of cases of condensed milk and vitamins to the babies of Spain, paying for them out of his own pocket.

After Blum had—however unwillingly—permitted the French fascists to strangle the Spanish Republic, the electorate of 1940 was through with him. Their vote would have called for a more dynamic chief of staff, who would take a firmer stand for revolutionary change at home in the face of fascist aggression in Spain. The French fascists could not afford to let this happen. For their own preservation they had to make sure that the elections of 1940 would not take place, and that a fascist leader like Pétain, whose prestige would screen the activities of Pierre Laval, was put in power.

Since the French people had refused to go fascist, groups of bankers and industrialists and some members of the General Staff decided to seek foreign intervention, even though France would thereby cease to be a free nation. On this road, the Munich betrayal was but the first stop. France officially dishonored herself there by sacrificing the forty Czech divisions which Hitler had dreaded to find some day in his rear. This action undoubtedly dashed the hopes of the Belgians, who could see from this example what was in store for the small nations of Europe.

The next step for the fascists, once war was declared, was to keep the French soldiers from fighting. This looked more difficult. The method they found was the device of the "phony" war, which was calculated to depress the soldiers and to bore them. That strange chapter of the Second World War when France's armies waited behind the Maginot Line and Germany's behind the Siegfried Line cannot be dismissed as entirely due to France's reliance on defense to win the war. The French officers did not even permit their men to hold maneuvers. Yet, for all the inactivity and the sudden defection of King Leopold III of Belgium (whose famous father, Albert I, the Soldier King, had died at an opportune time in 1934 from an Alpine accident which has never been explained), the French would have fought the rapid invasion of 1940 as they had fought the one on the Marne in 1914—if only they had been well commanded in the field.

There is no reason to suppose that the French Army was inferior to the German in any way except in numbers. In the interval between the two World Wars, the parliament had voted all the credits asked of it. The French Air Force was excellent. During the invasion, however, it was not sent into the air. As for tanks, the local victories of French tank units under the command of General Charles de Gaulle prove that defeat was not inevitable under *loyal* officers. Wherever a

French officer permitted his men to fight and commanded them faithfully, the Germans failed to advance, and sometimes withdrew. But such islands of resistance were of little importance to the Germans, because the French generals on the right or the left would order their divisions to give way, and the division which might have scored a success was obliged to follow suit.

The only real chance for the French soldiers of May and June 1940 would have been to shoot a considerable number of their officers and lead themselves into battle, or to follow the instructions of the few officers who were not traitors. But that would have been against soldierly tradition. Had they tried it, complete disorganization would have followed, and the German motorized divisions would have profited immediately.

Besides, it takes a certain time for honest men to understand that they are being betrayed by the very men who talk most about honor. It was the tragedy of the France of recent years that the mass of the people could not believe, at least in time to make the necessary decisions, that the upper classes could be guilty of such degeneration, baseness, and ill will as to range themselves in opposition to all that had constituted the glory and the beauty of France in the past.

France missed her last chance by just a few weeks. The "phony" war, which was in itself a betrayal (those eight months during which the soldiers were forbidden to fight while Daladier's semifascist government was purging the country of antifascists), had caused general dissatisfaction, which was ready to break out in open revolt about the month of June 1940. But whereas it is impossible to keep the sentiments of a whole people a secret, it is quite possible for a crafty clique to keep quiet about its plans and then strike powerfully at the chosen moment. Warned in time of the danger of a popular movement which would have instinctively followed the traditions of the great Revolution, the Pétain clique acted first. The German invading Army, passing through the open doors of Sedan, was already in Paris before the earliest possible date at which that revolt could have taken place.

That the French fascists—even those who would perhaps never have taken part in such a plot—were haunted by the fear of popular uprising may be seen from an incident, now famous, that occurred during the stay of the French Government at Bordeaux. When Paul Reynaud, then Premier, wanted to take the Government to Africa, where resistance could go on with British assistance, General Maxime Weygand suddenly announced to the Cabinet the terrifying news that the Paris workers were up in arms. "We must yield to the Germans, to fascism,

to save France from communism!" Georges Mandel, a member of the Chamber of Deputies, who knew that even generals sometimes falsify the facts, was seized with a sudden suspicion. He left the hall silently and stepped to the telephone. He came back a moment later to say he had just spoken with the Paris Prefect of Police and that the streets of the capital were enjoying their everyday calm.

The fact that a Weygand could tell such a falsehood indicates how much the French fascists dreaded having to face the people in their wrath. Freed of this dread for four years by Hitler's victory, today they must be haunted by it anew, and with reason. The good people of France, who in the beginning would have been content to drive out those fascists, will doubtless find it necessary to hang them as soon as the Wehrmacht crumbles, before any AMG can extend a helping hand.

The Third Republic owed its constitution, as has been said before, to the political ferment of the years immediately following the defeat of 1870 and the Paris Commune, when the upper bourgeoisie was still shivering over the memory of both. Those of the electorate who were not bourgeois were mostly peasants (always conservative in politics), and factory workers, who were to increase steadily in numbers over the next seventy years but were still not very active politically. It was luck rather than design that prevented the restoration of the monarchy. The monarchists themselves were divided between the Orléanists and the Bourbons, and could never quite make up their minds to pull down the tricolor and run up the royal banner of white silk with the three golden lilies of the medieval Kings of France.

The essential difference, then, between the French and the American constitutions lay in their purpose. In America, the founding fathers established their Constitution with the loving care one would give to a cherished child destined to live long in honor and happiness, whom one expects to see grow up, develop—perhaps change, but without losing his inherent qualities. The men who drafted the French constitution of 1875 thought only of re-establishing the monarchy. They therefore wrote a constitution that would be good enough while waiting for the restoration, one suited to a kingdom under the name of a republic, with a President as provisional head instead of a king. There were to be as few changes as possible on the day when the intriguers should decide whether a Bourbon or an Orléans should resume the throne of France.

Had the constitution really turned out to be a good one for a republic, it would only have proved that its architects were inept and had not at all succeeded in doing what they intended. But good or bad,

that constitution actually did last. While the partisans of the two available kings were disputing among themselves, the French people got used to a republican form of government, and the two Pretenders remained in exile.

An intelligent country can continue to live a long time with almost any kind of constitution. With a poor one, it lives less well, develops more slowly, is less completely itself, but by getting used to the discomfort of a garment that was not made for it, it manages to do its necessary work day by day. Only, in a moment of crisis this garment may hamper its action and cause it to lose precious time. That is what happened in France in 1936. One might say that at that moment, three years before the invasion of Poland, the garment that had been fashioned for a king and hung upon the shoulders of "Marianne" made it impossible to avert the present war, and placed victory within the reach of fascism.

At a matter of fact, in the 1936 elections the French thought they were putting into power an entirely new Chamber of Deputies with new personnel and new aims, as their constitution permitted them to do. Every adult Frenchman has officially the right and the duty to vote at the elections every four years, without distinction of age, fortune, length or place of residence, or any other condition whatever. He need not put himself out to go and register; each citizen receives through his letter box a registration notice notifying him where he is to vote, and also the voter's card which he is to present when he casts his ballot. Elections are by direct suffrage. The voter marks on his ballot the name of a candidate. The votes are counted, and the Deputy is elected by an entirely free suffrage.

But there are two houses in the French parliament, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and the Senators are not chosen by direct suffrage. Most French citizens have never had a chance to vote for a Senator. Those who choose the Senators are a very restricted group, composed of the *conseillers généraux* (the prefects), the mayors, and a few others already politically "arrived." A Senator has no public campaign to make, does not have to express his views at meetings, and does not submit to questions. It was constitutionally possible in France for a Chamber of Deputies, elected by 40,000,000 Frenchmen for the purpose of carrying out a particular reform, to be prevented from accomplishing it by the vote of the negligible minority which chose the Senators.

In 1936, when the newly elected Deputies arrived in Paris, they were sworn to vote for the progressive measures of the Popular Front,

and they were deeply impressed by the earnestness of the citizens who had elected them for that purpose. No elections were ever taken more seriously. Yet the vote of those more than 600 Deputies was constitutionally nullified by the reactionary old men in the Senate who were unwilling to turn a bill into a law, and for whom 999 Frenchmen out of 1000 had never voted.

The French fascists knew their constitution; they knew also that popular anger could change it. Accordingly they made a few strategic withdrawals—their animosity toward the masses growing with each partial setback—while the people wore themselves out gaining victories that never led to a complete political change. The Senate did not quite say no, but never did it quite say yes. It would discuss at great length each article of a bill in order to postpone proposal of another bill, thus rendering every law that did manage to pass less clear, less effective, less applicable.

The Deputies who were chosen with such hope in the Popular Front election shook the gates instead of shattering the wall. They feared the Senate, which yielded only on points that were not essential. To make a show of victory, they voted the forty-hour week, on which the Senate would yield, instead of expropriating the nation's banking power, against which the Senate would be adamant. All the social laws that would immediately alleviate the workers' living-conditions and render their lives less burdensome were passed one by one, but no one of the fundamental changes which would ensure the continuous application of those laws was forced through.

Such "strategic reforms," as the Popular Front called them, were never conceded by the Senate. In the political domain they corresponded to the positions of Verdun and Stalingrad in the two wars. But unlike them, they were not held. In other words, the Chamber of Deputies possessed itself of the plains, while the Senate and the fascists remained entrenched on the hills with their big guns. The Deputies had a Kerenski soul, whereas the people who elected them had the soul of Danton. Blum knew this. "I am Kerenski," he is quoted as saying. "Only, if I fail, it will not be a Lenin that will follow me, but a Hitler." (It was Pierre Laval.)

Those French members of the parliament were not for the most part bad men. Some were mediocre, but a considerable number of them were intelligent. Many would have preferred not to be weak and dishonest, but it would have taken more honor than they had to avoid becoming so. They were all caught in the net of old national habits that had fastened themselves on the French body politic for half a century.

Reality, for them all, lay not in politics but in money power. Nothing could be done without the banks. The bankers knew so well how to flatter, how to threaten, how to give invitations and hold receptions, how to decide what was correct and what was not, how to make use one day of the fear of bankruptcy and another day of the hope of a red ribbon for the buttonhole. They knew how to dispense money without its looking like a bribe. Rather it was a gesture of homage offered to the talent and the integrity of men (members of the parliament, by chance) who were needed to participate in some enterprise, or to give a bit of advice, or an hour per month of their time, or a brief opinion on an unimportant question on which the Deputy or his son-in-law considered himself an expert. It must not be forgotten that the bedazzled Deputies were almost all provincials in a country where the capital had preserved its authority as an arbiter of elegance, and where elegance had kept all its prestige.

During the four years between elections, the Deputies always felt fairly detached from their electors, who were not organized to exert much influence. The Popular Front tried to remedy this defect in democratic organization by setting up committees in every town and in every quarter of the large cities. Each district would send its delegates to the Popular Front Committee of the city or the region, and so on up to the Central Committee of Paris. The local committees discussed local interests and sometimes sent delegations to submit their needs and desires to the large Municipal Committee. If the municipal government was reactionary, this produced a sort of war between the two powers: the official power, which had existed for seventy years, and was very ardent in its defense of the interests of the rich, and the new power, which was not official, but supported by a large majority of the population. In cities where the Municipal Council happened to be in the hands of the liberal parties, relations between the two powers were easy and friendly, and the mayor was glad of popular collaboration. In any case the demands of the local committees were generally just, since those simple, honest people knew the needs of their district or their village.

What must have become of those Popular Front organizations under Pétain! Already, under Edouard Daladier, they had lost almost all their power. Many had been forced into inaction or even secrecy by the fear of prison, concentration camps, or the searching of premises. Daladier had also made a habit of appointing his own men to replace any mayors and municipal councilors—who had been elected by popular vote—in case they did not suit him. This system gave him a

sort of Gestapo. Pétain had only to strengthen the system, for Daladier had already begun the German work by obeying the fascists, and the Deputies had weakly acquiesced.

The French parliament is difficult to evaluate. Many of the standard criticisms are false or unimportant—for example, the accusation that there were too many parties. Those parties, whether small or large, ranged themselves in order from the left to the right as regularly as the seven colors of the rainbow. The voters found their choice among them easily enough, and often the existence of a small party enabled them to express a shade of opinion which had its importance. But on any grave question, all the parties to the right of a certain line voted together on one side, and those to the left of the line on the other. The line of separation was continually shifting according to the emotions and desires of the public. This gave extreme sensibility and flexibility to the political organism, such as cannot exist in the strict two-party system. Under the French system there could never be such oddities as an anti-Roosevelt Democrat or an anti-Dewey Republican. Besides, minor parties could easily disappear and new ones be formed according to needs.

At election time, owing to the French voting system, the voter had no fear of wasting his vote on a candidate who had no chance. The election was held in two rounds; if no candidate had a clear majority in the first round, at the second balloting the following week some candidate was sure to have one, for the less popular candidate always withdrew and asked his supporters to concentrate on the candidate whose ideas seemed nearest his own. It was not hard to get out the vote in France, and the voters all went cheerfully to the polls a second time. French citizens are passionately interested in politics, and "cracker-barrel" discussions hold sway in every village all the year round.

It was not the number of political parties which kept the French Deputy from fulfilling his duties. The defects of the French parliament were in general those inherent in any conservative democracy. It must not be forgotten that two powers exist—the economic and the political. If the parliament votes a law, there has to be money to put it into execution. The banks cannot forbid a legislative body to vote a law, but they can cause the sudden disappearance of money. They can keep it in their vaults instead of letting it circulate, or even—in a country like France, which has no such wealth as the United States—they can send it out of the country, to Amsterdam, to London, to New York. The day that happens, the country is paralyzed, and the parlia-

ment finds itself holding the wheel of a vessel which has no motor. The skipper may whirl the wheel to right or to left, but the vessel does not stir.

The French Deputies knew this so well that whenever a government fell, a prospective Premier paid a round of visits to the bankers even before accepting his nomination from the President of the Republic. The bankers knew his past by heart, and he set forth his projects for the future. They countered with a few questions, then either assured him that they would help him—provided he would give certain guarantees and not exceed certain limits—or else they gave him gently to understand that though they did not presume to offer any advice, and certainly would not violate any laws, under the circumstances they did not feel able to give him their support. However, they might add with glacial politeness, they were persuaded that he would succeed without them. In such a case, the prospective Premier understood, climbed back into his limousine, and had himself driven straight to the Elysée Palace to inform M. Lebrun that he had not been able to form a ministry. He did not even wait to present himself once before the Chamber to find out what kind of reception the Deputies might give him and his program. That would have been useless. Therefore President Albert Lebrun—who has the sad and disillusioned eyes of a man who has played in the same farce too many times—would call in another possible Premier.

When, at the third or fourth try, one of them was accepted by the banks, along with a dozen Cabinet members whose names he submitted to them, the final choice was seldom what the Chamber would have selected. Accordingly, the new ministry might not have a majority and might soon find itself dropped, sometimes at the very first session and sometimes the following Monday. Not infrequently President Lebrun's first choice would have been welcomed by the Chamber, but the fifth or sixth, which suited the bankers, had too little appeal for the country at large to be acceptable to a body that was dependent on votes.

It is easier to blame the people one can see instead of the gentry who pull the strings behind the scenes. The French parliament was condemned because it did not govern; in reality it could not govern. Actually, however, the parliament was as weak as its accusers said, for in effect it gave its consent to two fascist coups d'état. The first, brought about by Daladier, a weak, pretentious, and ambitious man, occurred in 1939, during the interval between Munich and the "phony" war. The elections were due the following spring and Daladier had

every reason to fear the results. The elections of 1936, as we have seen, had been a sweeping victory for the Popular Front, but Premier Blum and his Social-Democrats had not dared put through the "strategic reforms" which the country wanted. The more the people understood the obstacles which stood in their way, the more determined they became to achieve those reforms.

The elections of May-June 1940, accordingly, were almost certain to put men into power who were determined *at any cost* to establish the reforms and give them a solid economic base. As a result of those elections, the power of the banks, monopolies, and cartels might be broken by a new Chamber of Deputies. French foreign policy might be liberalized, democratic nations might receive French support, and the fascist governments of oppressor nations might no longer be appeased. The whole course of European politics would very likely undergo a change in which the forces of fascism would suffer an overwhelming defeat.

Such a prospect struck terror to the hearts of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Chamberlain, Daladier, and all other supporters of fascism. Accordingly, steps had to be taken to prevent the elections. In the seventy years of the Third Republic, elections had never failed to take place every four years except during the First World War, and no government had ever dared postpone the date by so much as a month, yet Edouard Daladier, in time of peace, decided to defer the 1940 elections for two years.

This act, strangely enough, went unnoticed outside France. Yet in reality it was the end of the Third Republic. Forty million Frenchmen lost their right to govern themselves. The Deputies, it is true, might well have refused to vote approval of this suicidal decree by which the parliament itself put an end to parliamentary elections. However, knowing that they were disqualified in the eyes of the public, and fearing to lose office in the coming elections, they ratified the decree which assured them their seats for two years more and perhaps—they hoped—for life.

Thus that Chamber which was the first to be elected by a Popular Front majority, in hope of instituting much-needed reforms and transforming France into a twentieth-century country, was the one which betrayed the confidence placed in it, virtually voted the Third Republic out of existence, and helped open the road to Hitler's armies.

This first coup d'état was followed by a second after the armistice of 1940, when Marshal Pétain was made dictator. The parliament voted him into that position, then voted all the decrees and credits he

asked for. Pétain was by that time stronger than Daladier had been, for he had his own Gestapo behind him and it had become dangerous for a Deputy to vote against him.

France did not give way to dictatorship without a struggle, however. In March 1942, when Hitler and Pétain brought six French military and political leaders to trial at Riom, Daladier attempted to redeem himself by denouncing the Vichyites and exposing them as the agents who had brought disaster to France. But it was Blum, the fragile scholar, who proved himself the hero of the trials—Blum, whose fear of crowds was so intense that he had always dreaded even the friendliest demonstrations. In a four-hour speech he transformed the trial into an indictment of his accusers, with such success that he was imprisoned and the rest of the trials were abruptly called off.

Five months later, in September 1942, word came from Underground sources that Jules Jeanneney, president of the Senate, and Edouard Herriot, president of the Chamber of Deputies, had written and signed a letter to Pétain and Laval denouncing the Pétain-Laval assumption of absolute powers and their suppression of the French parliament. That, too, took courage, and both are now paying for it in prison. Herriot is especially to be commended for speaking out, as his previous political career had always revealed excessive respect for legality and for the power of the banks. After the German invasion, however, Herriot had shown spirit in refusing to leave France, where he was in great danger, though he was being urged to come to the United States and his escape could have been arranged.

Jeanneney and Herriot were leaders of that minority who dared say no. But among the 600 or more Deputies, there were comparatively few heroes. Neither temperament nor habit inclined them to sacrifice, and they had been given to misrepresentation and compromise too long to be ready to die for an idea. Among the exceptions were the 72 Communist members, who had early begun to feel the heavy hand of Daladier's profascist government. The majority of them were imprisoned by his orders even before the invasion of Poland. They had been tipped off that they would be arrested, but most of them remained behind purposely in order to cover the escape of several of their number who were too important to be sacrificed. Some of these and about 120 other Deputies escaped in one way or another, by methods far more perilous than those which enabled Henri Giraud and numerous generals in his train to follow Lemaigre-Dubreuil to Africa.

If the parliament was not ruling the country, who was? The answer is—the Two Hundred Families. These represented an alliance, fre-

quently by marriage, of the rich bourgeoisie and the titled nobility left over from the ancien régime. They mingled very well, the bourgeois taking on the aristocratic tone of court society, and the nobles accepting with enthusiasm the lucrative financial sense of the bourgeois. Since many of the latter preferred incomes without work, they were often asked to do no more than lend an important name.

We must not, however, accuse them all of indolence, because there were some notable exceptions—the De Wendels, for instance, who were the French branch of a large international titled family. The De Wendels worked as hard as the most diligent industrialist or financier—as hard, indeed, as the Von Wendels, their relatives who lived on the other side of the Rhine. The French De Wendels were as nationalistic as the German Von Wendels, but not so patriotic. This was not because they were different, but because the two branches of the clan were agreed on one primary doctrine: the principle of German cartels *über Alles*, and the coming domination of Europe—and later of the whole world—by Hitler's Germany.

While the French De Wendels admired and respected Germany, they were nationalistic enough to be among the founders of the Croix de Feu, a blue-shirted fascist organization. It was well known that of the hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen who were members, the De Wendels were proud of holding the lowest-numbered membership cards. The leaders of the Croix de Feu knew very well what they were doing, but most of the members were average bourgeois, not at all ill-intentioned, who merely had a highly developed class feeling and believed that the people would never know how to govern themselves. While the chiefs knew they were sacrificing the interests of their country to those of their class, most of the rank and file sincerely thought they were combining the two. Their official leader was Colonel François Casimir de la Rocque, who when his country was invaded promptly put himself at the service of the invaders.

During the years immediately preceding the war, the members of the organization exalted De la Rocque as their leader, never dreaming that a French colonel could ever be a traitor. Under his leadership they prepared against the Communists—so they supposed—stores and ammunition dumps which were destined to be of great use to the Nazis. The secret reserves of gasoline held ready for the fascists in many villages partly explain the easy and steady advance of the German tanks in 1940. Notices cleverly posted along the route showed the German motorcyclists which turn led to the hidden caches that had been prepared supposedly to fight the Left-wing government of

Léon Blum. It was one of the great triumphs of Goebbels that he was able to make this scientific use of class feeling to induce a country to help in its own defeat.

It is impossible to analyze here the life and activities of each of the Two Hundred Families who supported De la Rocque. But we must not neglect André Michelin, the tire-manufacturer. Michelin had no blue blood in his veins. He and his family were typical of the hard-working reactionary bourgeoisie. His factories were probably as good as any in the world, and Michelin, like Henry Ford, had the idea that he could not make a mistake. A devout Catholic, he believed he had some sort of divine right to govern the region centered in his factories. He ruled it paternalistically, benevolently constructing Catholic schools, hospitals, and orphan asylums; and he refused to hire a good chemist who did not go to mass or vote for his candidate. His employees belonged to him. Nine or ten centuries ago he would have passed as a fairly humane feudal lord, hard but just, according to the traditions of his time and his caste. But in the twentieth century he was an anachronism. He assumed the right to determine the present and the future of his little city of Clermont-Ferrand, a few miles from Vichy, and also, unfortunately, of his country.

During the Spanish Civil War he generously sent three hundred tires a day as a free gift to Franco to help him conquer the Spanish Republic. In 1940 he went still further. The magnificent tanks put out by his factories were not forwarded to the French Army, but remained on railway sidings close at hand, where Heinz Pol, an anti-fascist journalist, saw them from the train that was carrying him that tragic summer from one French concentration camp to another. When the Nazi officers reached Clermont at the head of their troops, they saw for the first time, with admiration and satisfaction, the French tanks of the latest models which they would have been sorry to see coming at them three weeks earlier. All they had to do now was to take them over.

Another who must not be forgotten is Ernest Mercier, founder and president of the French electric trust. A graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique—the best scientific school in France, considered by some the best in the world—a good organizer, an excellent technician, Mercier might have accomplished great things if it had been the policy of the Two Hundred Families to develop the wealth of the country. But they preferred to stifle France rather than let her progress. Faithful Catholics, highly educated, they were in love with the grandeur and the power of seventeenth-century France and with the theocratic

feudal social structure of the Middle Ages. The beautiful and disarming symbols they often invoked were the Gothic cathedrals and the medieval songs to the Virgin. The names oftenest on their lips were Saint Louis, who inaugurated the Crusades; Jeanne d'Arc, on whom they fed their unfortunate hatred of the English; and Louis XIV, who represented the period when France was the mightiest power on the Continent. They could not bring themselves to like the idea of a young and active twentieth-century France, daughter of the great Revolution, keeping the beauty of her popular traditions in the midst of a modern industrialization which—thanks to the quality of French engineers—might have been the model for all Europe.

Mercier might have differed from them. He could have accomplished the electrification of rural France, one of the developments the Popular Front had called for. Eastern France is almost all mountainous, with its spurs of the Alps and the Vosges; Central France bristles with the Massif Central and the Cévennes. The waters of the mountain streams could be harnessed to make beautiful lakes and waterfalls whose energy could be turned into power. One of the four great French rivers, the Rhône, which pours out of Lake Geneva, has been the subject of numerous bold and practical projects which could render immense service to navigation and irrigation, besides furnishing electric current. Electric power could also be manufactured in the Pyrenees on the southwestern border, since they have the two essentials, precipitous slopes and innumerable cascades swollen with rains. The clouds floating in from the Atlantic are stopped by the ten-thousand-foot barrier, and discharge all their moisture on the French side, leaving the Spanish slopes yellow and dry.

Even the shore of the Pas de Calais, the "Invasion Coast," has been the subject of audacious and admirable plans worked out to the last detail by the Polytechnique engineers. Those heavy tides, so difficult for vessels, might be harnessed to furnish electric power for the mining and industrial regions of the north. Thus the peasants could have electric light and power on their farms, or in the factories that might be installed in their countryside. But all such projects resemble too closely the grandiose five-year-plans of Soviet Union, and the Two Hundred Families never wished to see them put into effect.

Somewhat below the Two Hundred Families flourished their useful protégés, who likewise must not be forgotten. Some of them were outright agents, paid to keep the people quiet or to disseminate rumors. Others were just good average people who believed, either through snobbery or through respect for tradition, that the rich would always

do what was best for the country. Finally, there were the Cagoulards ("Hooded Men"), a fascist secret society that tried to overthrow the Government in 1937.

The most picturesque of these protégés was Jean Borotra, the celebrated Basque tennis-player. Admitted with honors to the Ecole Polytechnique, and as gifted intellectually as he was in physique, Borotra was somewhat handicapped in his professional studies by tennis championship matches. He was assured that this was of no importance, because a certain highly placed banker took an interest in him and would further his career.

After graduating from the Ecole Polytechnique with his engineering degree, the tennis champion was employed as a kind of ambassador at large for the Two Hundred Families. As such, he rendered them many services at home and abroad. He was one of the organizers of the Croix de Feu in Paris, where his name and influence were useful in recruiting young sportsmen. "Borotra is a Croix de Feu" became their favorite slogan. When Pétain became dictator, he gave Borotra a Cabinet position as organizer of physical education, but the "Bounding Basque" was too good a Frenchman to get on long with the invaders. He seems to have had serious disagreements with them, whereas the De Wendels, the Michelins, and the Merciers appear to have remained faithful to the German Führer, who protected them against popular fury.

It was mostly for political reasons that the Two Hundred Families were opposed to the modernization of French economy. They preferred the vast majority of the people to be peasants, conveniently backward and governable. The writers whom they subsidized were men like the novelist Henry Bordeaux, who, in and out of season, preached a return to the land. Even the *chansonniers* of Montmartre were induced to sing the praises of rural life, though nothing can be further from a French peasant than a Paris song-writer.

Actually there is no reason why French economy should remain backward. France can never produce wheat so cheaply as Minnesota or Argentina, and French peasants have never been able to sell their products on the domestic market without the artificial help of tariffs. France must import food or her people must work at starvation wages, living in shacks and not buying new clothes more than once in five or ten years.

But if France must import, she can also export. In her more fertile regions grow fruits of far finer flavor than those of California. The French peasant drinks a Bordeaux or a Burgundy of far better *cru*

than is generally seen on the tables of Park Avenue. But for tariffs, France could export barrels of it every year without depriving a single French workman of his quart of wine at noon. When the United States went dry, the French wine industry was badly impaired. During the present war, wine production in France must be at an all-time low, with many of the best specialists in Germany as war prisoners or working in labor gangs to build new strategic roads. Yet it is not true that the market has disappeared. It has merely changed, and for the worse. German officers and their fat spouses have no palate, and the sommelier would sooner poison them than serve them his best wines.

During this war California, Ohio, and New York State have developed vintages which French expatriates consider palatable, but they are sold on the home market for five or ten times the price of French wines in France. It is difficult to predict now how connoisseurs will judge these new brands when they have a basis of comparison again, but we shall probably see the usual difference between rapid American mass-production methods and French quality. American growers may prefer to age their wines ten years in a single night by some chemical magic of their own rather than age them over a long period with the loving care needed for a Clos de Vougeot or a Château Yquem, just as American fruit-growers neglect the flavorsome snow apples and winesaps of our youth in favor of standardized, thick-skinned apples which pack well.

The same will be true of perfumes, where the difference between the Paris-made and the Brooklyn-made vials of "Scandal," "Illusion," or "Blue Dream" would give a lady a ten-length advantage in the seduction handicap.

French heavy industry has shown what it can do, with liners like the *Normandie*, that wonder of mechanical construction as well as artistic decoration, and warships like the *Richelieu*, which excited the admiration of all the marine engineers who saw her in New York Harbor. Here again, France is expected to excel not in quantity but in quality. France is not a big country as modern countries go, and should not try to be an ordinary one, producing with difficulty her bushel of wheat. Her interest lies rather in accentuating her special position as the spearhead of progress in the arts and in ways of living. France should specialize in doing what nobody else can do: permitted in a freer and less jealous world to buy freely from everybody; to sell everywhere; to export largely; to conduct an enormous tourist trade; and to encourage in her universities and studios the presence of those thousands of foreign students who after four or five years in Paris

keep for the rest of their lives, intellectually at least, a sort of double nationality.

France's natural customer is the entire world, since the luxuries she has to sell do not threaten the industry of any other country. There cannot be enough of such things to flood a market. Besides, France would welcome payment in the form of flour and coal, agricultural implements, trucks, and mechanical refrigerators.

Despite the efforts of the Two Hundred Families and the sentimental preachments of Pétain, France was not—and is not—first and foremost an agricultural country. Sixty per cent of her population is employed in other ways. A great many work at the luxury trades already spoken of, or in the vast tourist business; thousands are fishermen along the coasts of the Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean; by far the greatest numbers are in heavy industry, the railroads, the mines, the merchant marine. Most of the French factories, except those of the "Red Belt" * around Paris, are located in the Department of the North, close to the Belgian frontier, or in the departments of Lorraine, which have been alternately French and German according to the hazards of war.

If we do not achieve lasting peace, two out of the three vital regions of French industry will be living always in the fear of new invasions, and even the third will never be able to feel secure. This brings us to the essential French question for the future: What of relations with Germany? Is it not possible to put an end to the bloody Franco-German conflicts? A world at peace with few or no customs barriers would be a boon to a French economy organized for world-wide trade, and every French element and interest should strive to bring it about. The French, who since Napoleon's time have never invaded any European country but have been invaded three times themselves, long for such security more than anything else.

One economic fact is paramount. French iron and German coal, which are artificially separated by a frontier post, tend normally to unite. In truth, their union has continued even when the two countries have been at war. The shameful story of the Briey Basin during the First World War is now well known; and during the recent "phony" war, freight trains loaded with French iron ore merely made a detour through Belgium to avoid crossing the Rhine. Under the direction of the Two Hundred Families, French iron never failed to find a way to join German coal. The Messieurs de Wendel never interrupted their

* So called because the suburbs of Paris were inhabited by workers who formed a Socialist and Communist belt around the city.

relations with the Herren von Wendel. Good sense and hope for the future prompt us to ask why it is not possible to accomplish by wisdom in time of peace what was done by fraud and treason in time of war.

Might there not be a sort of joint enterprise directed by the Government of the French Republic on behalf of Europe? Such an enterprise could use the mines and industry of the Rhineland, the Ruhr, and Lorraine for the benefit of all Europe. It might be better still if they were directed by a European union, in which the workers might feel themselves the citizens of all Europe without losing their own cherished nationality.

France has problems outside of Europe, too. At the outbreak of the present war Paris was the center of a vast empire. The French Empire had its outposts on all the continents. It comprised almost one-third of Africa, with wide balconies on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; Indo-China in Asia, the loss of which, brought about with the connivance of Pétain, made Pearl Harbor possible; the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon close to Newfoundland, and Martinique and Guadeloupe not far from the shores of French Guiana on the northern coast of South America; and many islands of the Pacific, which De Gaulle early placed at the disposal of the Allies.

All the French colonial possessions had their representation in the parliament. There was a Deputy from Senegal, a superb Negro, whose son was a student in Paris and played on the national soccer team. Martinique sent to Paris a chocolate-colored Deputy who had a dark wife and three pretty frizzle-haired children. There is no capital of the white world where the color of a man's skin had less importance than in prefascist Paris. A man was judged there by whether he was intelligent or dull-witted, an honest man or a crook, a knave or a fool.

Algeria ceased long ago to be a colony. It is a part of France, with the same laws, the same rights, the same military service, the same schools. Algeria was colonized very much as our Atlantic seaboard was, by individual colonists who received grants from the state and ran their farms or their commerce more or less as they saw fit, working hard for a living. But in Morocco the situation is somewhat different. It was conquered in the days of the great companies and corporations. It was organized quickly, according to a comprehensive but oppressive plan, and more in the spirit of exploitation than in that of individual effort, at a time when economic progress was often balanced by a retreat on the social front.

Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, an able administrator but

a reactionary of the first water, always conceded too much influence to the big corporations, and made distinctions between the Moroccans and the Europeans, so that Fez is less of a French city than is Algiers. Almost everywhere in Morocco the newly built European city is set at a distance from the native city, with wide space left between. The economic development of this most recent of French imperial acquisitions has been strikingly rapid, but certain of Lyautey's tendencies provided a preview of Vichy. It must never be forgotten that Marshal Lyautey—intellectually and emotionally a Croix de Feu and a Cagou-lard—was one of the leaders of the only direct attempt made by French fascism in Paris to gain control of the capital by direct action, in the putsch of February 6, 1934.

Like many a great reputation, Lyautey's was partly built up by high-pressure advertising. In this country it owed much to a very carefully written biography by André Maurois, published in 1931. Maurois has a way of writing history which implies that the common man has had nothing to do with it; great ladies and noblemen always play the leading roles; the honest people whose working and fighting keep countries alive are not seen or heard. Charming history it is, when written on mauve paper with the gilded pen of a literary flâneur, but it should not be taken too seriously at a time when history is being written in tears and blood by the millions—and we hope *for* the millions. In Morocco, Lyautey worked sometimes for France, but more often for the few against the many. He was a genius, but also a reactionary. We may well learn from his methods of colonization what to do, and from his reactionary exploitation of the people what not to do.

France began her occupation of Morocco, as in her other dependencies, by establishing schools which opened their doors wide to the natives on an equal footing with the French. Natives who received degrees as lawyers, doctors, or professors were treated exactly like white men of the same intellectual level—a system which is in marked contrast to the British way in India. Marriages which ignored the color line were not looked upon with disfavor. Ever since the Revolution, Frenchmen have frowned upon racism, for they take their Declaration of the Rights of Man quite seriously.

If France retains her colonies, she need only look to her own best traditions to find a method to govern them; namely, to use the instrument of French culture rather than rifles and tanks. The history of Algeria shows that this is not at all impossible. Most Algerians feel

entirely French, and they would all be favorable to a general system of socialization such as the Popular Front desired.

One tendency which has been noticeable in recent years ought to be encouraged after the war, but not for the same reasons as those which brought it about. Before the war, French industrialists, and some foreign ones, had begun to establish factories in North Africa which profited naturally by their proximity to raw materials, cheap labor, and a loose application of labor laws by the local judge and police. These factories should of course be kept up, but operated in such a way as to give the French overseas territories an economic life of their own. The example of Canada in our own hemisphere indicates the possibilities of autonomous development.

Up to now, France has not sought to grant autonomy to her overseas possessions, and it is perhaps an open question whether it is better to grant complete autonomy or to permit the overseas regions to participate fully in the government not only of the Empire—a word which few Frenchmen ever used until the approach of fascism—but even of France herself. Although Senegal and Algeria did not play such an active part as Canada or Australia in decisions directly concerning their own welfare, yet under the French system the Deputies from Algiers and Dakar voted on social laws which were to govern Paris as well as on laws affecting their own cities. It was quite possible for a Senegalese Deputy to cast the deciding vote against the representative of the Eighth Arrondissement of Paris.

This system of legislative interaction between far places, based on the principle of human equality established by the French Revolution, could be extended, and indeed should apply not only to the French Empire but to the entire world. Dakar is nearer to Paris today than New York was to Washington a century and a half ago, and the principles of human fraternity on a world-wide scale are already being recognized as the only truly practical ones, whether we act on them or not.

Substantial public works, such as draining and irrigation projects, should be undertaken as soon as possible in French Africa. Algeria and Morocco have a healthful climate, one agreeable to tourists, but the vast regions of Equatorial Africa are still scourged by malaria and yellow fever.

One way of judging the level of civilization in a colonial region, and the honesty of the efforts made in its behalf by the mother country, is to interpret the mortality statistics. If the life expectancy is unreasonably short, it is obvious that public health has been neglected.

And for every one who dies prematurely, it may be assumed that there are twenty who suffer unduly from disease and privation. Perhaps a country cannot be judged exclusively by this standard, but such statistics cannot be ignored. If English rule is not appreciated in India, it may be largely because the Indian babies at birth have on the average less than thirty years to live. On the other hand, one of the finest features of American administration at home, in the Philippines, and in Panama has always been the concentrated American effort to fight epidemics and promote health. France seems to occupy a position half-way between Britain and the United States on this score. She has, at any rate, some first-rate specialists on tropical diseases, such as General Adolphe Sicé, one of the heroes of De Gaulle's army.

But it is not only in the colonies that France stands in need of public works. The Third Republic fell badly behind in this respect. The Popular Front had laid out an extensive program for bringing the country up to date, and as unemployment was at that time widespread, the French leaders were anxious to plan on a large scale for new bridges, railway lines, aviation fields, and canals.

One of the most important of these undertakings was the canal which was to unite Bordeaux on the Atlantic with Sète on the French Mediterranean coast, crossing the plains that lie just north of the Pyrenees. It could be dug without touching an acre of territory belonging to any other country. It would cut out the long voyage around the Iberian Peninsula and through the Straits of Gibraltar, so that vessels coming from England and bound for the Suez Canal could save several days. This canal would do for France what the Panama Canal does for the United States. One result would obviously be to diminish considerably the strategic importance of Gibraltar.

It is probable that after victory the French electorate will be more than ever in favor of the Popular Front and will vote for all those public works a second time, this time making the demand imperative. The Pétains and the Laval's will no longer be on hand to keep the country from developing. It is of course difficult to say when such works can be undertaken. Before constructing any new canals, the houses that were burned down and the bridges that were dynamited will have to be rebuilt. There must be hospitals and sanatoriums to take care of civilians who have not had enough to eat for years, and of war prisoners who have passed those years behind German barbed wire. The few French prisoners who have been returned to France were sent home because they were tubercular and could no longer

work. An exhausted people will have to make a gigantic effort merely to stay alive.

One of the first tasks beyond that struggle will be to industrialize France. Industrialization has been criminally neglected during the last fifty years. With few exceptions, big industry has not been interested in stimulating export trade for the sake of the home market or the colonies, and neither have the big banks. The following observations from a French report submitted in Algiers describe the condition of French industry:

South America and the Near East, disillusioned by the underproduction and old commercial methods of our country, rapidly turned to other producers. Central Europe and the Balkans, during the years when the Little Entente constituted a power in Europe, pleaded in vain for French industry to provide them with the things Germany was offering them. Events have shown the tragic consequences of insufficient industrialization in France. The Army itself was greatly to blame in underestimating the importance of modern industry. The General Staff scorned labor, the factories, metallurgy, and mechanization. It did not even seek the collaboration of industrialists and big business.¹

France can and must have heavy industry and light industry of high quality. The country has the best iron mines of Western Europe and enough bauxite to develop one of the best aluminum industries in Europe. It also has potassium, phosphates, and many other minerals. The only shortage is coal. That means, as the planners of the new France are fully aware, that after the war there must be close economic collaboration between France and Germany.

Such collaboration should be the result of a complete transformation of economic and social life in both countries: heavy industry in Northern France, Alsace-Lorraine, Westphalia, and the Rhineland—which might become an independent state—ought to be under joint management. The state, or the several states, should be the owners. There should be no more private cartels among the Schneider-Creuzots, the De Wendels, the Krupps, and the Röchlings. The whole industrial area from the Swiss border to the North Sea and from the Seine to the Elbe should be nationalized or socialized; that is, come under government control.

Many kinds of activities will be quickly resumed in France after victory. The forty-hour week obviously cannot become effective immediately, because too much of the work to be done is urgent, but the Popular Front laws for the protection of old people and children must be put into immediate effect.

One of the first desires of a people set free is education. The French system of education was once one of the best, but its rigid forms and organization became outmoded. It originated in the first years of the Third Republic, which had set out to do much better than Napoleon III and had easily succeeded. But children could still leave school at thirteen. The Popular Front immediately raised this age to fifteen, and with France liberated, the higher age will eventually be re-established. The lycées which gave French boys and girls a sound and thorough secondary education, approximating that of our junior colleges, were never expensive, and under one of the ministries of Edouard Herriot, who had been a lycée professor, they were made entirely free. Thus they became accessible to all children whose families could afford not to send them to work. This measure should perhaps be strengthened by a subsidy to families which cannot make both ends meet if their children continue at school beyond the age of fifteen. Tuition at the schools of law and medicine, where the fees were high, should also be made free.

On graduation from the lycée at seventeen or eighteen, those who wished to pursue advanced studies could enter the universities (the *grandes écoles*, which correspond to our graduate schools) for law or medicine, or one of the great governmental schools for special studies. These are the Ecole Polytechnique for civil engineers and artillery officers, the St. Cyr Ecole Spéciale Militaire for infantry officers, the Saumur Ecole de Cavalerie, the Ecole Navale for naval officers, the Ecole des Mines for mining engineers, the Ecole Normale to prepare teachers for the lycées, and the Ecole des Sciences Politiques for the training of diplomats and the high civil servants of the central Government and department administration.

The Ecole des Sciences Politiques, like the military schools, was always extremely reactionary. Candidates for the final examinations had to present themselves attired in striped trousers and frock coats so that their professors might be assured that they could comport themselves in a salon on a par with the old nobility. Admittance to any of the *grandes écoles* was by competitive examination only, and so was the award of degrees at the end of the course. During the years of study the students were subject to strict discipline. While their comrades were leaving the lycées to enter business or to continue their studies without restrictions at the universities, the elect of the *grandes écoles* had to stay two or three years longer at the lycées under the same rules of dormitory life as the young boys; and even after they

were launched at the professional schools of their choice, they were still disciplined as strictly as boarders are in a preparatory school.

The organization of the *grandes écoles* had not changed much since Napoleon's time. They were democratic only to the extent that Napoleon established the principle of the "career open to talent," knowing that intelligence did not necessarily go with privileged birth. But Napoleon was also a tyrant; he insisted upon obedience and discipline, and cared little whether his officers and administrators had broad ideas and a love for democracy. The schools he founded must therefore be modified, especially for the Army and the Navy, the ministries, and diplomacy.

The graduates of all the *grandes écoles* except the Ecole Normale were so molded and conditioned by conservative training as to be the enemies of the Republic they were to serve—that poor "Marianne" whom among themselves they called *la Gueuse*, "the Trollop." She paid their salaries while permitting them to despise her, to subject themselves to the influence of the clericals, and to develop a dangerous tendency to think of themselves as an elite consecrated to the service of a certain social class rather than of all France. This brings us to the question of the French nobility.

The Third Republic—unlike the First—never abolished titles of nobility. On the contrary, like the Weimar Republic, it confirmed the nobles in their legal status. Thanks to snobbery and tradition, the old families of dukes and barons of the former monarchies have kept their influence, and in many cases immense fortunes. For such people, the only natural social order seems the feudal system, ordained by God for their good; and few of the bishops they invite to their châteaux to enjoy the marvels of their cuisine and cellars would try to disabuse their minds of this belief.

French diplomacy under the Third Republic was, alas! almost entirely in the hands of a reactionary aristocracy which talked against "Marianne" behind her back while representing her abroad. The English nobility before the war was not nearly so reactionary as the French. It is of course axiomatic that aristocrats who are waiting and hoping for a restoration are more extreme in their ideas than any other group. Many of the French nobles have collaborated gladly with Hitler—for example, M. Fernand de Brinon, the Vichyite who had the singular honor of being the first French ambassador to Paris. They did not survive the liberation of France by a week. But that is not enough. Legal steps must be taken so that the sons of those traitors may never have the right to the titles which permitted their fathers to exercise a

deadly influence in snobbish international circles. There must be no more dangerous alliances like that of the Chambrun family, descendants of Lafayette, who did not hesitate to marry their son René to the daughter of the most corrupt politician in France—that son of a butcher who, by activities less honorable but more lucrative than those of his father, became for a time master of France—Pierre Laval.

Laval was controlled by the big banks. French finance deserves particular study, because it was most active in the conspiracy to turn France over to Hitler, and still expects to ride out the storm like a feather on the waves and to carry on after Hitler's defeat as if he had remained in power. The Banque Worms of Paris was a German bank. Upon Hitler's entry into the French capital, its desks and files were already in order for him and awaited only the arrival of his officials. It was the same with the Banque d'Indochine, which was all-powerful in that colony, and, working directly for Hitler in France and indirectly in China, served Hitler's friend the Mikado. When the Japanese generals and officials arrived at Saïgon with the friendly acquiescence of Pétain, they had an excellent address in that city, the Banque d'Indochine.

Such banks were closely allied to the trust, partly by the mysterious movement known as "synarchy," launched in France about 1938 by the Nouveaux Cahiers, which was supposed to represent a new political line. The movement is based upon a special system of technique and research, and amounts to a secret society. Whoever becomes a member takes an oath never to reveal anything concerning its organization or functions. A French industrialist named Jean Coutreau, who had become a member without fully understanding what kind of den he was getting into, made the mistake of telling one of his friends that he was worried by what he saw and wondered whether it was not his duty to make certain revelations. His death a few days later was never satisfactorily explained by the press or the police.

This powerful institution takes no more interest now in Hitler than in an old rifle, and is quite ready to buy a new model. Their specialist for America seemed at last report to be one Helmuth Wohlthat, a very clever choice, since he was for ten years employed by an American oil company in Mexico, presumably Standard Oil. Let us not forget that Standard's Paris office required all employees in its pay to have membership cards in the Croix de Feu.

The loyalty of the financiers is not to Hitler but to Hitlerism—that is, the domination of all Europe by a few vast cartels. It was to be

Europe to begin with, but Argentina and the United States were not overlooked. The economic domination of Europe was soon attained, thanks to the "democratic" statesmen who gave them Spain by means of the nonintervention farce, and surrendered Austria and Czechoslovakia without a fight, Italy by alliance, Pétain's France and the Low Countries with the minimum of resistance, and French North Africa outright through Pétain. North Africa is now happily lost to Hitler, though perhaps not to his financiers, since M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil seems to feel as much at home in Algiers as in Vichy or Berlin—but it is still possible that De Gaulle, with the approval of all good Frenchmen, will succeed in changing that.

On that Saturday, August 26, 1944, when General Charles de Gaulle marched down the Champs Elysées from the Arc de Triomphe to the Place de la Concorde, and then was driven on down to the prefecture and Notre Dame, he was in a sense unknown to the French people. His villa in Algiers had, to be sure, been visited from time to time by important representatives of the resistance forces; but traveling from an occupied country to Africa and back was so dangerous that only a few of them had been asked to attempt it. Before the war, De Gaulle was known only to his colleagues in the Army and to a few men in politics. Many Frenchmen heard his name for the first time on that day when, speaking from London, he assured his countrymen that only a battle had been lost, not a war. From that moment he became a sort of legend, of whose activities one could learn only by devious and precarious means.

But now the man himself was in Paris! What would he be like? He had been out of France during the German occupation, and therefore would find his country profoundly changed. Moreover, since he was a general, it was possible that he might not understand civilians very well. He was of noble birth and a devout Catholic, and therefore he might be a reactionary—or at least might seem one, whether he was or not. Unaccustomed to dealing with the great public, De Gaulle faced one of the most difficult tasks to confront any statesman of the modern world.

What was the situation in his country? France, which had been badly governed ever since 1919, had seen many of her former economic and political leaders openly commit deeds of perfidy under the German occupation. Consequently, a considerable number of those men whose technical capacity and experience made them most suited to governing had disqualified themselves. Was it inevitable that these must be retained for reasons of expediency? Was it possible to find other com-

petent men to replace them? Or to train a sufficient number of new men on short notice?

From the point of view of social questions, the difficulty was likely to be even greater. There, divergent doctrines were sure to clash. Their leaders having betrayed them, the people would want something different from what they had had. A sudden and violent reform would be difficult, especially since it was sure to displease the Anglo-American officials and generals recently landed on French shores, coming from lands where the old social order had never been seriously threatened. It seems probable that if the French Forces of the Interior, suddenly freed from German oppression, had felt themselves the absolute masters of their own country—if they had not had to take into account the presence of the Allied troops of occupation—they would have immediately set about accomplishing great social changes, even if they had to leave many necessary details for later.

In order to avoid disaster, the new French Government had to steer its course skillfully, in such a way as not to alarm the Anglo-Saxon conservatives and at the same time not to appear reactionary to a French population transformed and matured by harsh experiences.

Two early acts marked the attitude of this new Government: the nationalization of the Renault factories and De Gaulle's "planned-economy" speech at Lille on October 1. The General's promise of far-reaching reforms in the social structure brought loud applause from the crowd standing in the rain to listen as he spoke from the balcony of the prefecture in the Place de la République at Lille. "We do not want to return to that political, social, and moral situation that took us to the edge of the abyss," he said. "Our duty is to make the fullest use of what we possess in our soil, our subsoil, and our empire. To do this there is no other means than what is called a planned economy. We want the state to direct the economic effort of the entire nation for the benefit of all and to ensure that the life of every Frenchman and Frenchwoman shall become a better one. . . . The first essential is that the collective—that is, the state—should take over the direction of the great sources of the common wealth and should control certain other activities, but of course without excluding the stimulus of just profit and private initiative." ²

It augurs well for the future that many of these industrial and social questions are now beginning to be solved. But the final solution cannot be arrived at until after the troops of occupation have departed, or at least until after the peace is signed and the French people can again feel themselves masters in their own house. Until that time

a definitive solution is not even to be hoped for. It could not help being deflected and modified by foreign influences; and unless it were a purely French solution, it would not work and could not last.

What of the attitude of the French working class toward De Gaulle and his government? A complete answer to this question could not be given at this writing. The workers obviously did not want any break with him, nor any kind of disorder that might disturb the American, British, and French armies fighting on the frontiers of Germany. They were opposed to any strike that might hinder those armies or bring famine to a country already worn out with privations, where each pound of bread, each ounce of meat, each cake of soap, was a precious object. Consequently the masses in France could not manifest their opinions. Nevertheless, the workers do talk together, take decisions in their trade-unions, and express themselves in their newspapers, of which one of the most important is the *Humanité*, organ of the Communist party in France. This is not only the leading working-class journal; it also has the widest circulation of any newspaper in the country. Next to it comes the *Populaire*, formerly directed by Léon Blum.

It is impossible to estimate the proportion of Communists among the French workers, but probably there are less than 50 per cent, perhaps only 40 per cent. In any case, it would not be very useful to know the precise number, so long as there cannot possibly be an immediate showdown, either by force or by elections. And between now and such a showdown, many circumstances will have been altered. What is, however, more important to know—and, moreover, certain—is that not a single French workman is in favor of reaction. If any were reactionary before the war, Pétain would have disillusioned them. They do not want any return to the status quo ante bellum, nor do they want a forward movement that seems slow or timid. The most moderate among them would content themselves with the minimum that the Popular Front promised in its program, and these moderates must represent approximately 50 per cent of the whole population. Faced with a choice between the two extremes, nearly all the moderates would prefer the solutions of the extreme Left to those of the extreme Right. It must not be forgotten that they had plenty of time and opportunity for reflection in the years between the invasion and the liberation. The others—the other 50 per cent or less—are openly under Communist influence. But the Communists of 1944, it must be remembered, were calm and thoughtful men, scarcely attracted by desperate adventures. They sought single-mindedly the defeat of Germany. To

that end, they would accept any government that was not totally unendurable. They are still the greatest partisans of order, and should cause no difficulties to any reasonable government.

But although the De Gaulle government advanced along new paths in some matters, in others it still clung to the old ways. To procure the necessary funds without delay, it had recourse to the ancient method of a public loan. It is well known that the successive governments of the Third Republic were always held in bondage by the bankers. Because their budgets were chronically out of balance, sales of government bonds were the usual procedure. The bankers liked this system; it enabled them to make considerable profit without risk and it kept the various governments dependent on them. If the leaders of the *Maquis* had had to assume the responsibility of a decision, they probably would have sought to use some newer method—one more audacious and resolute, and more in keeping with the wishes of the public. But they were not the masters. And even if they had been, what method could they have employed that would not have thrown them into immediate conflict with the Anglo-American conservatives?

Far from being the masters in France, the *Maquis* even found it difficult to maintain their own existence as an organization. On this question, as on many another, De Gaulle found himself caught, so to speak, between his own people and his two powerful Allies. The French would have found it natural for the chiefs of the resistance forces to assume the right of decision in all large questions—political, economic, social, and even perhaps military (since they were obviously the most trusted by French opinion at the moment)—until after the elections, which were expected to follow the return of the prisoners from Germany. But London and Washington looked upon them as dangerous revolutionaries, and soon regretted having given them arms with which to fight the Germans. London and Washington would have liked those arms back again. But the men of the resistance forces wanted to keep them, and the French people wanted them to keep them. The *Maquis* was organized in trained groups; its members were disciplined and bold. But London and Washington would have liked to see them merge into the ranks of the regular French Army—one by one, and not as a group.

There is, in any case, a sort of potential friction between partisans and the professional officers of any army, no matter of what nationality. For soldiers, they think too much. That is objectionable to army officers, who are frequently reactionary, as well as to the bankers, who favor the officers. The soldiers of the *Maquis* may be compared

to the troops of Cromwell, an army that thought and argued and discussed, and yet was the finest of its time, arousing the admiration of even the King of France, who witnessed its activities in Flanders. The men of the Maquis, too, are incomparable fighters. They are possessed by a profound sense of justice and liberty, and they are difficult to fool—neither Pétain nor Hitler could bluff them. It is certain that they constituted—and will continue to constitute for a long time to come—a truly revolutionary force of a high order. Not a force for anarchy, however—tugged to right or left at the behest of bizarre and disordered notions—but a conscious and reflective force which may contribute to the creation of a new world, a force which at the time of the American Revolution we would have understood and respected.

Despite their unwillingness to be absorbed anonymously into the French Army, the soldiers of the Maquis must not be thought of as antimilitarist, in the sense of wishing to see the French Army done away with. On the contrary, they would like to see France have an Army strong enough to permit her to deal on a footing of equality with her Allies, strong enough above all to protect her against Germany. This has also been the principal purpose of General De Gaulle; on that point he and the Maquis were in entire agreement. It is only upon the character and attitude of that Army and its officers—the question of whether it should be less or more democratic—that there may be a serious difference of opinion. It was De Gaulle himself who once proposed for France a technical and professionalized army (*une armée de métier*), and he is an Army officer by career; hence what is surprising is not that there should be any divergence of opinion between him and the Maquis, but rather that there should seem to be so little violent conflict and that De Gaulle should appear to get on so well with them.

While it is the Maquis whom the Anglo-Saxon Allies would like to see "liquidated"—at least as a formal organization—it is not the Maquis whom the French themselves are longing to be rid of. Those whom the French themselves consider their worst enemies are the former collaborators: the legion of traitors and profiteers, the former friends of the Nazis. These may be divided into two classes: first, the miserable wretches who allowed themselves to be bought for a few francs, and who sometimes ended by acquiring a sadistic taste for the cruel methods their German masters taught them; and second, those who did not have to be bought or won over—mostly bankers, indus-

trialists, rich bourgeois, or renegade writers who had already shown a dubious or a reactionary attitude before the war.

Those in the first category are doomed in advance. Nobody is going to protect them, nobody takes any interest in them. The people who once paid them despise them, and know that in case of need, others can always be found to accept payment for that kind of dirty work. The second category is different; they are the ones the mass of the French people instinctively loathe the most. But they are also the very ones whom their counterparts in other countries desire to see spared—whom they will try to save from the firing squad and even from the prisons where they await trial. And they will try to protect against arrest those who are not yet in prison, to whose luxurious homes Anglo-American officers gladly accept invitations to dine and dance. These collaborationists all have admirable cooks and set an excellent table with what they buy in the black market with the 1000-franc notes left them by the Germans. The women who adorn their drawing-rooms are marvelously dressed, and know how to murmur discreetly insinuating propaganda between glasses of champagne: "Pétain was not really at fault. . . . For four years order was, after all, maintained. . . . Among the F.F.I. there are—after all, what can you expect?—many bandits and gangsters. . . . Laval . . ." But Laval is generally not mentioned at all.

In short, in Paris as in Rome, an American or a British officer is not likely to be invited to the home of a worker, who hardly has a home to call his own, who has no food even for his own family, and whose daughter has not a silk dress to her name. It is vain to deny, and dangerous to forget, the political weight of a *suprême de volaille* and a good *cru*, of hands delicately manicured, of hair done by the best Parisian coiffeur, of the titles of duchess or marquise—so agreeable to the lips of citizens of a country where titles do not exist. Luxury and elegance constitute a secret weapon in Paris, as in Rome.

The purge thus lags, and up to the beginning of 1945 the convictions had not been many. And most of them had been imposed on culprits of no great importance. It is true that there had been a good many arrests, and substantial reforms were put through in the first weeks. From the governor down, all the officials of the Banque de France were arrested, as were the heads of Air France and the president of the well-known network of banks that covers all France, the Société Générale. The Vichy laws against the Jews and persons not born in France were repealed. Actually these had never been rigorously ap-

plied; officials had let them fall into disuse as soon as the early zeal of the authorities slackened.

The school heads dismissed by Vichy were reinstated, and the schools were soon restored to virtually what they had been before the war. Women were granted the vote for the first time in France, and two women were given seats in the Consultative Assembly. Five French airlines had resumed regular schedules by the end of September 1944, and the first newly manufactured plane took to the air on October 11. A new locomotive made its first run not long after that; trains began to follow, if feebly, regular timetables despite blown-up bridges and lack of coal, and the first train with sleepers and dining-cars rolled southward from Paris early in December. Still the transportation of goods lagged sadly; supplies remained very low, and there was an alarming shortage of fats in Paris. Tuberculosis and infant mortality continued to increase all through 1944.

But the vast majority of collaborators were still at liberty. And they were not hiding in cellars, in farmhouse lofts, or in the wild mountain woodland as did the Maquis. They were comfortably established in their own homes, their châteaux in Anjou or Touraine, their villas on the Côte d'Azur or at Biarritz, or in their handsome Paris apartments; they were giving magnificent receptions, managing their affairs, renewing old prewar contacts, re-establishing the influence that untoward circumstances had temporarily imperiled. The uncertainties of that difficult period of transition from the Laval-Pétain-Gestapo government to the organization headed by De Gaulle were diminishing a bit from week to week. The anger against them, they hoped, would soon die down; people would forget; the dreadful habit of shedding blood would soon be lost; and if one day they should be called before the bar of justice, the chances were that the judge would be an old friend—or at least someone of their own class, who would understand. They were striving in every way to restore the past just as if there had been no war, or as if they and the Germans had not lost it. They were rapidly returning to their usual way of life. And they confidently expected to find themselves still the masters; they were hoping that their workmen, whom they had betrayed and whom they had urged to accept deportation to Germany, would quickly recover their old respect and obedience. Were they right? Had they calculated correctly? In this hidden strife between them and their patriotic workers, De Gaulle had not at this writing taken a definite stand.

Another problem is presented by the French clergy. France is not a country of innumerable sects; most Frenchmen, if they belong to any

church at all, are Roman Catholics. But even within the Church, two contradictory forces have been at work. One was the attitude of the Vatican, which had indicated fairly clearly its preference for a New Order dedicated to the suppression of the spirit of revolt, the preservation of class distinctions, and the maintenance of power and wealth for the rich and misery for the poor. The other force was the very spirit of Catholicism itself, based upon the concept of Christian equality and compassion for all human suffering, which was in striking contrast to the practices of the German Gestapo and the strong-arm hired men of Pétain. Every member of the hierarchy had to make his choice between these two positions.

Those who followed the Vatican line to its logical conclusion became traitors to their country and were given high consideration by Vichy and Berlin. Naturally these were in great part the princes and dignitaries of the Church, accustomed to authority and honors and to the society of the rich and the powerful.

Not so the *petit clergé*. The good country curé—humble, helpful, and devout—is nearer to Christian fellowship and much farther from the Vatican. Generally the son of a peasant family and accustomed to a life among the humble, he counsels his parishioners and with his slight store of francs aids those who cannot make both ends meet. The French curé is usually better educated than the villagers to whom he consecrates his services; he knows them all, and he is not lacking in sympathy and understanding. During Nazi occupation the average curé conducted himself with honor and often with heroism. Moreover, within limits, the Germans respected him and stood a little in awe of his influence and strength. They considered it unwise, even dangerous, to shoot a curé out of hand or without proof. Accordingly such of them as were men of courage and resolution often found themselves playing a useful role in the resistance movement, and some of them paid with their lives. But although the heroes were certainly more likely to come from the lower ranks of the hierarchy and the traitors from the higher ones, still there were some courageous prelates, such as the bishops of Toulouse and Montauban. The Bishop of Montauban made declarations after the liberation which place him among the defenders of social progress.

The difficulty for the De Gaulle government was to avoid the maintenance in power of a fascist clergy and at the same time to avoid the danger of irritating half the population by attacking the French Catholic hierarchy as a whole. Here again the attitude of the Provisional Government (recognized as such by the United States on

October 23, 1944) was a shrewd mixture of firmness and moderation. The Government exacted from Rome a promise to replace with others not open to criticism those prelates who had compromised themselves too far under the occupation.

Another source of difficulty was the Paris world of writers and journalists. Before the war the French press, as everyone knows, was one of the most dishonest in the world, and not without reason, for it was the especial target of fascist bribes. The long and patient preparatory efforts of international fascism, of which Hitler was merely the spearhead, were particularly directed toward the French press. France was the only Continental country which could conceivably have put up any resistance to the Reichswehr, and so a French fifth column was the most useful and the most necessary of them all. To create a fifth column in France and then establish round about it a sufficiently wide group of indifferent and compliant sympathizers, the agents of Goebbels and also his friends in foreign financial centers poured out francs by the million. The life of a journalist who wished to keep his hands clean was neither easy nor lucrative, and temptation was great; moreover, the very existence of an honest newsheet was precarious. When the first Germans entered Paris, certain newspapers were found organized, ready and waiting to play their country false. On the other hand, sooner than anyone could have believed possible, other journalists, disgusted with the kind of work they had had to do for so long, banded together and managed to bring out thirty or forty clandestine sheets that drove the Nazis into a perfect fury.

At the moment of liberation, then, there were two sets of newspapers, the German and the French. The journals of the resistance forces found themselves perfectly at ease, surprised and happy at being able at last to come out into daylight. The attitude they took toward General de Gaulle was one of reserved approval—the attitude of all Partisans. Their reservations were due to the government's moderation in the matter of the purge and of social reforms, and its lack of warmth toward the Partisans and the forces of revolutionary tendency.

In this situation the De Gaulle government gave proof of a certain wisdom. There were some convictions: Georges Suarez was executed, Stéphane Lauzanne was sentenced to twenty years in prison, and Paul Chack was condemned to death. Jules Patenôtre, Charles Maurras, and Henri Béraud were arrested, and at the turn of the year were awaiting judgment. Shortly after the liberation, French men of letters and journalists themselves drew up a list of dishonored names

(*tableau d'infamie*), denouncing those of their colleagues—more than a hundred and fifty of them—who no longer merited the confidence and affection of their country and with whom they would refuse all future professional contact. This, insufficient though it may seem, is no small penalty for a class that lives so largely on prestige.

What can now be looked for in the material development and recovery of France? We must not lose sight for a moment of the fact that this is not 1918. A quarter of a century has transformed the possibilities of production and technical progress. We can rebuild bridges now, mine iron, and roll machines off the assembly line at a far greater rate than we could two or three decades ago; and traveling has become easier and quicker. We must take account of all such matters when we try to compare the postwar period of the First World War with the coming one. The material destruction caused by the present war is cruelly important, but from a purely economic point of view, perhaps it will within a few years appear less important than we believe it to be today.

The reconstruction of France, which began immediately after the liberation, is almost as striking an example of advance—not quite, however, because the French Government is still in a state of transition between the old methods and the new. There is unemployment in France, although there is so much work to be done. Foreseeing in April 1944 that liberation was not far off, the National Council of French Resistance held a sort of congress under the very noses of the Gestapo, and set down on paper a declaration of aims to be attained when France was free. It was a kind of Bill of Rights, which went beyond the assurances in the Atlantic Charter, and moreover, it is taken very seriously by the members of the National Council of Resistance. Included in its provisions were: the right to health, of which the Atlantic Charter had nothing to say, but which is perhaps the most essential of human rights; the right to work; the right to security, which is equivalent to "freedom from fear"; and the right to take part in the economic management of the country—which likewise found no place in the Atlantic Charter.

The declaration set forth projects for basic planning with regard to mines, raw materials, agriculture, and transportation. The degree of control to be exercised over these various activities was also indicated: for the mines, it would be complete; for heavy industry, partial; for many other types of commercial and manufacturing enterprises, there would be no control whatever. For agriculture, the plan envisaged a certain redistribution of private holdings; such a step is necessary

in France because the division and subdivision of farm lands into even smaller plots, which may have seemed suitable and desirable a century ago, is a hindrance to modern methods of cultivation. This program of the National Council of Resistance even provided for some experiments with collective farming. It offered the best technical training for industrial and agricultural workers, and also free public instruction for all those capable of profiting by it, up to and including graduate studies.

On December 15, 1944, delegations representing the Committees of Liberation of virtually all the French districts, sitting in Paris, renewed the demand that the Government apply the program of the National Council of Resistance. It is probable that, faced with such a program, the reactionaries of all countries would say that a nation inspired by these principles is doomed to disaster. But they would be the same ones who used to tell us that the Russian experiment could never succeed, that Russian industry would never produce anything to measure up to current standards, and that the undisciplined hordes of the Red Army would not hold out against the Reichswehr for three weeks.

The fact remains that of all the countries of Western Europe thus far liberated, France is the only one where public order reigns, where there are already the beginnings of economic recovery, and which looks with a live hope to the future. Obviously, the chief reason is that France is the only one of those countries to have very nearly the government she desires. Conditions in France should convince us that it is impossible for a Gauleiter supported only by foreign tanks and planes to establish order in a modern country, but that a national government is quite equal to the task, so long as that government is sufficiently approved by a majority of the population. What difficulties the French Provisional Government was having in the early weeks of 1945 (and they were not very serious) would have disappeared overnight if it had been possible to follow the wishes of the majority completely: that is, to act more resolutely along the lines of social progress, and to eliminate the traitors.

In international politics, France is beginning to find herself in an exceptionally favorable situation, perhaps even a brilliant one. She seems to be the only country capable of formulating and applying a postwar doctrine which differs widely from the old and worn-out systems to which humanity already owes two wars and incalculable suffering, without at the same time plunging headlong and irrevocably into communism. Those who think that in spite of its practical

advantages communism is far from perfect and not even attractive, that it is too harsh and rigid, too artificial and doctrinaire to give satisfaction outside the Soviet Union, will learn a great deal by observing what we may call the French experiment.

In 1917 the Russians began trying out a method which has certainly yielded great and remarkable results, but which many would not care to see imitated elsewhere. Yet in all democratic countries one is forced to recognize a certain degree of popular unrest, and the necessity for important changes of some kind is becoming evident. If the French experiment were to succeed, French influence might become exceedingly powerful in Western Europe. German methods have always and everywhere eventually failed; English methods do not seem to give universal satisfaction, judging by the situations Britain developed in Greece and Poland. So if the De Gaulle government continues to maneuver intelligently, and if it draws nearer to the wishes of the French people, France ought normally to take a place in world politics that will be far more important than the size of her population might seem to justify. It would be wiser not to judge the future weight and power of France from the point of view of material potential, for other values always weigh heavily. That has been true for at least three centuries, and will doubtless continue to be true for a long time to come. Without Laval and Pétain, there could not have been the defeat of 1940 with all its horror. And with a truly French government—one that represents the French people and not international fascism—the peace of Europe will perhaps be assured.

What of relations between France and Britain? It must be admitted that the French and the English have never understood each other very well. In psychology and tradition, the score of miles that separate Calais from Dover make a wide ocean. While the English use Normandy, Brittany, and the Riviera as playgrounds, Frenchmen rarely go to Britain for their pleasure. They dread the climate, the language, and the casualness of the welcome. The two peoples can respect each other and carry on trade, and remember that they depend on each other in large measure for security, but temperamentally the Englishman seems more alien to the Frenchman than does any other European, be it Serb, Greek, or Norwegian. Moreover, the House of Lords and the Court, however they may charm the snobs of the Champs Elysées, seem archaic to the French masses. And to them, Albion still seems slightly perfidious. Nevertheless, friendship and alliance between the two countries is one of the prerequisites for a lasting peace in Europe.

As for the French attitude toward the United States, the two republics have a long tradition of friendship, and certain analogies of birth and growth. But the French have never forgotten that after President Woodrow Wilson had written a treaty with Premier Georges Clemenceau which promised to protect the French on their eastern frontier, he was treated by the Senate on his return as if he had simply been passing a few months in Paris and Versailles as a tourist. They remember too well that, having yielded the Rhine frontier, they found themselves without even a scrap of paper to ensure them against a new German invasion. They cannot help asking themselves whether the United States will ever be party to a real treaty, signed, registered, and executed. They do not know how this country's strange government functions or how far one can count on it.

To be sure, they see that the United States eventually gets into every European war, whether by its own choice or through the violent initiative of the Mikado, but they know also that they may expect to have time to die of their wounds, of hunger, or of cold before those unpredictable inhabitants of what seems to them a different planet—comfortable, well nourished, and overloaded with automobiles and electric refrigerators—can consider themselves finally equipped and in the mood for action. These few years of delay have twice cost dearly in lives, in suffering—and in Franco-American understanding.

Furthermore, although Washington was full of courtesy and kindness toward France throughout the First World War, the official attitude in this war has seemed changeable and hard. The United States has not welcomed refugees. In the last war refuge was never denied those who needed it, but in this one many Europeans have fallen into the hands of the Gestapo because a hesitant American consul could not decide to give him a visa. The French antifascists who have succeeded in coming over have not been given a very cordial reception, although the representatives of Vichy—even the ubiquitous M. Camille Chautemps—have been warmly welcomed and consulted at every turn. De Gaulle, who represented the French flag for every Paris workman and for every peasant from Normandy to Provence, was snubbed more than once, while the heroes who rallied to his once desperate cause were belittled as "the so-called Free French."

Yet some kind words have been spoken, and many boxes of powdered milk and vitamins have been distributed by the admirable Quakers. Also, the bright memory of the adoption of French orphans by American families in the last war has kept alive in France some faith in a generous and free America. But after this war there is

bound to be a deep cleavage between those who have lived through its turmoil in Europe and those who have only witnessed it from afar, however much their hearts may have been wrung with sympathy.

The French understand people like the Russians and the Yugoslavs, who are either at peace, or at war body and soul as a matter of life and death, instead of taking their time and remaining in some degree unconcerned when war comes to them. The French have always known that war is a serious affair. The pain of that day in 1871 when they saw the Germans marching through the streets of Paris made them fight like lions at Verdun half a century later; and if in the "phony" war they were persuaded by their Government and some pro-fascist officers not to take things too seriously, the months and years that followed made them realize again, and far more cruelly than ever before, what an invasion means. Most Americans will never understand that, and the French know they will not. For a generation at least, this difference will be a basic one. It will prevent the two countries from having more than a superficial—though doubtless useful—understanding.

Not so with the Yugoslavs, the Spanish Republicans, the Belgians, the Dutch, even the Danes. These people have been in the same prisons. They too have seen innocent hostages—their friends and neighbors—shot in their village graveyard after digging their own graves. Whether they were born south or north of some old frontier line within the sight of the Alps or on the Danube, whether they have dark or blond hair and complexion, the same expression will come over their faces when certain things are mentioned—things which Americans will know only vicariously, perhaps only from the adventures of the well-groomed hero or the platinum-blond heroine in a Hollywood picture.

The French will remain friendly toward the citizens and even the Government of the United States, but with the inner feeling that these are very far away, that one cannot hope to understand them, and that since the Americans live morally and geographically in a different world, it is better not to count on them. While there must be the best possible relations, one must never again risk one's own existence on the heads-or-tails deliberations of the United States Senate.

Owing to these impressions, the French will be disposed to consider carefully the two European countries that know how to think and act decisively—for evil, or for good. These countries are Germany and Russia. In the summer of 1939 Russia incurred the hostility and the

suspicion of France by the nonaggression pact with Germany. But subsequent events have made it clear to most of the French people that by that time the Soviets had no choice. Whether it is completely understood or not, the pact is by now ancient history, redeemed by the limitless bravery of the Russian people. The Soviet Union has accepted the sacrifice of millions of its soldiers and civilians to preserve its liberties, and has known how to make its decisions in time, to transfer its factories across distant mountain chains, to burn its farms and scorch the earth, to work and fight without respite. Furthermore, instead of despising France in the hour of her travail, Russia has known how to distinguish between traitors and heroes, between Laval and De Gaulle, between the general of Sedan and the Maginot Line and the faithful workers in the Underground.

Shortly after the French Committee of National Liberation was organized by the Fighting French in Algiers in June 1943, the Soviet Government sent it a large and carefully chosen delegation headed by one of the most influential personages of the Kremlin, who could ill be spared from the councils at Moscow. In so doing, Russia not only spoke but acted as if she considered France the key to the future of Europe.

The contacts made at that time brought fruit almost a year and a half later, within two months after the liberation of France: on December 10, 1944, General Charles de Gaulle signed a treaty of alliance at Moscow. With the signing of that treaty, which restored France to her rightful position as a first-rate power on the Continent, General de Gaulle stood revealed as a statesman of the first order.

Interestingly enough, the Moscow treaty was in the great French tradition of friendship with Russia. Théophile Delcassé negotiated a similar alliance with Czarist Russia shortly before the First World War. That tradition of friendship was abruptly suspended in 1934, when the assassination of French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou at Marseille interrupted the re-establishment of the Franco-Russian alliance and elevated Pierre Laval to a position where he could sabotage it.

Russia is France's most natural ally from the point of view of security, which is so precious to the French because they have so often been invaded. Laval was forced by the logic of events to complete the treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union shortly after Barthou's death, but unhappily the generals and the Government of France refused to invoke it in the spring of 1939. This refusal, the reason for which was presumed to be ideological, provided an opening for Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler's Foreign Minister. The ideo-

logical reason never did hold good for the people of France; it was valid only to the bourgeoisie, who disqualified themselves as Frenchmen under the New Order of Hitler-Laval. After the liberation, there was no longer any serious obstacle in France to a sound and complete agreement between the French Government and the Kremlin.

The other great Continental country which no Frenchman regards as unreal or remote is the terrible, ever threatening Germany. The feud between Germany and France has for many decades been the center of European wars, and now—in the twentieth century—of world war. Being at the center of the whirlpool is no pleasure for the French, who would like to have peace at practically any cost. The total destruction of Germany, no matter how desirable, offers no solution. Yet peace and security there must be, and a strong Europe in which Germans—not Germany—with their special talents should play a part.

What guarantee has France that the German Colossus, if it is permitted to live, will not be at her throat again in a few years? A treaty signed—or drafted and not signed, as in 1918—by the Anglo-Saxon powers would not strike a Frenchman as very impressive. Nor would some German Badoglio, sponsored by the Allied Military Government, reassure France very much. The France that is emerging from the struggle has been concerned about what type of government and social order Germany will have, and about the democratic or undemocratic attitude of the Germans in their activities. If the cartel system, which at present threatens the entire world, is maintained in Europe, the center of Europe will continue to be Berlin, and its moral code will be that of a pack of wolves. A socialized Germany is therefore as indispensable to French security as a socialized France. But France neither would nor could force a system of her own choosing on her bigger neighbor.

The only country that could possibly accomplish this is Germany's other neighbor, Russia. Fortunately, French and Russian interests do not conflict with regard to Germany. From the French point of view the new German state must have some sort of popular government, and the new French state must be led by men who realize that no truly popular government in any country in the world wants war. Any German government that will satisfy the people of Russia is practically certain to reassure the people of France, whatever its precise details. It is not that the French people resemble the Russians so much, but just that they know instinctively that any *people* is safe from any other *people*, and that the danger of modern wars comes only from new cartels, or old aristocracies and imperialism.

Will the French love the Germans, once the latter have a reasonable kind of government? At the present time or in the close future, that would be asking too much of the relatives of hostages. But working agreements might be effected. If the basic question of iron and coal distribution were settled and Lorraine and the Ruhr Valley were socialized, one of the major causes of European wars would be neutralized.

The German question disposed of, France should revive her traditional alliances with the countries that respect and cherish her, such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The murder of a Yugoslav King in Marseille in 1934, under the averted eyes of the French profascist police, was one of the signposts pointing to the fall of France.

Relations will be relatively easy with an Italy which has rid itself of all Badoglios, as a dog might scratch away its fleas. This holds even more true for Spain, once the Spanish people have come into their own again. The relations of the Mediterranean Latin countries should be very close. French influence in Spain might be of the utmost moment to the world at large; it might transform the old peninsula, which has been kept centuries behind the times by its Church, its monarchs, and its recent dictators, into a vital new region where trade and industry could develop under a more humane and progressive social system.

Spain is the geographical link between Europe and Africa, its southernmost tip divided by only a few miles of smooth blue water from Ceuta on the African coast. The railway that runs from Paris through Biarritz to Madrid should be widened and improved, then extended southward to the coast. From there, travelers and merchandise could be ferried across a few easy miles by sea to a North African train, thence to follow the line of the coast southwestward to Dakar, the harbor city on the bulge, the outermost point of the western shore fronting the Americas.

This intercontinental line from Paris to Dakar ought also to extend northeast to Moscow, and from Moscow to Vladivostok, an hour or two by plane from Yokohama. Thus it would cross the three old continents, joining by rail—with the one short transshipment by water—the maritime provinces adjacent to Manchuria, Korea, and North China with the tip of Equatorial Africa that faces the New World!

The French role in the future of Europe is obviously destined to be greater than ever. France's re-emergence has been, of course, in sharp contrast to the confusion and aimlessness attending the corresponding period in Italy. Though one need not necessarily subscribe to the great-man or the indispensable-man theory, the difference seems

to lie in the quality of the men both countries have produced. Twenty-five years of Fascism must have left their mark on the Italian soul. Whatever has happened in France, the spirit of the French Revolution and the traditional sense of liberty have not altogether died out.

General de Gaulle re-established France in the council of nations. Upon his return from Moscow, his prestige was at an all-time high. At that moment his opportunities were as great as the challenges he would meet. If he proved able to achieve a golden mean of policy in the face of contending social forces, he would go down in history as a truly great man. After this superb achievement in the field of foreign policy, he still had to pursue a course which would save the French Government from the mistakes of the Greek Government of George Papandrou and those of Hubert Pierlot's Belgian Government. If the domestic policies he established in 1944 with regard to the control of France's public utilities were any portent, De Gaulle had learned from those mistakes. Whatever his future course, it was by that time clear that De Gaullism had emerged as a dynamic political principle, and that its creator had discerned the signs of the times.

11. *The Role of the Churches*

BY ALL ODDS the saddest chapter in European history during the past decade has been the complete moral and practical failure of organized religion. This is of course particularly true in Germany. The problem of Europe's religious crisis is part of a larger world situation, and even though its solution will prove very difficult, it will have to be faced. After the destruction of Nazism, the religious question must also be resolved by a house-cleaning. The men responsible for the moral debacle of the past two decades must not be left secure in their positions merely because we are tempted to think of the clergy as inviolable. The need for cleaning house is not restricted merely to those "German Christians" who deliberately used their pulpits as branch offices of Dr. Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda. The theologians who used their chairs in the universities to educate the youth of Germany to the idea of racialism, and to hate other nations in the name of the Lord, must also be dealt with. And besides these gentry, there is the even more difficult question of those Catholic priests and bishops who supported the Nazis openly, particularly in the first years of Hitlerism. That support lasted until 1935.

A purge is not the answer here. The Churches will have to abstain from political action, open or covert. There must never again be any German Center party (the party of political Roman Catholicism taking its directives from abroad). That party had as one of its leaders Franz von Papen, who, incidentally, is still being mentioned in certain quarters as "the coming man." Von Papen could never have played the role he did if the Center party had not existed. The Concordat between Hitler and the Pope was made possible only because of political pressure inside Germany on the part of the Center party.

Briefly, political religious parties must be abolished in postwar Germany. There should be complete freedom of religion, but also a

complete separation of Church and State. This complete separation is necessary because the German Protestant Church was for several decades the State Church. This was particularly true in Prussia, and since state policy under the Hohenzollerns was reactionary, Protestantism was also reactionary, nor did it change under the Weimar Republic. No stretch of the imagination is needed to understand that the Protestant leaders will exercise a tremendous and reactionary influence upon the formation of the new Germany after Hitler's removal. A German is not necessarily a democrat because he is against Adolf Hitler.

The majority of Germany's anti-Nazi leaders in both the Protestant Churches and the Roman Church are certainly not democrats. Therefore it is essential that with the separation of Church and State the Churches should limit themselves to their own domain and not again arrogate to themselves political and educational functions which do not belong to them.

The attitude of German Protestantism toward fascism differed considerably from that of the Roman Catholic Church. First of all, the Protestant Churches everywhere in the world, including Germany, were not so well organized. In Germany, Protestantism included the Lutheran Church, the Reformed Church, the Free Religious Church, and a dozen other organizations. All these were Protestant denominations, but they had no organizational unity. For instance, the Southern Protestant Church, particularly in Württemberg, underwent a much more independent development than did the Evangelical State Church of Prussia, which since the beginning of the nineteenth century had sold itself, body and soul, to the Hohenzollerns and was always the home of reaction. In the eighties and nineties of the last century the great preacher Adolf Stoecker, who was Protestant father confessor to Wilhelm II, preached racial anti-Semitism and was a prototype of the modern Nazis. On the other hand, thanks to the decentralization of Protestantism, there were in Germany quite a number of pastors and theologians who maintained their independence of thinking. German Catholicism, by contrast, both before and particularly under Hitler, loyally followed the political and diplomatic instructions of the Vatican, which meant that its representatives supported Hitler as long as it served the policy of the Vatican to do so.

German Protestantism, lacking so unified a policy and confronted by the moral crisis of Adolf Hitler and Nazism, split. One portion openly put itself at the disposal of Hitler and collaborated without protest. Another and quite substantial part immediately took a sharp

position against Nazism. It is thanks to this section of German Protestantism that Hitler did not win his struggle against the Church. His success lay in splitting Protestantism; but those of the Protestant clergymen and theologians who became enemies of Nazism became leaders in centers of resistance which went beyond the purely ecclesiastical and took political forms.

The number of the Protestant clergy which did take a position against Nazism was not larger than 30 per cent. Another 30 per cent of Protestant leaders went over to Hitler openly; the rest were divided among neutrals, indifferents, halfhearted Hitler followers, and halfhearted opponents.

So far as the future is concerned, the fact that one section of the Protestant Church opposed Nazism in much sharper fashion than did the Catholic Church generally cannot offset the truth that the Protestant leaders, particularly in North Germany, were, as a matter of principle and on the basis of a long tradition, ultranationalistically inclined.

The greater number of the Protestant clergy who had already been officiating during the monarchy and who were left by the Republic in their old pulpits sabotaged the Weimar Republic from the very moment of its birth. They quickly became propagandists for all nationalist movements, such as the Free Corps and the Steel Helmets. Similarly, the theologians and their universities were nationalist. The theological University of Marburg had been a center of reaction and nationalism since 1918. The students of Marburg, inspired by their professors, were the first to murder German workers methodically, in 1919.

This hatred of everything democratic and progressive was, of course, the thing which led to the typically Nazi development of the "German Christians." This movement was born in 1930 and sprang from among the ranks of Hugenberg Steel Helmets, whose leaders included a great number of Protestant clergy and professors. Their intention was to centralize German Protestantism on a nationalistic basis. When the Nazis learned of the intentions of the Steel Helmet Protestants, they decided to act in the same sense. Toward the end of 1930, two sons of the Kaiser, Eitel Friedrich and Prince Auwi, together with Goebbels, Wilhelm Kube, and a number of pastors who were members of the Nazi party, founded the Glaubensbewegung deutscher Christen, which can be best translated "Believers' Movement of German Christians."

The leader of the movement was Pastor Joachim Hossenfelder. In 1932, shortly before Hindenburg called him to office, Hitler gave the

movement a shorter and more effective name, "German Christians." This movement, organized by the Nazi party, absorbed in 1933 all similar movements, particularly that first founded by the Steel Helmets. Openly subsidized and supported by the Nazi state, the "German Christians" made a determined effort to take over the entire Protestant Church. Under the impact of their terrific organizational and propaganda effort, the movement almost succeeded in achieving control. Although in 1939 non-Nazi pastors created the Pastors' Emergency League, the "German Christians" succeeded in making an Army chaplain, Ludwig Müller, National Bishop of Germany and State Bishop of Prussia.

Müller was a Nazi. He simply replaced the Cross by the swastika. An Army chaplain during the First World War, he continued during the days of the Weimar Republic as chaplain of the Königsberg garrison in East Prussia. Here he distinguished himself immediately by his nationalist sermons, in which he demanded the extermination of Poland and a war of revenge against the world. He became a protégé of Werner von Blomberg during the latter's command at Königsberg. When Blomberg, as Hitler's War Minister, remembered Müller, he recommended him to Hitler, and the latter, delighted by Müller's attitude, made him his representative in all Church questions.

In 1933, independently of those Protestants who first fought Hitler in the Pastors' Emergency League and who later, under the leadership of Martin Niemöller, Karl Barth, Dr. Otto Dibelius, and others founded the Confessional Church, there appeared a third group which became known as the Third Confession. During the past ten years its membership has varied between 300,000 and 500,000.

The Third Confession is, of course, nothing more than an anti-Christian grouping of the various heathen bunds whose leaders are men like Alfred Rosenberg and Professor Otto Hauer. The greatest group within the Third Confession is the Nordic Movement of Faith. The followers of the Third Confession, who are particularly strong in Thuringia, reject not only the Old Testament but also the New Testament. One section declares Jesus to be a German Aryan; another section rejects Jesus, Aryan or non-Aryan, and engages in an open Wotan cult. The Third Confession has in its membership hundreds of Protestant clergy, particularly in Thuringia, although the movement has remained small in comparison to the "German Christians" and the Confessional Church.

It is interesting that the Aryan question became an open issue within the Protestant Churches as early as 1933. In September 1933 the Prus-

sian Synod decided that no non-Aryan could be a member of the Protestant clergy. At that time the Prussian Synod, representing German Protestantism, was composed of 229 members. Only 75 protested against the decision and withdrew from the synod. But those of the Protestant clergy who fought the "Aryan paragraph" were not against the Nazis because the Nazis were anti-Semites. They were opposed not to the persecution of the Jews, but to the idea that the State might interfere with the prerogatives of the Church. The opinion of the majority of the German Protestant clergy with regard to the Aryan question may be summarized by saying that they decided that "persecution of the Jews is up to the State and not to the Church."

Other Protestant clergy and theologians, particularly Karl Barth and the Protestant Bishop Theophil Wurm of Württemberg, did object on ethical grounds. They took the attitude that since Christianity also recognized the Old Testament and since the prophets and Jesus and his disciples had been Jews, Protestantism could not admit anti-Semitism. In 1928 Karl Barth, a Swiss theologian teaching in Bonn, returned to Switzerland. Life had been made unbearable for him in Germany. Following the Munich Conference of 1938, Barth wrote an open letter from Basel, placing himself squarely on the side of Czechoslovakia. This enraged the Nazis, and the official organ of German Protestantism, the *Deutsche Evangelische Korrespondenz*, to such an extent that it printed in answer: "We can characterize the letter of Professor Barth only as infamous war-baiting and blasphemy of the name of God and Christ. Barth has torn away all his bridges to Germany and also to German Protestantism. One can realize only with deep shame that this man, who misuses the holy name of Christ in such a way, is a professor of theology."¹

Pastor Niemöller is a pretty fair example of what German Protestantism has been like for a decade or more. Niemöller became the leader of the Confessional Church because he had the courage to preach against Nazi culture. But the relations of this former U-boat commander to the German Army and other reactionary groups must not be forgotten. He preached in Berlin's most fashionable suburb, Dahlem, where the generals, the bankers, and the industrialists had their villas. Never a democrat and always a Pan-German, he was no more than a nationalist with a conscience. Arrested in July 1937, and sentenced in February 1938 to seven months in prison, he was held by the authorities to have served his sentence during the time he was under arrest. He left the prison, but only to be thrown into a concentration camp. He is there today. When war broke out he volunteered, but

Hitler rejected the offer, realizing clearly that Niemöller might become the symbol not only of a nationalist camarilla opposing the Nazis, but also of a possible democratic opposition.

Long before the outbreak of the war the other leader of the Protestant resistance movement, Dr. Otto Dibelius, had been forced to leave the pulpit. He is a courageous man and, like Niemöller, an ardent Pan-German who disagrees with Hitler's methods but not with his objectives.

Altogether, the record of German Protestantism as a moral force is very dismal indeed, and if it is not rebuilt from top to bottom, German Protestantism cannot be reckoned with as either an educational or a moral force in immediate postwar Germany.

The same holds true of German Catholicism. The record of the official German Roman Catholic Church is every bit as dismal as that of the Protestant Church. Its responsibility is as great, or greater, since it was a politically stronger organization and more powerful than Protestantism. In order to understand the role German Catholicism has played in the past, it is necessary to distinguish between two concepts, religion and politics. When Hitler came to power, the Catholics in Germany numbered approximately 20,000,000. These 20,000,000 persons were not only members of the same Church, but they were also politically organized, for the most part in the Center party.

The Center party dominated the political life of the Weimar Republic to an extent which today has been more or less forgotten. Its members sat in all the Cabinets of the Reich and of Prussia, and between 1919 and 1933 no less than seven Catholic leaders became Chancellors or Vice-Chancellors. Under their leadership the Republic gradually swung from the Left to the Right, and from a foreign policy of reconciliation to one of resistance and secret rearmament. Although there were Right and Left wings within the Center party, a considerable number of the Catholic politicians, and with them the Catholic industrialists from the Rhineland, Bavaria, and Silesia, were organized both in the reactionary Bavarian People's party and in the German National party of Alfred Hugenberg, whose alliance with Hitler took place at an early stage. And from them sprang the first financial backers of the Hitler party, as for instance the Association of Bavarian Industrialists, which was almost completely under Catholic influence and whose President, Dr. Alfred Kuhlo, collected funds for the Nazis as early as 1922.

In the years prior to Hitler's advent to power the political promo-

tion of the Nazi movement had nothing to do with the fact that strong protests emanating from Catholic clerical circles were raised against the antireligious attitude of the National Socialist party. This was the only point in Hitler's entire program on which there was not unanimous agreement. The formation of the Hitler government had been the work of Franz von Papen, who was and still is the leader of the Right wing of Catholic politics in Germany. One of the greatest Catholic authorities of our time, the French historian Robert d'Harcourt, in his impartial book *The German Catholics* describes the attitude of the Catholic reactionaries in Germany when Hitler came to power in the following terms: "The Right wing, undoubtedly the more powerful, made up of Catholic conservatives, not only displayed no horror at the Nazi triumph but gave almost at once an impression of drifting towards the victorious party. The rapidity of this drift . . . will be a subject of astonishment for the historian of these decisive years."²

But it was not merely the Right wing. The prelate Ludwig Kaas, leader of the German Center party and representing the moderate trend, was the first to appeal to the German Catholics, in March 1933, to abandon all opposition against the new masters of Germany. He had good reasons for this demand, for he had been called to the Vatican to discuss with Cardinal Secretary Pacelli—today Pope Pius XII—the preliminaries for the conclusion of a Concordat with Hitler Germany.

The actual negotiations for the Concordat began on April 9, 1933, when Vice-Chancellor von Papen arrived in Rome and submitted Hitler's suggestions to the Pope. Catholic politicians were little perturbed over the fact that while they were negotiating the victorious Nazis in the Reich were taking measures against Catholics and Catholic priests who were not inclined to suppress their feelings toward Nazism. The well-being of an isolated number of Catholics was not so important. What actually was at stake was revealed by Von Papen, who was not merely Vice-Chancellor but Papal Chamberlain (a position he still holds), in a speech he made on June 11, 1933, before the Catholic Apprentices' Organizations (Katholische Gesellenvereine) at Munich. The Apprentices' Organizations were rather on the Left wing of the Center party and the Bavarian People's party, and therefore it had become necessary to make them realize the intentions of political Roman Catholicism and the Vatican toward the Hitler regime.

"Hitler," Von Papen declared, "will re-establish the social order on the basis of the estates of the realm (Ständestaat). This is the order from all liberal or democratic party forms. Therefore the new regime,

which is antiliberal and antidemocratic, must enjoy our complete and unrestricted confidence."

Revealing that internal German affairs were not alone at stake in the great game Catholicism was playing with Nazism, Von Papen concluded: "Today, and maybe never again, the hour of German history has come to pave the way for the re-establishment of the social order in Europe, and to help the European mission of the Reich to final victory." This sounded more like a declaration of war.

At the beginning of July 1933, negotiations for the Concordat seemed to have come to a halt, particularly since the collisions between Catholics and Nazis in the Reich were constantly increasing. Intervention had to come from above. Archbishop Jacobus von Hauck of Bamberg issued an order to the Catholic press, over which he had full power, to abandon all open or concealed attacks against Hitler and support "wholeheartedly the spiritual and economic resurrection of Germany." And Archbishop Conrad Gröber of Freiburg strictly forbade his clergy any form of criticism and any mention of persecutions of Catholics by the Nazis. Then he went to Rome to participate in the negotiations for the Concordat. On July 6, Hitler—who was just as anxious as the Vatican to conclude the Concordat—sent Ministerial Counselor Buttman to Rome in his private plane.

Everything went smoothly. On July 20 a Vatican communiqué informed an astonished world that the Concordat had been signed. A splendid reception took place at the Vatican, culminating in the decoration of the happy Von Papen with the Grand Cross of the Order of Pius. Ministerial Counselor Rudolf Hermann Buttman received an autographed picture of the Pope. Everywhere in Germany the Catholics arranged jubilant festivities. In the Roman Catholic Cathedral of Berlin the "Te Deum" was sung. There was great rejoicing and happiness all over the country.

The political significance of the Concordat was truly extraordinary. Not quite six months had passed since Hitler had come to power. The governments of the European powers looked upon the new regime with the utmost suspicion. Until the Vatican concluded a treaty with him, Hitler had been considered an adventurer with whom it was best not to have any dealings. "The Vatican was the first state which, by consenting to treat with Hitler, had legalized his signature,"⁸ writes Robert d'Harcourt. Indeed, from now on Hitler would have to be treated as an equal.

So far as effectuating the religious content of the treaty went, both the German Catholics and the Vatican were much disillusioned as

time passed. From a political point of view, however, the pact proved to be of great advantage. The Catholic comments on the Concordat amply justify this statement. In the August 13, 1933, issue of one of the most influential German Catholic periodicals, *Die schönere Zukunft*, Monsignor Georg Messner wrote: "Now liberalism has also been overcome and abolished by official decree. A new era has begun."

In the *Kölnische Zeitung* of July 24, 1933, Cardinal Bertram, president of the Bishops' Conference of Fulda, thanked Hitler in an open letter for his understanding attitude toward Catholicism. At the same time the *Augsburger Postzeitung* wrote a jubilant hymn on Hitler: "Democracy is essentially hostile to Christianity; but the totalitarian state comes close to Christianity's fundamental concepts."⁴ At the end of July 1933, the *Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung* went a step further: "The best Catholic minds, particularly among the youth, must not be content with a simple and inadequate adaptation, but must devote themselves with passion to the historic task of National Socialism."⁵ The most open statement came from Papal Chamberlain von Papen's announcement in a speech delivered at Gleiwitz: "The Third Reich is the first power in the world not only to recognize but to translate into practice the high principles of the Papacy."⁶

For the sake of this high principle the Center party, the Bavarian People's party, and all other Catholic political and social organizations had been voluntarily dissolved, even before the Concordat was signed. Was this a tactical step, or did it not rather indicate a fundamental willingness to amalgamate completely with National Socialism in order to attain a certain political aim?

In a sensational radio speech on June 15, 1933, Von Papen, then just back from Rome, presented the following arguments for the dissolution of his own party: "Hitlerism is a Christian countermovement against the spirit of the French Revolution of 1789. We therefore stand at the beginning of a Christian Revolution." Compliance with the decree ordering the dissolution of the Center party—signed, among others, by Prelate Kaas and Heinrich Brüning—was nothing but a prostration to the "new legal order," demanded of all Catholics.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Concordat the religious persecution in Germany started again with increased violence, but political Catholicism continued to support the Hitler regime, especially when the Nazis needed and demanded this support. When, in November 1933, Hitler made his spectacular break with the League of Nations, he demanded a "plebiscite" to approve this step. The Bavarian bishops, although they disapproved of the religious persecutions, ad-

dressed an official proclamation to German Catholics asking them to sanction Germany's resignation from the League: "The Catholics will once more declare their fidelity toward their fatherland and their full agreement with the large views and vigorous efforts of the Führer to save the German people from the horrors of a new war and the atrocities of Bolshevism."

The year 1934 gave definite proof that Hitler had no intention whatsoever of supporting religious Catholicism in Germany. Even independent political or cultural movements, such as the Catholic Action, were to him undesirable. Catholic Action was smothered, together with the other victims, in the blood purge of June 30, 1934. But even this fact disturbed neither the Vatican nor the wirepullers of political Catholicism in Germany, for the Saar plebiscite was nearing.

The Saar population was to a large extent Catholic. It would have been easy to persuade them to adopt a neutral attitude and thus strike a blow at Hitlerism. But it was not Hitler the Church feared so much as the spirit of 1789. Was this not the moment to wipe out its last traces, not only in Germany but perhaps in all of Europe? Hitler had to be supported no matter what the price; consequently the Bishops of Trier and Speyer, who were in charge of the Catholics in the Saar region, issued an official proclamation a few days before the plebiscite asking the Saarlanders to vote 100 per cent in favor of Hitler. They did so, and thus Hitler put the Catholic Saar in his pocket.

The Nazis showed little gratitude. The wave of Catholic arrests increased. Exhibition trials of priests, monks, and nuns became popular. Sincere Catholics turned to their leaders and appealed for help. But the leaders themselves, like the diplomats in the Vatican, were helpless and had no answer. Was it possible that they had deceived themselves about Hitler's historic mission?

At that moment the Spanish Civil War broke out, and Hitler, with his Italian Fascist ally, intervened from the very first day. In August 1936 the German bishops gathered at Fulda for their annual conference. On August 26 they published their Pastoral. It was a single jubilant cry over the military intervention of Nazism and Fascism. "May our Führer, strengthened by the faithful co-operation of all citizens, succeed with God's help in carrying through this work with a firm and unshakable hand." ⁷ They asked Hitler to "bury the past and accept [their] co-operation in fighting the ever-increasing threat of world Bolshevism which shows its sinister hands in Spain, Russia, and Mexico." ⁸

Finally, in the Christmas Pastoral of the same year, Hitler was urgently implored to intervene in Spain in a more forceful manner: "As Catholics we are ready, in spite of the mistrust shown toward us, to give to the state what belongs to it, and to support the Führer in his struggle against Bolshevism and in his other tasks."⁹ The "other tasks" were the preparations for the assault on Europe and the world. The leaders of political Catholicism in Germany knew of them and approved them. German Catholic bishops have repeatedly and explicitly endorsed the German conquest of Austria and Alsace-Lorraine and the expansionist claims of Pan-Germans. Here, too, whatever quarrel existed was merely over the means to the end and not over the end itself.

Political Catholicism in Austria after the First World War was continuously reactionary, fascist-minded, and Pan-German. Monsignor Ignaz Seipel, head of the Austrian state from 1922 until his death in 1932, was in favor of the Anschluss, provided that Germany was not governed by Social-Democrats. Therefore in 1929, when there was a definite turn to the Right in Germany, he fervently advocated the "Zoll-Union" with Germany. He was the founder of the Heimwehr in the twenties, the first full-fledged fascist army of Central Europe.

His successor, Engelbert Dollfuss, speeded up the fascist trend in Austria, and did so with the blessings of the Vatican. Before the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 27, 1932, Dollfuss announced: "Austria is working out a new constitution. In this she will be guided by the principles laid down by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical 'Quadragesimo Anno.'" This encyclical advocated the corporate state. Dollfuss tried hard to come to terms with Hitler; he negotiated for months in 1933 and 1934 with Theodor Habicht, the representative of Hitler. But Hitler hated Dollfuss because of his admiration for Mussolini.

Then came Kurt von Schuschnigg. Son of an Austrian army officer, he was born into a Pan-German, pro-Hapsburg family, and studied under the Jesuits at Stella Matutina College in Vorarlberg. In 1934, in his first press conference as Chancellor after the assassination of Dollfuss he said: "We believe it impossible to restore parliamentary democracy in Austria."¹⁰ The famous Catholic historian William Teeling in his book *Crisis for Christianity* wrote: "He was much more German-minded than Dollfuss . . . he failed to continue the cry of 'Austria for the Austrians' . . . he always stressed the German qualities and the German mission of Austria and there he often

played into the hands of the Nazis, who made full use of this point of view.”¹¹

Schuschnigg's chief adviser in all home and foreign affairs—unofficially, of course—was Cardinal Innitzer of Austria. In honor of Hitler's entry into Vienna on March 12, 1938, Innitzer ordered the pealing of the church bells. Some days later he published a proclamation, signed by him and all other Austrian archbishops and bishops. This proclamation asked the Austrian people to support the Greater Germany and its Führer, “whose struggle against communism and for the power, honor, and unity of Germany corresponds to the voice of Divine Providence.”¹² Former *New York Times* correspondent G. E. R. Gedye says in his book *Betrayal in Central Europe*:

Cardinal . . . Innitzer and many of his Austrian Bishops cruelly stabbed their German co-religionists in the back at the height of the struggle. . . . In Austria “the spittle-lickers to the Nazis” was for a time one of the mildest epithets used by Catholics about their own leaders. . . . The higher Catholic clergy have in the main escaped the persecution . . . making, to their eternal shame, common cause with the invader. Over the Cathedral of St. Stephen floats for all to see the flag of surrender and the badge of their own contumely.¹³

Today the Catholic political leaders in Germany and the Vatican are through with Hitler and his Nazis, of course, but they are not at all through with fascism. They are preparing for a regime in and around Germany that will be ruled by Catholic politics. They have several plans—depending upon the situation at the end of the war. The most cherished idea is the revival of the Holy Roman Empire, with Germany and Austria united and Vienna as the capital. The alternative plan is to divide Germany, to split up South and parts of West Germany to unite them with Austria, in order to create a strong Catholic Germanic state—Prussia excluded.

If all that fails, the Vatican is advocating a separated Austria ruled either by the Hapsburgs or people like Seipel, Dollfuss, Schuschnigg. Concerning Germany, the Vatican and the reactionary Catholic leaders in Germany are offering a German Cardinal as peacemaker and future ruler, complete with a revived Center party. Von Papen, who still is the most active *Verbindungsmann* between the Pan-Germans and the Vatican, is proposing Cardinal von Faulhaber of Munich. Faulhaber has always been a reactionary, but at the same time never a friend of the Nazis.

Following the publication on January 15, 1944, of a report by the Foreign Policy Association on the foreign policy of the Vatican,

written by Sherman S. Hayden, a lively controversy developed as to whether or not Vatican policy had been profascist up to that point. The publication of the report led also to a number of savage attacks by the Soviet press on the foreign policy of the Vatican as well as on the personality of Pius XII. These attacks were in the form of a commentary upon Hayden's report, which had stated in its conclusion that "the view that the Pope is at heart a Fascist and wishes to see the triumph of modern dictatorships, while a long sequence of superficial evidence can be constructed to support it, proves to be without foundation in fact. At the same time, he is not a supporter of democracy but is just what he claims to be—indifferent to political forms. . . ." ¹⁴ The Soviet press presented many arguments which were in contradiction to the conclusions arrived at in this report but which were not in contradiction to the facts contained in it.

The timing of the Russian attacks was quite obviously connected with the intervention of Vatican diplomacy in the Russo-Polish boundary dispute, with Polish Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski in Washington and Apostolic Delegate Amleto Giovanni Cicognani jointly advising the Polish Catholic clergy in this country to organize pressure among Americans of Polish descent. This program finally resulted in open threats that the Polish vote would go against President Roosevelt if he did not support Polish claims against Russia.

Mr. Hayden made a point of the fact that Mr. Roosevelt's personal diplomacy in sending Myron Taylor to the Vatican had failed, since it did not succeed in getting the Vatican to declare the Allied war against Germany a just one. Further than that, as late as June 13, 1943, the Pope warned 25,000 Italian workers not to revolt in order to come to the aid of the Allied Armies, by way of saying: "Salvation does not lie in revolution . . . a revolution which proceeds from injustice and civil insubordination." ¹⁵

Perhaps the argument as to whether or not the Vatican has pursued a fascist policy during the past twenty-five years is best settled by reviewing a number of the significant dates in that policy:

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|----------------|--|
| 1923, January | Cardinal Gasparri, the Pope's Secretary of State, makes a secret deal with Mussolini to save the Bank of Rome. This bank was controlled by Catholics, and the Holy See and Vatican prelates in part entrusted their funds to it. Mussolini saved the bank from bankruptcy. |
| 1923, February | Conversations between the Vatican and the Japanese Government to establish diplomatic relations. |
| 1926, October | Cardinal Merry del Val, Pontifical Legate of the centen- |

- nial of Saint Francis in Assisi, states: "My thanks also go to Mussolini . . . who with a clear insight into reality has wished and wishes Religion to be respected, honored, practised. Visibly protected by God, he has wisely improved the fortunes of the Nation, increasing its prestige throughout the world." ¹⁶
- 1926, December Pius XI in his New Year's address calls Mussolini "the man sent by Providence."
- 1929, November Concordat and Lateran Accord between the Vatican and Mussolini.
- 1930, June Pius XI orders that membership in the Catholic Action is not to be considered an obstacle to membership in the Italian Fascist party.
- 1930, September The Vatican announces that Catholic university professors may take Fascist oaths.
- 1931, June Pius XI in his Encyclical "Non abbiamo bisogno" states: "We preserve and shall preserve memory and perennial gratitude for what has been done in Italy for the benefit of religion, even though not less and perhaps greater was the benefit derived by the [Fascist] party and the [Fascist] regime. . . . We have not meant to condemn the party and the regime as such." ¹⁷
- 1931, August *Osservatore Romano* explains that Catholic university professors can sign an oath to the Fascist regime because "Fascist regime" means "government of the state," a state which might also be non-Fascist.
- 1933, July The Concordat between the Vatican and Hitler Germany signed by Cardinal Pacelli and Franz von Papen.
- 1933, July Von Papen becomes Papal Chamberlain, is awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of Pius XI, and speaks of the Concordat (see page 218).
- 1933, September Ratification of the Concordat. The Vatican and the Nazi Government deny emphatically that the Pope's disapproval of Hitler's policies caused delay in ratification.
- 1933, September The first Apostolic Delegate, the Most Reverend Paul Marella, arrives in Tokyo.
- 1935, January The German bishops of Trier and Speyer issue an official proclamation asking the people of the Saar to vote 100 per cent in favor of Hitler. This proclamation decided the fate of the Saar.
- 1935, October Cardinal Arthur Hinsley, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, states in defense of the friendly attitude assumed by the Vatican toward Fascism in its war against Ethiopia: "While I do not in principle approve of Fascism, I do say that if Fascism goes under in Italy, then nothing

- can save the country from chaos. With it God's business, too, will go under."
- 1936, May Pius XI praises the Ethiopian War and says in an address: "We feel the need of partaking in the triumphant joy of an entire great and good people over a peace which, it is hoped and intended, will be an effective contribution and prelude to the true peace in Europe and the world."¹⁸
- 1936, August After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the first protests of the Vatican against the Loyalists, the German Catholic bishops gather at Fulda and with the approval of the Pope publish a Pastoral letter asking that the German Catholics back Hitler fully in his intervention in Spain.
- 1936, October *Civiltà Cattolica* of Rome, a periodical edited by Jesuits whose chief editor is appointed by the Pope, writes about the Jewish problem: "Two facts which appear contradictory are to be found together among the Jews scattered in the modern world: their control of moneys and their preponderance in Socialism and Communism." The Jews, therefore, at least many of them, "constitute a serious and permanent danger to society. . . . Even today a way ought to be found to render the Jews innocuous, as the Church succeeded in doing in the Middle Ages, with means more suitable to modern conditions and without persecutions."
- 1937, January German Catholic bishops in a New Year's message pledge aid to Hitler in Europe's drive against the Red menace.¹⁹
- 1937, June *Civiltà Cattolica* discusses Zionism, and characterizes the Jews as "foxy profiteers, who penetrate into all international organizations and especially in two of them, Freemasonry and the League of Nations." The article concludes by saying that "a suitable way ought to be found to change their wicked mentality."
- 1937 Cardinal Pacelli goes to Paris and confers with Yvon Delbos, French Foreign Minister, to urge that France give aid to Franco Spain.
- 1937, July *Civiltà Cattolica* writes about the Jewish problem: "It is necessary to limit relations between Christians and (without having recourse to anti-Semitism) to raise a barrier against the twofold perturbing Jewish preponderance, the materialistic-financial and the revolutionary preponderance."
- 1938, April *Civiltà Cattolica* writes about Palestine that the best solution would be to force the Jews to evacuate Palestine

- again. There could be no other solution "than that traditionally adopted by the Popes"—that is to say, "Charity without persecution and prudence with suitable provisions, such as a form of segregation and identification suited to the time, or in a word, the kind of hospitality and civil relations such as are used with foreigners."
- 1938, July *Civiltà Cattolica* writes that the Hungarian laws of 1922 restricting Jewish activities are "fully justified."
- 1938, August Pius XI sends Franco his Apostolic blessings.
- 1938, December In his Christmas message the Pope says about Mussolini and the Fascist regime: "We say loudly that after God, our appreciation and thanks go to the very high persons—we mean the very noble sovereign and his incomparable minister—to whom it is due if the so important and beneficial work [the Lateran agreements of 1929] could be crowned with a good ending and happy success."²⁰
- 1939, April After invasion and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by Hitler, the new Pope Pius XII recognizes at once the independence of Slovakia which under the Reverend Josef Tiso has become a full-fledged fascist state.
- 1939, June Pius XII greets at the Vatican 3000 Franco soldiers led by Ramón Serrano Suñer and tells them: "Love of religion . . . has brought you to the triumph of the Christian ideal . . . you are the defenders of the Faith and of civilization."²¹
- 1939, June Pius XII urges the British Government to call a four-power conference (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy) to settle European affairs. Russia, in the opinion of the Vatican, should be excluded from the conference.
- 1939, July Monsignor William F. O'Shea is appointed Apostolic Vicar of Heijo, Korea.
- 1939, July Cardinal Gasparri arrives in the United States to prepare the juridical status for the possible opening of diplomatic relations between Washington and the Vatican.
- 1939, December Pius XII greets the Italian King and Queen at the Vatican and calls the King the "King-Emperor," adding that "Italy, always vigilant and strong under the august and wise hand of the King-Emperor of Ethiopia and the far-seeing guidance of her rulers, remains peaceful in civil life in concord of spirit . . . and in the solemn rites of the Catholic religion."²²
- In returning the visit, at the Quirinal Palace the Pope praises "the glorious dynasty of Savoy, crowned by its saints and its blessed." He calls Mussolini "the illustrious Chief of the Government."²³

- 1940, February President Roosevelt sends Myron Taylor as Special Envoy to the Vatican. In 1936 Taylor had said that "the whole world has been forced to admire the successes of Premier Mussolini in disciplining the nation."²⁴ He praised the conquest of Ethiopia. It is also said that Taylor "was personally acquainted with many important personages in the Roman Catholic hierarchy and with persons prominent in the Italian government."²⁵
- 1940, June Thirty Italian bishops send telegrams to Mussolini urging him "to crown the unfailing victory of our Army by planting the Italian flag over the Holy Sepulchre."²⁶ This was a few days after Mussolini had attacked France.
- 1940, July Three weeks after Pétain assumed power, the Pope advises Catholics to aid in the "national restoration." Pétain's national restoration meant the abolition of the French Republic and all its institutions.
- 1940, July *Civiltà Cattolica* carries a message to the Italian youth to "carry out their duties with the loyalty proper to citizens and soldiers. Catholic youth, mindful of the heroism and the spirit of sacrifice of the last war, will give proof of the same heroism in its task of assuring prosperity to this nation, the center of Catholic faith and civilization."
- 1940, August After several meetings with the French Cardinals, the Vatican concludes an agreement with Vichy which resembles a concordat. All laws and regulations of the French Republic restricting the power of the Church, especially in the field of education, are abolished.
- 1941, January French Cardinal Gerlier confers with the Vatican in Rome in behalf of Pétain, who asks for the open approval of the Pope.
- 1941, February The French archbishops, after receiving a message from Pius XII, issue a proclamation officially backing the Vichy regime.
- 1941, March Pius XII receives the Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, and concludes an agreement with the Japanese Government concerning the Japanese Catholics.
- 1942, March An official Japanese mission arrives at the Vatican. The first Japanese Ambassador to the Vatican, Ken Harada, is nominated.
- 1942, March Archbishop Francis J. Spellman of New York, holding the Catholic bicentennial mass, defends the Vatican-Japanese relations: "... the Holy Father must be impartial. . . . The Holy See must accept the envoys who choose to make their contacts with the Vatican."²⁷

- 1942, September Myron Taylor returns to the Vatican as President Roosevelt's personal representative. After having seen the Pope, he confers with Spanish officials and with Antonio Salazar of Portugal.
- 1943, April The *Catholic Herald*, official organ of British Roman Catholics, says that Pius XII refuses to approve the cause of the United Nations: "The endeavor of the United Nations, and more especially of the United States, whose President undoubtedly holds the present Supreme Pontiff in very high regard, has been throughout to persuade the Pope that the interests of the world are bound up with an Allied victory and, therefore, obtain the Pope's openly expressed moral approbation of the Allied cause—or at least the Pope's open condemnation of the Axis cause. . . . These efforts have failed."
- 1943, April The Madrid press publishes the text of oath for newly appointed Spanish bishops (according to the Vatican agreement of June 1941). The oath swears allegiance to Franco and his regime and promises to do nothing that might be against the interests of the present regime. The Spanish Papal Nuncio and Franco watch the ceremony which administers the new oath to some Spanish bishops.
- 1943, June Ramón Serrano Suñer visits the Vatican, is blessed by Pius XII, and receives from him the Grand Cross of the Order of Pius XI.
- 1943, August The Vatican radio broadcasts in favor of Badoglio and continuance of the war against the United Nations, stating on August 10: "The present government [Badoglio] has taken over the formidable heritage of war. . . . We all wish the end of this war, but no one would wish it concluded otherwise than with honor and justice. It is, therefore, necessary to persist in patient waiting, in constant, rigid discipline, and in wholehearted collaboration with those who bear the tremendous responsibility of the dual task of facing the present and of preparing a better future."

However the reader may appraise the weight, the importance, and the trend of these events and comments, it is fairly clear that the role of Catholicism in postwar Europe is not likely to be that of the leader in a great rebirth of spiritual values. The Roman Church has been playing the world's game quite as assiduously as German Protestantism. It is everywhere associated in the minds of men with practical politics. The lesson of the Spanish Civil War has not been lost upon

the minds of Europeans. This status of organized religion in modern Europe must be considered as, on the whole, an entry on the debit side of the ledger so far as the future is concerned. It appears hardly likely that any other of the older Churches of Germany, Austria, and Italy can refrain from an intense and often illiberal participation in power politics.

In America we may look for the mobilization of our own public opinion through Church channels. That happened once before, at the time of the Spanish Civil War, and it will happen again. American support for any position taken by clerical groups in Europe will undoubtedly prove valuable, and be schemed after with diligence. The prospect is not a heartening one.

Meantime, the record of their Churches will scarcely encourage Europeans as a whole to look to religion for a new basis for their lives. If a religious revival should occur, it will almost certainly do so outside the normal boundaries of the organized Churches, whether Catholic or Protestant. Europe today is as spiritually poverty-stricken as she is ravaged by war and schismatic with unresolved political and economic tensions.

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 "The gap between Prussia's regeneration and its position of pre-eminence in Europe is only a narrow one. What was looked upon in Europe as vagaries of the imagination only a few years ago already reveals itself as the realistic instrument of a power-craving usurper. Prussia's regeneration is completed. This

militaristic state, in Hitler's opinion, is the germ cell out of which, 'in the fire and thunder' of battles, a new Reich will arise, a Reich of 'greater power and glory.'"

Nothing can be added today to the foregoing analysis, written in 1935. Events have only too well confirmed its accuracy.

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